نشریه جاویدان خرد
سال ششم شماره 1 (پیاپی 10، بهار 1388)

The most important subject in the two fundamental extant works of Imam Muĕammad al-Ghazålì, that is The Alchemy of Happiness and The Revival of the Religious Sciences, is ethics (akhlåq). In those topics in which there is a disagreement between Divine Law (shar') and reason ('aql), Ghazålì takes the side of Divine Law. At the same time, he considers ethical virtues (maĕåsin-i akhlåqì) and the cultivation of ethics/virtues (tahdhìb-i akhlåq) to be acquired and to be a matter for education, believing ethics (akhlåq) to be changeable. In this article the author intends, firstly, to clarify the place of ethics in Ghazålì 's classification of the sciences; and, secondly, to show how, in the thought of Ghazålì, the principles of ethics and Divine Law conform with one another, whilst at the same time the cultivation of ethics/virtues on the basis of mysticism is the most fundamental and complete basis of ethics (akhlåq).

One of the most basic concerns of al-Ghazålì, which is observable in his shift toward taģawwuf (Sufism) is tawìl (esoteric commentary) and its methods. Although he rejected certain sects, such as the Båtinìs and Ismå'ìlìs, and criticized their approaches to interpreting the Quran, it is clear from his own rules of interpretation that he was in fact under influence of these sects, an influence which played a major role in Islamic intellectual history up until the time of Mulla Sadra (d. 1640 A.D.). This paper discusses the rules of tawìl and its divisions according to al-Ghazålì.

At the end of his magnum opus, Hikmat al-ishrâq, Suhrawardî, the founder of the Illuminationist school of Islamic philosophy, has alluded to the seven paths in which, upon reaching the seventh path, the sâlik (spiritual wayfarer) reaches an extraordinary joy. The traditional exegetes of Hikmat al-ishrâq have interpreted these seven paths as the five external senses plus the faculties of imagination and reason. However, this article is shows that it is more appropriate to understand the seven paths as symbolising the seven stages of gnosis, in a way similar to that which has been described from the famous Sufi writer, Abû Tâlib al-Makkî.

Physical resurrection is among the principles of Islamic belief to which God has referred explicitly in the Holy Quran. Until the 10th century A.H., Islamic scholars appealed to revelation as the only way to verify this doctrine. However, in the 11th century, Sadr al-Mutaallihìn Shìrazì (d. 1050 A.H. [lunar]) added a philosophical proof for the verification of the idea. His theory was criticized by philosophers following him, including the late Åqå Alì Mudarris Zanĩzi Tihrånì (d. 1307 A.H. [lunar].). Having criticized Sadr al-Mutaallihìn's ideas, he presented his own innovative theory in this regard, which was later approved by some of the outstanding Islamic philosophers following him, including the late Ayatollah Mìrzå Abĩ'l-Hasan Rafì'ì Qazwìnì (d. 1395 A. H. [lunar]). According to Åqå Alì Mudarris, in contrast to the belief of religious lay-people, the physical resurrection is not a return of the soul after its departure to the same material, worldly body, preserving its worldly status, because this is logically impossible; rather the physical resurrection is an ascent of the body toward the departed soul as a result of substantial motion (harakat-i jawhariyyah) and the qualitative ascent of its essence.In this article, by employing the late Åqå Alì Mudarris's words, we have tried to clarify Ayatollah Rafì'ì's theory regarding physical resurrection.

This article begins with a brief presentation of Henry Corbin's important book, En Islam Iranien. We then deal with Corbin's views on the relation of Islam and Iran, considering his belief that the spiritual world of Iran, before and after the advent of Islam, has constituted a whole. On the grounds of the analyses of this section of the article, we conclude that instead of translating the French title into Persian literally, as Andar Islåm-i Ìrånì (i.e. On Iranian Islam), it should be translated as Islåm dar Sarzamìn-i Ìrån (i.e. Islam in the Iranian world).

One of the issues discussed in Shi‘ite jurisprudence in a comparative way is the question of “misdirection and approval” (takhĥa’ah wa taģwìb). On this point, Imamite Shi‘ite jurists held discussions with followers of Sunni schools, and each have taken positions that have become characteristic for both sides. The Ash‘arites and a small number of the Mu‘tazilites held that God has no verdict in this sensible world, but that God’s verdict is identical with the opinio communis reached by the authoritative experts. Hence, the experts in Islamic jurisprudence (the Mujtahids) never fail. This theory is labeled the “theory of approval” (taģwìb), and its followers are called “the approvers” (muģawwibah). The followers of the contrary theory are called “the fallibilists” (mukhaĥĥi’ah), i.e. the theory hat holds that God does have verdicts in the real world and that the jurists might or might not find them, so that in the latter case they are indeed fallible. Al-Ghazålì, one of the outstanding patrons of the Ash‘arite school, is a stout defender of the “approval” theory. Apparently, this quarrel does not go back to the early centuries of the canonization of Islamic jurisprudence. It rather seems to have resulted from discussions that gained momentum in the circles of theologians, i.e. kalåm theorists. Generally, the issue has more of a theological character rather than belonging to judicial discussions. In this regards, this paper discusses questions such as: What was the initial claim? What are the roots of the quarrel? And finally, what was actually troubling the mind of those who pursued the question?

Here I present a critical edition of one of Ibn Sina`s short treatises containing subtle points in logic. So far only half of it, which is not devoid of errors, has been published in the margins of Mulla Sadra`s commentary on the book: al-Ĕidåya al-Athìriyya, in the lithographic edition. My critical edition is based on three manuscripts from the libraries of Istanbul and a manuscript from the Senate House of Iran library (Majles-e-Sena), in addition to the above mentioned incomplete lithographic edition. Some of the features of this treatise in contrast to IbnSina`s other logical writings are: the priority given to 'assertion' (taģdìq) over 'conception' (taģawwur); a brief but comprehensive classification of the four human faculties; a different definition for 'proposition'; and the classification of propositions into 'predicative', 'connective' and 'disjunctive', without mentioning the conditional. Furthermore, it should be noted that in this treatise singular propositions are confined to predicative ones.