فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
پیاپی 4 (بهار 1390)

The comparison of two philosophical schools, particularly if one belongs to ancient times, can be done in two ways. The first requires historical studies and demonstrating the interactions between the two cultures based on historical proofs, and the second demands a study of the various features of each philosophy and the similarities between them. Here, the semantic analysis of the technical terms and expressions used in each school of philosophy and examining their shared and different points are of prime importance. The present paper is devoted to a comparative discussion of philosophical thought in ancient Iran and ancient Greek following a philological method. This paper emphasizes not only the similarities of the two systems but also their differences. A study of the theories of these two schools of philosophy in the fields of theology and cosmology and their approaches to history and the intellect indicates their similarity and reveals their common roots. The writer demonstrates the above claim by presenting some examples.

In Kant’s philosophy, sense data stand at a very short distance from plurality when entering the faculty of understanding; however, they are not completely ready yet for the application and use of apriori forms of understanding. Since these forms perform an act similar to conceptualization, an intermediary is in fact needed to provide these sense data for the application of apriori forms. Kant believes that this intermediary is nothing but the faculty of imagination. The task of this faculty is what he technically calls “schamatism”. In fact, the faculty of imagination tries to create a kind of unity and connection between the faculty of sensation and the faculty of understanding which bear no similarity to each other. According to Heidegger, the relation between the cooperation of the faculties of sensation and understanding or, in other words, time and categories to its components is completely aposteriori rather than apriori. In man’s opposition to his relation, what enjoys precedence is non-being, which means that, in Heidegger’s view, the most principal ontological question is: why are things in existence instead of being non-existent? Schematism is principally for human beings and does not belong to an external object. This denotes that any knowledge of existents requires a kind of pre-knowledge. In Heidegger’s view, imagination is the main faculty of knowledge, and sensation and understanding are also rooted in imagination. Moreover, imagination is also related to time, and that is why it is the root and origin of metaphysics. In other words, both the theoretical reason and practical reason are rooted in imagination. Consequently, we can say that Heidegger generally tries to promote the level of Kant’s epistemological discussions to the level of ontology. Heidegger believes that the transcendental idea refers to a position that determines the prerequisites of the possibility of knowledge. He maintains that concepts are pure ontological manifestations and not merely some mental phenomena.

A glance at the history of philosophical thought in Islam from a practical point of view reveals that some Muslim philosophers, in addition to benefitting from new findings in the field of philosophy in relation to the common needs of their time, were also experts in various sciences such as education, politics and statesmanship, ethics and religious or formal training, and military and defense affairs and wrote some books in this regard. Some of them also held some positions in the above fields. However, there were several Muslim philosophers who mainly had some theoretical innovations and were not involved in practical affairs but, with the expansion of methodological discussions, some practical ideas can be inferred from their thoughts. This problem rarely existed at the beginning of the history of Islamic philosophy; however, in the course of time and, particularly, some years after the Mongols’ attack it became more widespread. What was the real problem? Was it, as some claim, the nature of Islamic philosophy that led to this state or there were some other problems? Given today’s conditions and the necessity of benefitting from national and Islamic sciences in devising the curricula for human sciences in our country, the necessity of dealing with this problem becomes even more prominent. Posing this issue is, on the one hand, because of the needs and problems of today’s society and, on the other, because of the necessity of incorporating the invaluable efforts of these thinkers and philosophers which have been ignored until now.The results of the investigations indicate that the inference of practical judgment from theoretical ideas are followed by some obstacles and problems which are discussed in this paper. These problems can be divided into three groups: some of them are related to the capabilities of philosophers and scholars; some are related to the nature of their thoughts and philosophy in terms of methodology, and some others originate in the hardships involved in moving from theory to practice. The present paper intends to study each of these problems based on an analytic-historical approach.

In this paper, the writer has tried to provide an answer to the fundamental question of the whys and hows of some kalami problems that are particularly of a religious form and nature (specifically, the problems related to the body and its principles and states as well as those related to substance and accident). Responding to such problems requires an inquiry into the thoughts of the philosophers and mutikallimun (theologians) in the historical context reflected in this paper. Emphasizing the exchange of ideas in the fields of philosophy and kalam, the interactions between them, and the quality of the spread of the related thoughts in other fields are among the consequences discussed here. The writer explains that the necessity of demonstrating the Maker of the world has led mutikallimun to discuss the body and its states and principles. In this way, philosophical discussions have become more widespread in kalam, and the way has been paved for some theologian-philosophers such as Tusi to grant a more philosophical nature to kalam.

In John’s Gaspel, Jesus heralds the coming of someone called Peraclete or Paraclete. Peraclete means “praised” and has been used in ancient texts.Paraclete in the sense accepted by the Church means “consolation” or the “Holy Spirit”.Through a study of the Gnostic theory of Theophany, the quality of the manifestation of divine names and attributes in the various levels of being, the perfect man’s being the manifestation of the supreme name of God, its manifestation in the existence of the Holy Prophet (s) and Infallible Imams (a) and its continuity with the presence of God’s remainder (Imam Mahdi (a)), aims to demonstrate that what Jesus heralds in John’s Gospel is the same Muhammedan truth, which existed in all the prophets and reached its perfect manifestation in the Holy Prophet (s) and the Infallible Imams (a).In line with this goal, the writer of this paper first explains the first theophany and manifestation of Muhammedan truth, whose other names are the “first intellect” and the “Holy Spirit”. Then she refers to the second theophany as a result of which all the existents that are present in the divine Knowledge in the first theophany appear in the outside world, and the Muhammedan truth, which appears as the perfect man in the clothes of prophet hood, messenger ship, and leadership (Imamat) and is the guardian of all the worlds of being, is the same consoling entity, the Holy Spirit or the praised whose coming and staying Jesus has heralded. Hence, in spite of the conceptual differences between the two words of Peraclete and Paraclete, there is no difference between them in terms of their referents. The referent of both is one truth which is the Muhammedan truth.

Different reasons have been presented concerning Ghazzali’s opposition to philosophy or philosophers by both Ghazzali and his advocates and his opponents. Ghazzali and his followers pretend that he opposed and, ultimately, excommunicated philosophers merely for religious reasons and for the sake of God. Although some of his opponents also agree with this position, not all of them follow the same trend, and some believe that, firstly, religion is not inconsistent with philosophy in its common sense among Muslims so that Ghazzali excommunicates philosophers in order to protect religion. Secondly, this was not his only reason for opposing philosophy. Rather, as some of his more moderate opponents believed, political reasons also played a role in this regard, and some of them have even considered resorting to religious, logical, and rational reasons to be a means for attaining power and political victories. In addition to the above, many of Ghazzali’s opponents, because of considering his oppositions to be irrelevant to religion, logic, and the intellect, have also referred to psychological motifs and maintained that if he had studied philosophy under a master, he might not have chosen the path of opposition.The present paper intends to demonstrate that, although religious and Shar’i motives have priority here, on the basis of the principles accepted by Ghazzali himself, there were some ways other than excommunication to oppose philosophers that he did not follow!

The question of the possibility of ontology is in fact a question of the possibility of attaining the ontological nature of existents. We can pose the question as follows: Can human beings develop an approach on the basis of which the existence of things themselves unfold to them? As a result of a subjective interpretation of the relationship between the human being and existents of the world in western philosophy, this question turned into such a challenging question to the extent that Kant considered the Knowledge of the existence of things to be impossible and introduced the human knowledge as phenomenological one. Heidegger has put this question forward in his philosophy quite seriously and maintains that any response to it is rooted in the understanding of the relationship between man, the world, and the reality of being as the basis of the appearance of existents. He calls such study “fundamental ontology”. The term fundamental ontology was first introduced by Heidegger in his book “being and time” as a research on the possibility of any Kind of ontology. The basic question in fundamental.Ontology is, irrespective of its various meanings, is attaining the knowledge of existence essentially possible? In order to respond to this question, he proceeded to analyzed the ontological structure of the human being and his relationship with the world and existence.On the basis of Mulla Sadra’s philosophical principles, we can develop a new approach in order to answer the question of whether ontology is a possible science or not. In other words, is it possible for human beings to develop an understanding of the ontological nature of existents and, more importantly, the reality of existence as the basis of existents? In Mulla Sadra’s view, the human Knowledge has also a basis the root of which should be sought not in the human being as a limited being but in one’s ontological relationship with unlimited existence. In other words, as unlimited existence of the interior and basis of existent is limited, man’s knowledge of the unlimited. And the absolute is based on the knowledge of limited existents. He believes that all human beings possess a kind of apriority understanding of the existence of Almighty truth as the interior and basis of all existents. However, this understanding is of an intrinsic and genetic type rather than a conceptual and theoretical one. It is the basis of our whole knowledge of limited existents and, in fact, the basis of human transcendence. Nevertheless, most people are ignorant of such an intrinsic understanding and, thus, Mulla Sadra Calls it “simple understanding”. Therefore, the root of any kind of ontology and our knowledge of the ontological nature of existents is hidden in this apriority understanding of unlimited existence. It is an understanding the explanation and interpretation of which in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is only possible in the light of his interpretation of the cause-effect relation.

Hermes, who is known as Akhnun and Idris in religious texts and as Tat and Hushang in Mythology, was one of the early prophets and, according to some, the founder of many sciences and wisdom. The character, works, and thoughts of Hermes were discussed not only in religions texts but also in historical, mythical, and philosophical ones. They also affected many nations, individuals, and thoughts. Hence, he can be considered as a focal point in comparing religion, mythology, and philosophy and then explore the rise of each of these fields and the interactions among them. Therefore, this paper first deals with Hermes in religious texts and refers to the similarities between Idris and Akhnun. Then it studies Hermes, Hushang, and Tat in the myths of Greece, Iran, and Egypt and explains their similar identities, roles, and times, finally, by resorting to Hermetic and philosophical texts. It refers to schools of philosophy which not only discuss the origin of human thought but whose language is also similar to that of religion and mythology.