Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs
Volume:1 Issue: 3, fall 2010

There has been a marked volte face in Russia’s position toward the Islamic Republic. This was made clear when at a critical political juncture – namely the watershed agreement on fuel swapping between Brazil, Turkey and Iran – Russia expressed support for the US-led UNSC resolution to impose a fourth round of sanctions against Iran. This paper argues that Russia, a country that has traditionally shielded Iran and weighed down on the US from pressuring her, obstructed the initiative out of economic and geopolitical considerations. Prompted by the eternal quest to restore Russia’s former status as a great power, the Kremlin has had to re-evaluate its relationship with Tehran. Moscow in is in dire need of foreign investment, advanced technology, and even markets, which requires thawed relations with the US. Moscow is ostensibly dissatisfied with the NATO’s eastward encroachment and also needs the US to turn a blind eye to it geopolitical aspirations in the former Soviet space. These considerations require that Russia warm up to the West in general and the US in particular. Incidentally, Obama is offering Russia a carrot – a diplomatic reset – and Moscow is biting the bait. Today, it appears that Russia needs the US more and the Islamic Republic less. However, Russia’s about turn suggests that Moscow is conscious that if the nuclear impasse is resolved, Iran would be on its way to becoming a genuine regional power. Furthermore, the Iran-Turkey cooperation axis could also suggest diversification of energy supply routes, breaking Russia’s monopoly on gas. With geopolitical considerations and energy politics in the balance, the stakes are higher, explaining why Russia has acted in an increasingly unfriendly manner than Iranians seem to have expected.

The present article intends to explore discernible shift in Iran’s foreign policy toward Latin American countries in recent years. Iran’s relations with Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and more recently, Brazil, have grown warmer in recent years. The ever-increasing scale and scope of diplomatic ties and bilateral economic cooperation agreements between Iran and these Latin American states, most of whom pursue generally radical, anti-US policies, demonstrate the changing orientation in the Iranian policy as well as in the dynamics of the Latin American politics. The emergence of an Iranian president in 2005 with a populist outlook and pronounced anti-US/Anti-Western rhetoric has facilitated the closer ties between Iran and the leftist Latin American governments. This aspect of the Iranian policy has drawn both domestic criticism and outside opposition, particularly from the United States. Given this, a major question that could be raised is whether the new trend will be a long term feature of Iranian foreign policy or a temporary, transient one, especially taking into account the major role played by the personality of these countries’ leaders in their policymaking. A related question is whether these heads of states will be able to create the necessary institutions, processes, and coordination mechanisms to remain in place even after they leave office. The author looks at the recent developments in these politico-economic relations, and tries to examine the degree of long-term resilience of Tehran’s current involvement in Latin America. The main conclusion of the paper is that for as long as the Islamic Republic of Iran feels the need to look for countervailing force in its ongoing conflict with the US and the West, the current policies in seeking close political and economic ties with the anti-Western and radical Latin American states, as part of a larger coalition of like-minded developing countries, will continue.

This article analyzes President Barack Obama’s thematic use of “mutual respect” in his foreign policy and in his efforts to engage the Islamic Republic of Iran. President Obama began his presidency by proclaiming that America seeks “a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, the President spoke of constructive diplomacy, a process “not advanced by threats,” but an “engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect. «As will be shown, the ideal of “mutual respect” resonates authentically with Obama’s personal background and worldview. The President believes that mutual respect matters, that it positively enhances American policies toward friends and adversaries alike. “Mutual respect” also strikes a responsive chord inside Iran because it embodies a time-honored value embedded deep in Iran''s diplomatic culture, transcending personalities, governments, and factions. Yet Obama’s mutual respect message has not been heard clearly in Iran, in part because of contradictions emanating from simultaneous expressions of pressures, sanctions, and time limits, words perceived in Iran as threatening and disrespectful. Despite such serious problems, this essay contends that “mutual respect” still matters, that it provides a constructive rail for bridging present chasms between America and Iran, a necessary pre-requisite to overcome counterproductive habits of “mutual disrespect.”

This article investigates the main roots of tension between Iran and the United States in the post-9/11 Middle East. Since 9/11 and especially after the 2003 Iraqi crisis, Iran’s role has sharply risen in the region. The evolution of Iran’s role and power in the regional system has led Iran to seek a bigger weight and role more in tune with its acquired stature and capabilities. The conflict between Iran and the United States has been generally attributed to either a political-ideological clash and mutual hatred, or to a simple aggregation of a number of distinct policy disputes including: Iran''s nuclear program, Iran''s state support for organizations that Washington regards as terrorist groups, human rights issues, and Iranian involvement in the new Iraq, the Levant, and Afghanistan. While accepting these explanations, the author takes a step further and argues that the conflict, especially since 2003, has been essentially focused on a dispute over the growth of the two sides'' role in Middle Eastern politics which both regard against each other''s national interests and security. The author concludes that complex and interdependent nature of regional security necessitates, on the one hand, Iran’s cooperation in the wake of the end of the U.S. combat role in Iraq in Summer 2010, and on the other, that the United States recognize and respect Iran’s legitimate security concerns and accept the evolution of Iran’s role in the region.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, held in New York, 3-28 May 2010, was of particular importance to the US, especially in view of its serious concerns for nuclear proliferation. In this context, the US perceived violation of the NPT by Iran’s nuclear activities was among its major concerns. For the US, the review conference provided a unique opportunity and occasion to draw international attention to the US non-proliferation concerns in general, and work towards further containment of Iran’s nuclear program in particular. To this end, the US Administration under Barack Obama has pursued an overall “containment” strategy, aiming at the twin, inter-related objectives of rehabilitation of the tarnished US image and credibility and effective exercise of the US leadership towards non-proliferation and strengthening of NPT. The present article undertakes to look into how Barack Obama and his Administration have fared in this regard since he took office in early 2009. The article explores, in particular, Obama’s campaign platform of change in foreign policy, and how his “defensive neo-realism” outlook differs from the “offensive neo-realism” of the George W. Bush era. While looking in relative detail into the US wide-ranging, extensive “containment” strategy towards the Iranian nuclear program, comprising both of measures and policies at bilateral and multilateral levels, the article concludes on a positive note. The engaging, proactive approach and conduct of both countries at the 2010 review conference – allowing the meeting to produce a consensus final outcome – could point to a possible more engaging, and mutually-beneficial, multilateral work and even cooperation in the future in the nuclear field

Iran’s decision to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) is now 14 years old, among the longest cases in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO history. Given the fact that negotiations have not yet started, it may be the longest accession process when Iran finally joins the Organization. This paper attempts to shed some light on the procedural and substantive aspects of the case. A brief account of the WTO accession procedures and a quick glance on the history of the Iran’s application provides solid background for the more analytical parts of the paper. It will be shown how unnecessary application of “consensus rule” to the purely procedural stage of accession (establishment of the working party) cost Iran 9 years. Iran could have become full member during the same period in a less demanding negotiating context. The paper will also look briefly into the political environment surrounding Iran’s application for membership. The paper also presents a critical outlook on the negotiations for accession and the accession outcomes. It criticizes WTO-plus commitments/WTO-minus rights paradigm which now prevails over the accession negotiations and argues that this paradigm contradicts the contractual nature of the WTO Agreement. It emphasizes that an acceding country should have a clear picture about rights and obligations of the membership. That should be the WTO Agreement as it is. The balance of rights and obligations (terms of contract) should not be changed in the course of negotiations. This paper also intends to serve as a basis for further research and discussion over an important and challenging area of Iran’s trade and foreign policy.

The Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in October 2005 and, by July 2010, 112 States plus the European Community had become Parties to this Convention. This is a relatively healthy number but, at approximately half of the Member States of the Organisation, reflects that there remains a degree of uncertainty among States as to the potential national and international policy and legal impact on Parties. Thus far, Iran has chosen not to ratify this Convention and there continues to be a national debate on this question with a wide range of views expressed. One important aim of this article, then, is to consider and address these concerns through examining both the international (Cultural) policy context of the Convention’s negotiation and the rights it grants to and the duties it places on Parties. The 2005 Convention shares an ancestry with the 2003 Convention on the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage in that both of them reflect different aspects of the 2001 Declaration on Cultural Diversity. Understanding this fact can provide some guidance as to the orientation and purpose of this treaty in that it addresses the rights of States and their international duty to preserve the aspect of cultural diversity that relates to the cultural marketplace. At the same time, it is by no means a ‘pure’ human rights text in its character or its intention as this article will show. After having examined the history of the text’s development and adoption and the wider legal and political contexts within which this took place, the article will then consider the direct implications for Iran of ratification of this important international Convention.

Amb. M. Javad Zarif (PhD)**, Amb. S. M. Kazem Sajjadpour (PhD)***, Multilateral Diplomacy: Theory and Practice of Regional and International Organizations (2009), School of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran (in Persian), 3 Volumes, vi + 720 pages (Vol. I & II), Annexes to p. 971, English-Persian Glossary to p. 1022, Selected Bibliography (Persian and English) to p. 1041 (Vol. III).

Persian Gulf: Atlas of Old & Historical Maps (3000 BC- 2000 AD), 2005, compiled by the Editorial Board (Mohammd Reza Sahab, Reza Nazarahari, et al), Center for Documents and Diplomatic History, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, Sobh-e Sadegh Publishing House, XXIV + 576 pages, Index to p. 580, Bibliography to p. 584.