مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال چهل و سوم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1389)

According to the rules of quadruplet relations between concepts, Muslim logicians have proved that relation between the negations of two concepts which are equal (Musawi) or absolute-general-and-specific (‘Amm wa Khas-e Mutlaq) are, respectively, equal and absolute-specific-and-general; but these rules come across some problems when the most inclusive concepts are involved, since the negation of them are empty concepts. The argument for establishing these rules becomes invalid. The source of this invalidity is that the truth condition of negation proposition is different from affirmative equipollent proposition. However, it seems, none of the solutions, presented by Muslim logicians, are convincer except that of Mulla Sadra. He presents a proper interpretation of that difference, and by using non-conclusive proposition he succeeds in solving the problems.

The problem of pleasure is one of the long life, great, effective and much as disputable during the human history. And a variety of philosophical-ethical schools, and also religions, divine and non-divine have paid attention - affirmatively or negatively - to it since a long time ago. Although, Avicenna has been affected in his definition of the pleasure by scholars of the past, but he had not been as a pure imitator of them. He has given two definitions about the pleasure the second of which is more perfect than the first. His definitions are based on the positive and negative affairs. In the first stage, Avicenna, divides the pleasures into three parts: sensual, intellectual and intuitive ones. He believes, in spite of the public assumptions and some epicureans, that inner sensual delights are superior to external sensual ones, and the intellectual pleasures and intuitive ones are better than both of sensual delights, and he gives reasons for his claims. In the second stage, he divides the pleasures into mortal and eternal, and then into corporeal and spiritual, but he perfects eternal and spiritual pleasures over corporeal and mortal ones. He also believes that the pleasures have systematic ambiguities in five degrees.

By introducing two counterexamples, Gettier claims that it is possible that a person S has true justified belief that P but fails to know that proposition. The proposition P in Gettier’s first counterexample includes a “definite description”. We try, in this article, to refute Gettier’s first counterexample by means of what Russell, Strawson and Donnellan have said on the analysis of the propositions contained definite descriptions. More precisely, we will show that S doesn’t know that P because either he don’t believe that P or P is not true. It means that Gettier’s first counterexample cannot refute tripartite definition of knowledge

Khunaji and his companions get influence from Fakhr al-Din Razi and classified quantified propositions into two kinds: factual and external. Abhari added the third kind which was named mental. Tusi and his companions refuted Khunaji’s viewpoint. Analysis and explanation of the historical development of classification of predicative proposition into factual, external and mental is the problem of this research. In the shade of analysis and historical explanation of this classification would be clear that this problem has two classifications under one name: bipartite and triadic. The present article is an attempt to study the contribution of two-fold logicians of the 7th century to the development of logic.

The belief in Allah and having the inclination towards Him is of the innate human disposition; and human beings have throughout the history sought to know their God and many have undeservingly applied the quest to false gods whom they have worshiped. In order to know Allah, some people liken Him to human beings or other creatures and even they attribute a body to Him; yet others establish absolute transcendence of God in order to avoid comparison claiming that they can by no means come to know God. Imam ‘Ali (a.s) rejects the comparison and establishes arguments on it such as the following: Allah has no match; the similarities among the creatures are the reasons of the uniqueness of Allah; Allah cannot be encompassed, etc. As for the rejection of anthropomorphism, he mentions some reasons and evidence such as the following: The impenetrable tremendousness of Allah withholds vision. Allah is pre-eternal; Allah is unmatched and place embraces Him not. He is never weary and incompetent and is not affected by suffering, and so forth. Thus, Imam ‘Ali (a.s.) interprets the Quranic verses which might have resulted in fanciful anthropomorphism. He does not establish the absolute transcendence of Allah, rather he knows that Allah can be discerned to the extent He Himself and His messengers did make Him known and as His signs and actions reveal. However, knowing the essence and the substance is by no means possible; The Imam (a.s) establishes some arguments for transcendence: Allah has no limits: Allah cannot be encompassed; Allah is beyond description.

From Avicenna's era up to now, various arguments have been presented for the mental existence (al-wujud al-zihni), the most important of which are ten. These arguments dont have the same some of them are used only to reject the theory of relation (al-idafah), and some engage to refute the theory of phantoms (al-ashbah). Considering critically the ten arguments, this article tries to show: (a) proving the mental existence for the mediate knowledge (al-‘ilm al-huSuli) is possible only through an extending premise; (b) two arguments, i.e. the argument through assertion about non-existents (al-hukm ‘ala al-ma‘dumat) and the one through factual propositions (al-qadaya al-haqiqiyyah), are sound only if they are based on the argument through ideating non-existents (taSawwur al-ma‘dumat); (c) the proofs of mental existence are mostly examples for the argument through ideating non-existents; (d) among the ten arguments, only two, i.e. the argument through ideating non-existents and the one through misperception, are able to prove the mental existence, and the others are not sound.

This paper aims not to study Sadra’s viewpoint on the language of Qur’an but aims to offer Sadra’s division of and criticisms on the different approaches to the language of Qur’an. Therefore, this study has been conducted on the negative dimension and has a critical attitude and is not going to study on the positive dimension and to explain Sadra’s viewpoint; although recognition of this negative dimension will clarify Sadra’s viewpoint to some extent. Of the current (cognitive and non-cognitive) theories of religious language which are offered in general or specially in relation to the language of Qur’an, Sadra has hinted or specified six theories: (1) Language of formalism, (2) language of extravagance in esoteric, (3) language of moderation, (4) figurative language and metaphor, (5) language of poem and oration, (6) folk language, first four of which are cognitive theories and second two are non-cognitive theories. These six theories will be criticized and analyzed in this paper.