نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 61 (پاییز 1389)

What is the secret behind the evidence of the first form of syllogism? Aristotle believes that the first form is complete while the others are not. Therefore, he demonstrates them by means of the first form. He also clarifies the syllogisms of the first forms through explaining the concept of “being predicated on all” and “being predicated on none”. Aristotle’s syllogism is not as formal as that of Ibn Sina (we infer this from their views of subjects such as categories, example of refutation, and the fourth form). Accordingly, when explaining the first form of syllogism, the First Teacher resorts to the predicative context of “each A is related to each B”, but Ibn Sina resorts to the copulative context of “each A is A”. In a copulative context, the first form is considered to be evident and the equity syllogism must be referred back to it. However, in a predicative context, it becomes clear that the first form, like the equity principle, depends on the transition of relation and does not need one to refer to another.

Based on a quotation from Henry Corbin about Suhrawardi’s philosophy, the writer of this paper argues that the issues related to the intermediate world are found in philosophies that believe in a kind of oneness among all levels of being. Accordingly, if we fail to observe such a typical unity between the worlds of light and darkness in the philosophy of, for example, Suhrawardi, even if, in a way, we consider him to be the founder or reviver of the issues related to the intermediate world, we will never be allowed to place the intermediate world at the basis of his ontological system. This indicates that in his philosophy a kind of duality remains in the realm of being. The role of the intermediate world is not simply to add a world to other worlds. Rather, it is to unite the other two worlds so tightly with each other that the lower world attains the principles and attributes of the higher world as much as possible, and, in this way, a kind of unity is established. Of course, we must pay attention that such a role is necessitated by the intermediary nature of this world.Accordingly, available evidence in Suhrawardi’s philosophy indicates that Henry Corbin’s interpretation of Suhrawardi’s philosophy as a school based on the intermediate world, or, in his own words, based on imagination, which has created a revolution in philosophical methodology and is between ‘yes’ and ‘no’, will be correct only if propounding this world causes the penetration and inclusion of the reality of the higher world into the innermost of the essence of the lower world. However, the duality of the worlds of light and darkness does not allow the portrayal of such a picture from Suhrawardi’s ontology. In line with this discussion, the writer, after a brief reference to the ontologies of Ibn Arabi, Dawani, and Mulla Sadra, will deal with the assumption of the realization of the intermediate world in each of them as an objection to the oneness of being in Islamic philosophy. Nevertheless, it is presupposed that, according to Mulla Sadra himself, there is no difference between his gradational unity and Ibn Arabi’s partial unity.

Ibn Arabi and Rumi were two well-known gnostics and poets who both lived in the 7th century, one from the West and the other from the East of the world of Islam. The significance of Ibn Arabi’s works lies in his developing the system of Islamic theoretical gnosis and theorizing in this field. The effects of his teachings and thoughts have still remained with us until now. However, Rumi’s significance lies in his expressing a number of profound gnostic concepts mainly in the mould of poetry in Persian. His Mathnawi is his masterpiece and the most important gnostic work in the field of Persian literature.Both of these two prominent gnostics dealt with the fundamental issues in the gnostic worldview including “gnostic anthropology”. The essence of Ibn Arabi’s gnostic anthropology is the discussion of the “perfect man”. He coined this term himself and used it in his important works such as in Futuhat al-makkiyyah and in the first chapter of his Fusus al-hikam. After him, Sadr al-Din Qunawi, Ibn Arabi’s student, disciple, and step-son, explained it in detail in his Mafatih al-ghayb. Rumi has also spoken of gnostic anthropology – without using the term “perfect man” – in his works, particularly in Mathnawi.In this paper, through a study of the most important works of Ibn Arabi, particularly Futuhat al-makkiyyah and Fusus al-hikam, and Rumi’s Mathnawi, the writer has tried to compare their ideas concerning the issue of the “perfect man”. He has also tried to examine their similar views and the possibility of Rumi’s having been influenced by Ibn Arabi.

The relationship between knowledge and ethics is one of the important issues that has always been discussed in epistemology. The effect of self-purity on the quality of knowledge acquisition is also one of the interesting and fundamental subjects in this regard. In this research, after a general study of the views of Muslim philosophers concerning knowledge and the quality of attaining perception, it becomes clear that the truth of knowledge is ontological in nature and is emanated from the world above to man’s heart (soul). A study of Mulla Sadra’s works reveals that perception is attained at three sense, imaginal, and rational stages through unity with imaginal forms and the immaterial intellect. In doing so, some obstacles such as the love of worldly affairs and soulish desires block the necessary potential for attaining true knowledge. Finally, the writer introduces the purification of the soul as the most important factor in attaining certainty.

This paper seeks to revise the Avicennan argument with an analytical view. On this basis, first a specific division concerning the theory of the Avicennan argument is presented based on its inclusion of doctrine, method and skill. Then focusing only on the doctrine part its contents and claims are studied by dividing it into the two conceptual (or logical) and objective (or epistemological) parts.In this paper an attempt is made to discuss the main characteristics and the key points concerning the doctrine of argument.

of the present research is the concept-referent relation in Mulla Sadra’s system of philosophy. It also aims to demonstrate the hypothesis of the correspondence of the different types of imaginative concepts and referents. Moreover, based on the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy as well as the principle of the correspondence of the worlds and the quiddative unity of realities, this research proves the conformity between imaginative concepts and their referents.Concerning particular quiddative concepts, the representatives of natural forms in the soul are justified through the actualization of perceptive forms. However, when it comes to universal quiddative concepts, the conformity between the concepts and the referent is justified through: 1) the unity of the soul with the active intellect, 2) the observation of intellectual forms, and 3) the natural universal and individuals. Secondary logical intelligibles, which are among the accidents of primary intelligibles, have a corresponding relation to mental referents (primary and secondary logical intelligibles). In addition, philosophical secondary intelligibles, except those concepts lacking in an actualized mental and external nature, have external referents. Mulla Sadra’s proof in this regard is that in the receptacle of each relation there are two sides. Therefore, a philosophical secondary intelligible bears an unveiling relation to its external object and corresponds to it.

The cosmological argument is one of the arguments on the demonstration of God’s existence which has attracted the attention of philosophers since the time of Plato. In this paper, the writer has presented ‘Allamah Tabataba’i’s interpretations of the arguments on the demonstration of God, particularly the argument of cause and effect and the argument of motion and the mover. Later, he has compared Tabataba’i’s ideas in this regard with those of Suhrawardi.In order to accomplish this task, the writer has referred to the arguments that Suhrawardi has presented concerning this topic in his books. Then, following a comparative approach, he has explained the interpretations and ideas of ‘Allamah and Suhrawardi concerning the cosmological arguments and pinpointed the former’s adaptations of the ideas of the latter and discussed ‘Allamah’s related innovations in comparison to those of Suhrawardi. It is worthy of attention that most of ‘Allamah’s arguments are more convincing and stronger than Suhrawardi’s.