نشریه فقه اهل بیت
پیاپی 62 (تابستان 1389)

The author discusses the condition of ration in paying alms for the property in four aspects. First he examines the necessity of ration in paying alms; he mainly refers to certain narrations, checking their reasoning and sources and proving inappropriateness of their minor reasoning on the subject. Second, discussing the alms of grains and cattlebelonging to a crazy person, he criticizes the opinion of later jurisprudents, and highlights and completes the idea of known former jurisprudents, who support paying alms for grains and cattle of a crazy person according to the basis of religion.Next, he suggests certain reasons to prove paying alms for the merchandise of a crazy person, being recommendatory or obligatory, and insists on the similarity between the merchandise of the crazy and other persons. Finally, the author brings four opinions, rejecting the first three and proving the other one. He signifies that the alms should be paid if the owner of merchandise is not crazy at the time when he is obliged to pay,not during one year. He then concludes and explains effects of each one of the four opinions.

The author categorizes divorce to immediately implemented and suspended divorce. He examines suspended divorce in two kinds: simply suspended and suspended by a word of swear. One the one hand, he suggests five Shiite-supported reasons of invalidation for suspended divorce, and on the other hand discusses three reasons to defend this kindof divorce.In the next part of essay, swearing to divorce the spouse is illustrated,and then refers to the proofs that agree and disagree with suspended divorce. Finally, he reviews the proofs which examine the correctness of this kind of divorce.

The paper analyzes the relation between the contract and condition, presenting five jurisprudential opinions and studying their reasons and effects. First, the contract is like a receptacle to the condition; second, the condition is the outer or visible parts of the two sides; third, the condition is only the outer or visible parts of the two sides; fourth, the condition is the dependent part in a mutual consent; and fifth, the condition is themotivation in a mutual consent. The author elaborates each opinion and criticizes their reasons and effects. Rejecting four opinions, he proves the fifth one.

The author starts with the answer to the question whether brain death can be actually defined as death or not. The death issue is central in many of jurisprudential topics as inheritance, waiting term after divorce, retaliation, discharge of a representation contract, and permission of marriage to the widow of the brain dead deceased, and hence one withbrain death is potentially subject to above topics and their related rules. Today donating organs of the brain dead ones, even the major organs as heart and liver, is common in our hospitals, according to the brain death act ratified by Islamic Council Parliament. Yet, most of jurisprudents, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, do notpermit to cut off the organs of the brain dead person, and some call it an act of murder which would call for retaliation. Furthermore, the guardian Council, being in charge of serving Islamic law in ratification of acts, rejected this act three times.Although it appears to be a new modern subject, some of its lines can be traced back in the works of past scholars. The author notes that the subject is a typically new one, which can be recognized by certain scholars, and he examines views.

Liability for renunciation of a legal act in a contract has been less discussed in Iranian civic rights; yet it is a controversial subject for jurisprudents, and subsequently for the jurists. Three opinions can be considered when a legal act in a contract is supposed to be renounced - due to a condition - but is not whatsoever. First, while the conditioned legal act is considered to be lawful, the party being conditioned to do or not do still keeps the right to renounce it. Second, if the legal act is in contradiction to the condition ofrenouncing the conditioned one, thus it would be unlawful. And third, if the legal act is against the condition, it would be irrelevant. The authors try to examine various proofs brought by jurisprudents and the jurists and they decide the second of the above opinions seems to be more defensible.