فصلنامه ذهن
سال دوازدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 45، بهار 1390)

The traditional problem of soul-body emerges when we consider the two as being different by essence. The questions of the nature of soul and its relation to body are two questions for which replies should be provided. Dualism (a series of dualist doctrines) puts emphasis on the distinction between the two. In the present article, the author will say that Mulla Sadra is not a dualist. Monist (but non-reductionist) view is based on three ontological presumptions: (1) principiality of existence, (2) gradation of existence, and (3) substantial motion. The impact of this ontology on Sadra's psychology may be found in the following doctrines: (4) immateriality of the faculty of imagination (the middle point between reasonable and sensible); in its simplicity, the soul contains all faculties; and (6) in its origination, the soul is corporal, and in its permanence it is spiritual. The conclusion of these premises is manifest in the essential (and not accidental) relation between the soul and body. In conclusion, the author has made a comparison between Sadrean view and emergentism. The author is of the opinion that some readings of emergentism may be useful to provide a new formulation of Sadrean view.

For man's access to knowledge of the external world, there should be, firstly, forms of things in the mind; secondly, such mental forms should represent the external things; thirdly, these representations should correspond to the things existing in the external world. Representation of the external world by mental forms, or in other words, existence of some sort of relation between the subject and object seems to be evident. But explanation of the way that these forms represent the external world and relate to the objective things has caused many debates among Muslim philosophers some part of which has been introduced under "mental existence". Presumption of discussions about mental existence is that there is some sort of relation between mental existence and the external world. The focus of discussions about mental existence is explanation of the nature of this relation and clarification of the point that what in man's mind is which is taken as a standard for knowledge and links our impressions to the external things. In the Islamic philosophy, concerning mental existence and the way that mental existence relates to the external world, totally four theories have been introduced. According to the Muslim philosophers, mental existence and external thing are united in quiddity, and what that comes into existence in the mind is the same as their quiddity. Some Muslim theologians have rejected the [notion of] mental existence, and think that knowledge and mental forms are of the kind of relation. Some other Muslim philosophers and theologians, though they have accepted mental existence, think that mental forms are images of the external thing and not the same as its quiddity. Criticism and assessment of these theories is the subject matter of this article.

The issue of intelligence, its meaning and place in the world and in particular in the theory of knowledge is an issue not so eminent classical philosophers have neglected to study it from the viewpoint of their philosophical foundations and principles. At the same time one of the most challenging and most extensive issues is the issue of the active intelligence both ontologically and epistemologically. In the present essay, relying upon philosophical ideas of two great philosophers of the Christian world and Islamic world- who are at the same time theologian as well-, i.e. Thomas Aquinas and Mulla Sadra, the author has tried to criticize and explore their views concerning epistemological function of the active intelligence and its relation to human soul. In spite of critiques posed against Thoma's ideas concerning active intelligence, if his whole philosophical system is taken into account, it seems that he has provided an explanation which is more coherent than that of some Muslim philosophers and in particular Ibn Sina. In various statements of Mulla Sadra and in particular his al-Hikmat al-mutaaliyah fil asfar al-arbaah al-'aqliyah concerning the place of active intelligence, three kinds of explanation may be found. And this very difference in explanations causes serious challenges for his view which are discussed in the present essay.

The present writing discusses one of the new issues needed by epistemology in the field of modern theology and within the realm of all Divine religions. Having described a short process in the present narrow scope, the author tries to depict and analyze the negative impact on man's valuable knowledge of tendency toward "skepticism" and "relativism" in two fields of "relativity of truth" and "relativity of understanding". Providing short examples of some ideas posed by skeptics and relativists in the 19th and 20th Centuries, he discusses and criticizes the great role played by relativism and skepticism in epistemology and the structure of the theory of "philosophical hermeneutics". In this way, the author tries to reject the claim posed by some people who deny "their commitment to skepticism and relativism" and clear themselves of such accusations; then he attempts to prove their practical and theoretical commitment to the complicated skepticism and relativism.

Through his own reading of Wittgenstein's teachings in Philosophical Investigations, Kripke develops a skeptical argument on the basis of the concept of "rule-following". Then, he refers again to the later Wittgenstein's teachings, and provides a skeptical reply. It seems that the argument is aimed to challenge the realistic approach to "meaning" and, generally speaking, to provide an alternative picture of the way that "meaning" is attributed and statements are acknowledged. Skeptical argument is based on the thesis of normativity of meaning. Assuming such a thesis, Kripke's skeptic concludes that "if I believe in semantic realism, I will not be able to find a fact showing that, using various words, I have intended (and intend) to communicate some meaning; for, there is no such a fact at all, thus there is no meaning". According to the realistic approach to meaning, only if we can find the truth-condition of the said sentence, we will be able to speak of its truth, falsity, and meaning. In the present writing, skeptical argument, its consequences, and presumptions will be posed; and then Kripke's skeptical reply will be introduced. In this regard, the author has tried to, at first, provide a proper formulation of his argument, and then he introduces, on the basis of this formulation, possible solutions for such a skepticism. Then, he will discuss the conflict between this skepticism and semantic realism. In what follows, he will try to discuss some of the most important characteristics, consequences, and threats of this argument in some fields; in doing so, he will show some possible defects in Kripke's non-realism.

Nature of the mind, mental states, and the relation between these states and body and bodily states are among the oldest and most difficult philosophical problems which have been always focus of philosophical studies concerning the mind (or soul), and philosophical systems, depending on their cosmological foundations, have spoken about them. In the present age and in the contemporary philosophy of mind, these issues are the subject of various physicalist views or views which have adopted somehow materialist approaches. This article seeks to, after a brief mention to the meaning of the term "physicalism", focus on the problems faced by this view. "Conscious states" of our mind, and to put it more precisely some kind of consciousness called "phenomenal consciousness", play a critical role in the objections posed against physicalism. While exploring various meanings of consciousness, the present writing will focus on consciousness in its phenomenal sense and the most important problems caused by it which reject materialism or physicalism, and its main goal is, after describing three classical and important arguments against physicalism, exploration, criticism, and, to some extent, defense of these arguments. In this way, the present writing will emphasize that these three arguments, though they may be defended, merely briefly touch these characteristics.

The nature of relation between soul and body is among issues to which attention was paid when man began to philosophical thinking and inclined to know his own self began. In the Greek period and Medieval Ages, various theories were advanced concerning the nature of relation between soul and body. In the modern era as well, this issue has been discussed. With Descarte's philosophy, this issue became the focus of attention; for, after proving the Cogito proposition, and while considering a distinction between the corporal substance and thinking substance, Descartes changed the [issue of] relation between soul and body to a problem that philosophers tried to solve it for a while. By distinguishing these two substances, the father of modernity caused a distinction between two philosophical schools, i.e. empiricism and rationalism. Descartes accepts the relation and interaction between soul and body in the daily experiences; but he is not able to solve [the problem of] this relation and interaction on the basis of philosophical principles.