نشریه جاویدان خرد
سال ششم شماره 4 (پیاپی 13، زمستان 1388)

The inapplicability of the understanding of western aesthetics for the analysis or evaluation of the works of art or crafts of Iranian artists/craftsmen is too clear to require a detailed discussion. This aesthetics results from adherence to appearance/perspective (nemĩd), that is to the world of multiplicity and the created order and its exact representation. The Islamic-Iranian artist on the other hand adhered to semblance (namåyesh), that is to the representation of the manifestations of the Divine, and as such did not adhere to precise mathematical proportions. However these two poles and schools in the course of their historical endeavor did grow nearer to each other. One of the main goals of this article is a historical investigation of the transformation of the meanings of crafts (ģanå'at) and art (honar).

Sa''adi''s ghazals are based upon the idea of mystical love. In the following ghazal، explained here، Sa''sdi speaks of the love that accompanied his soul in Eternity and will remain with him until he returns to the eternal life. As in all Persian Sufi love poetry، the most predominant metaphor used for this love is wine. Having been inebriated from this wine in pre-eternity، the human soul seeks to drink from it once again in this world. However، this wine is not offered as a reward for one''s struggles and strives. It is only given to those who come with humbleness، ready to sacrifice their ego for the Beloved.

Senå’at has a meaning more general than ''art'' as it is currently used، for senå’at means ‘art’ in the traditional sense، being free from the limitations of modern paradigms which are now imposed on the latter term. In the translations of Greek texts، senå’at is used as the equivalent of Τεχνη (techne). Avicenna، who pays particular attention to Aristotle in most of his philosophical works، gives a relatively exhaustive commentary on the book περὶ ποιητικῆς (Poetics) of the ''first teacher'' (Primo Magister، Aristotle) in the ninth branch of the first section of his magnum opus، the Shifå’، in the last part the Logic section. However، the Poetics does not encompass all of Aristotle''s opinions about art، and to emphasize it too much would be misleading، for there he mainly considers art in its external aspect. Indeed، to understand Aristotle''s doctrines about art one must study his other works، taking into account the explanations of his disciples and commentators. In this respect Plotinus plays an important role، for he examined and critiqued the works of Plato and Aristotle and has interpreted and clarified some of their more abstruse discourses. It is also significant that Plotinus had a particularly strong influence on Muslim Sages. According to our inferences from the commentators’ interpretations، the Greek sages consider τεχνη (techne) in three aspects: 1) the essential aspect or Spirit of τεχνη (techne)، that is، μιμησις (mimesis); 2) the substantial aspect or soul of τεχνη (techne)، that is، ποιησις (poesis); 3) the accidental aspect or body of τεχνη (techne)، that is، πραζις (praxis). On basis of a consideration of: firstly، the stages of understanding and acquisition of knowledge in the philosophy of Aristotle; secondly، his theory that the ''becoming'' of everything is according to ''nature'' (φοση، phuse) and ''art'' (τεχνη، techne); thirdly، his belief that ''form'' (ιδος، idos) is immanent – as opposed to the transcendent forms of Plato; and finally، his manner of placing forms within ''nature'' and within the artist''s soul before creation، we can clearly understand the nature of the stages of inspiration، innovation and making. The movement of a form from the level of the intellect to imagination and from imagination to sensation is of great importance for our discussion of art as senå’at. Plato gives a great deal of emphasis to μιμησις (mimesis) and believes that αρχη (arche، principles) and ιδεη (idea، Platonic ideas) or intellectual forms are its corollaries. Aristotle also believes that the corollary of μιμησις (mimesis) is a form، which in this case exists with nature، and hence is here in agreement with his teacher to a certain extent. In any case، attaining the stage of ποιησις (poesis) is not possible without the stage before it، just as without innovation nothing can be made. A discussion similar to this is to be seen in chapter two of the second essay of sixth section of the Shifå’ dealing with psychology and the types of human perception، as also in the forth essay of this book. There Avicenna points to the stages of abstraction (tajrìd) of ‘forms’ on the different levels of perception، from sensation to intellect. Similar discussions are to be seen in the Risåleye Nafs (Treatise on the Soul) and al-Ishåråt wa at-Tanbìhåt (Remarks and Admonitions)، emphasizing the capacity of the intellect to derive benefit from the Sacred Intellect (intellectus sanctus). According to Avicenna، the soul is a substance with two aspects، the first of which looks towards the active intellect (Madonna Intelligenza) from which the theoretical intellect takes its knowledge، and the second of which looks towards to body، and this is the practical intellect. The perfection of the intellect is when into the intellect are impressed the intellectual forms of all beings as they exist in the Divine Essence. In this respect al-Shaykh al-Ra’ìs (the authoritative master، Avicenna) seems to be in agreement with the Greek sages. All of these considerations suggest a theoretical diagram of senå’at or τεχνη (techne) based on the stages of intellect، imagination and sensation، through each of which form (ģĩrat) descends، and all of which are necessary for the realization of senå’at.

The Authenticity of Rubâ'iyyât attributed to Hakîm 'Omar Khayyâm has been a controversial subject. M. A. Forûqî; an Iranian scholar and politician, has selected 178 rubâ'iy-s and has published them with some notes. But, it seems that the original and authentic Rubâ'iyyât have been numerically much less than this. In this paper, 28 rubâ'iy-s, on the basis of the some philological and philosophical criteria, have been selected, accompanying with some comments, according to the point of view of Sophia Perennis.

This article is an investigation into the nature of the Sufi metaphysics of Ģadr ad-Dìn Qĩnawì and his followers. In contrast to previous scholars، who have considered Qĩnawì to be dismissive of philosophy in a way similar to Ghazålì، the author shows that in fact philosophical metaphysics، and in particular the formulations of Ibn Sìnå، had a great impact on Qĩnawì and his followers in the school of Ibn ‘Arabì in their attempt to develop ‘ilm ilåhì (divine knowledge، i. e.، metaphysics). Indeed، the influence of philosophical metaphysics is one of the crucial factors which distinguish the thought of this school from the earlier phase of theoretical Sufism. The article begins with an overview of the two important phases in the history of theoretical Sufism، the school of Ibn ‘Arabì being the second. Then the author considers how this second phase has been interpreted by traditional and contemporary scholars. Following this، in the main section of the article، the author analyses the metaphysics of Qĩnawì and indicates the way in which it was influenced by the philosophy of Ibn Sìnå.

The present paper aims at clarifying the role of the concept “walåyah” in the philosophy of the unity of being in Islamic philosophy (waĕdat al-wujĩd). The concept “walåyah” is deeply built into the philosophic system of the Islamic theory of being, and moreover the dynamic aspect of this concept has always activated Islamic philosophy of existence and stimulated the thought of Islamic philosophers throughout history. The concept “walåyah” is a concept intrinsic to the philosophic tradition of Islam which is not found in other philosophic traditions. For this reason, philosophic inquiry into the concept “walåyah” will help us to have true insight into the essence of Islamic thought

The present article is both an analysis of the ethical theory which is inherent in Islamic teachings a meditation on how current attitudes in the living tradition of Islamic thought must be adapted to meet the needs of contemporary challenges. To achieve the first goal, the author begins with an analysis of the ethical teachings of the Qur’an. He then seeks to analyze these teachings using the conceptual distinction ‘teleological vs. deontological’ which is so important in western ethical theory, coming to the conclusion that from the Islamic perspective, “human action gets ethical acceptability if it is carried out ‘khalisatan li-wajh allah’ or ‘for the sake of God.’ Hence, Islam so beautifully reconciles the teleological standard with deontological standard.”In the second part of the paper the author presents guidelines for the future of Islamic ethical thought. These include the necessity of emphasizing the universal spirit of Islam, which is clearly present in the Qur’an but which is often underemphasized in the Islamic tradition; the need for an ethical interpretation of jihad; and the need to distinguish foundational Islamic principles from aspects of the tradition which are based on particular cultural circumstances. Additionally, the author emphasizes that the liberal and humanistic outlook which he sees to be necessary for the future of Islamic ethics has always been present in the tradition of Islamic mystical poetry. Giving many examples of this poetry, he argues that the mystical tradition must again come to the forefront. If this and his other recommendations are carried out, Islam will be able to achieve its potential to play a key role in global civilization and in developing a much needed “common morality for the global age.”