فصلنامه روش شناسی علوم انسانی
پیاپی 64-65 (پاییز و زمستان 1389)

This article studies the possibility of the establishment of the economical science ina society, such as Iran. In order to achieve this purpose, conditions should beanalyzed that should generally exist as a basis for the establishment of economicalscience as a social science.Thus, we first review Hayek’s criticism of neoclassic economy and socialistschematization to show that the possibility or lack of possibility of economicalscience is rooted in a problem called the main problem of economical science.Solving this problem is based on solving the paradox of institutionalism. In order tosolve this paradox, we review Sarel’s criticism of institutionalism to realize thedifference of constitutive and regulative rules. The next step is analyzing the issue ofcriteria in following a rule with the aim of the Wittgenstein philosophy.Finally, it is depicted that solving the main problem of the economical science followedby the possibility of the foundation of economical science is based on a language throughwhich institutional order can be shown as the economical reality. In order to achieve this,changing the method from positivism to transcendental is inevitable.

Doubtlessly, the economical polices are derived from the economical science, suchthat it can be claimed that economical science is a specifically prescriptive science.This reality does not imply that economy is intrinsically unscientific. It also does notmean that economical theories are intrinsically about personal opinions with anideologic nature.Thus, in the literature of the standard economical science the stress is on thedifference of positivist economy and normative economy. But, the nature of therelationship of these two concepts is less discussed.In this article, it is attempted to explain the root of the difference of these twoconcepts and also the state of their logical relation. With respect of the kind ofrelation between these two concepts, the origin of theorizing in Islamic economicscience can be defined.

In the last two decades, many thinkers have presented their views in agreement ordisagreement with the religious science. However, in most cases, theepistemological foundations and suppositions have not been clearly outlined.This research explores both views about religious science and attempts to derive andanalyze their epistemological foundations. At the first deduction, we reached eightepistemological bases, four of which are presented in this research work. The restwill be presented in another paper.The first four bases are:1. Objectivism or Subjectivism2. The influence or lack of the influence of values on knowledge (value-freeness orvalue-freelessness).3. Influence or lack of the influence of the metaphysical premises on knowledge,4. Consideration of knowledge as pure knowledge or as an action.

After the Islamic revolution in Iran, a dramatic change in the nature of thedevelopment program was expected; but this was not accomplished. Variousanalyses have been proposed in this regard, judging which is impossible without adeep understanding of the development program. Despite the extensive impact of thedevelopment program in cultural and societal fields, little philosophical and ethicalstudies have been performed in this regard.In this article, after a review of the background of the development program, it isshown that the development program, based on the different proposed definitions oftechnology, has a technologic nature and can be treated as a technology ofphilosophical and ethical study. A study of the nature of the development program,in Heidegger's view, is presented in this article that includes indentifying themetaphysical inputs and outputs, manifestation of value orientation of developmentprogram, attention to ethical considerations in programming and implementation ofdevelopment program. Finally, the question is raised that what should be thereaction to the development program? The analyses of this article set the ground forthe answer of the following question: Why has the Islamic-Iranian model ofdevelopment program not been developed in Iran?

This paper provides an explanation of the quality of a good theory and theorizingprocess as one of the most serious activities of mind. This paper has been written intwo sections. The first section focused on the quality of good theory and model. In thissection, the criteria of a good theory are classified into three categories: philosophical,methodological and practical. In the second section, we review the existing models of"link between theory and practice" (shaping a good theory), and then we propose amodel for scholars and practitioners for sense-making linkage between theory andpractice. This model emphasizes on the collaboration between action-orientedpractitioners and science-oriented scholars in order to develop a good theory. It isbelieved that prescriptive theories of practitioners must be combined with descriptiveand normative theories of scholars to develop a sound theory.

The purpose of this research is to study the necessity of conceptualization inpsychological research works and present various approaches towardmethodological concepts in the view of Islamic psychology.The question at hand is that: Does a consensus exist on methodological conceptssuch as “scientific method,” “half-scientific,” “non-scientific,” “observation,”“introversion,” “measurement” and such, or not? The views of some psychologicalphilosophers, specially Bunge, philosopher of psychology in Mc Gill University inCanada, and other Islamic philosophers were retrieved and studied by rational andtheoretical analysis methods.The research findings include the following: lack of consensus on conceptions suchas scientific method, half-scientific, etc.; the definite necessity of performingexperiments; the necessity of having experience but its insufficiency; lack ofgeneralizability of animal study findings to the people.

Theories that explain social phenomena can be categorized based on their stress onagent or structure as: agent-oriented theories, structure-oriented theories, orborderline theories that attempt to find a third way. Voluntarists (including rationalchoice theorists) stress on the role of the agent. On the other hand, structuralists andpost-structuralists stress on the role of the structure. However, the structuration andcritical realism theories try to find equilibrium of the past two views.The weak point of voluntarism is the reduction of complex issues to the role ofpeople in the society and history. The discourse theories well depict how the subjectturns into object in the heart of the discourse. On the other hand, the weak point ofstructuralism is ignoring the role of people. Instead, the borderline theories (thirdcategory) do not suffer from the limitations of the other mentioned theories andoverall seem more defendable.

It appears that it was only Poincare who pointed out the role of convention inconstitution of the foundation of science, in the contemporary era. He remarked thatthe axioms and theorems laid down as the foundations of sciences neither representa priori truths, nor empirical ones, but rather they are rooted in the conventions.Following his trace, philosophy giants of the century like Schlick, Carnap and Quineask about taking conventions as constituents of the basis of the sciences. This makesthese empirical sciences correspond to the external world state of affairs and claimobjectivity. Thus, after these thinkers, the leading question of this paper would be:what is the influence of conventions on our explanation of the connection betweenscientific theories and the reality.

In new era, as result of the empirical science, the discussion of method in philosophyhas an important position.The thinkers either apply the mathematical method, or the geometrical method, orthe common methods used in empirical sciences to philosophy. Wolfson, thehistorian of the history of philosophy, uses the hypothetic-deductive method instudying philosophical and theological texts. Wolfson first sets a hypothesis andthen tries to supply evidences in support of this hypothesis. Thus, he tries to connectunrelated views and schools in order to recognize new philosophical systems.

Davidson, inspired by some famous philosophers, such as Frege, Tarski and Quine,poses a kind of theory of meaning which includes the theory of truth, in style ofTarski’s theory. This theory has two sides; formal and empirical. Therefore,applying this theory for interpreting speakers’ linguistic behaviors and utterancesdepends on satisfying some formal and empirical restrictions. Formal restrictions aretaken from Tarski’s works on formal adequacy of an adequate definition of truth.For empirical examination of the theory, Davidson leaves it to be inquiredempirically in the radical interpretation’s procedure. However, there are othercrucial factors which Davidson enters in his works on meaning, such as holism,insisting on imposing rational patterns on linguistic behaviors of speakers which thePrinciple of Charity dictates, and so on. But, Dummett has had explicit criticisms onthe various parts of this kind of theory. He criticizes using the notion of truth as thecentral notion in a theory of meaning, and makes some different criticisms aboutknowing explicitly truth conditions of sentences that the theory deals with. In thisessay, after describing the Davidsonian meaning theory and the process of radicalinterpretation, I will illustrate the most important criticisms that Dummett has madeabout the theory. Eventually, the question which will be discussed is that areDummett's criticism of the Davidson’s views, acceptable and defendable?