فهرست مطالب

حکمت و فلسفه - سال هفتم شماره 3 (پاییز 1390)
  • سال هفتم شماره 3 (پاییز 1390)
  • 150 صفحه، بهای روی جلد: 18,000ريال
  • تاریخ انتشار: 1390/11/01
  • تعداد عناوین: 7
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  • Mohammad Hosein Bayat Page 7
    The main aim of this paper is considering and criticizing knowledge, will and power of God and human from the viewpoint of philosophers and theologians. The paper has three sections: The first section is devoted to some preliminary definitions; in the second section, I explain and criticize views of some philosophers and theologians about knowledge, will and power of God and human; and in the third section, I conclude the preferred views about the mentioned topics.
  • Bijan Abdolkarimi Page 29
    In this paper it is tried to criticize Jalal Al-ahmad's conceptions of the notions of the West and Westernizaton, his understanding of the social and historical origins of Westernization, and his understanding of the tradition and the necessity of returning to it, the issue that have had a very fundamental role in the formation of the paradigm of Iranian's social thought in contemporary history. It is worthy to note that Al-ahmad's social thought has domination in recent Iranaian social sphere after elapsing about a half of century from publishing his book Westernization. Al-ahmad's veiws are criticized in the light of Iranian contemporary thinker, Ahmad Fardid's profound insigts.
  • Abdullah Amini, Mohammad Javad Safian Page 55
    The principle of sufficient reason is one of the most significant philosophical principles. Arthur Schopenhauer, the well-known German philosopher, has emphasized on this principle and taken it as the entrance key element to his philosophical system. He tries to characterize the limits and conditions of application of this principle, and to avoid the inappropriate use of this principle outside the phenomenal reality domain. In his philosophical system, this principle governs the relations between phenomena and objects. Furthermore, the mentioned principle is not equal to the principle of causality, but it is more general than that. For the principle of causality is only one of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason. This paper tries to discuss the content, application domain and importance of this principle in Schopenhauer ׳s philosophy.
  • Hassan Ahmadi, Mastaneh Kakaei Page 73
    The problem of God as ipsum esse is dependent to the way of understanding esse and defining acts of being and existence. Aquinas shows the importance of this problem in On Binge and Essence. Aquinas uses being (esse) in different meanings in his works. In Summa theological, he ascribes two meanings to esse: the act of essence, and the composition of a proposition affected by the mind in predicating a predicate to a subject. We use the second meaning about God as well as the first meaning; we say "God exists" is true. Aquinas notes that not only about things that composed of matter and form, but also about sui generis substances, the essence differs from existence. Only is God the same as his essence. Aquinas believes the name "He who exists" is most properly applies to God. The being is the most unlimited and universal name which its only bearer is the sui generis existent whose essence is the same as his existence.
  • Reza Dehghani, Hossein Kalbasi Ashtari Page 87
    One of the main themes in Heidegger’s thought is the genesis of metaphysics. This matter plays a significant role in the fundamental question in the so-called Turn period. In this paper, we will concern about three approaches to the genesis of metaphysics in the mentioned period. Heidegger discusses these three approaches in his three different works: Kant and the problem of metaphysics; What is metaphysics? and Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. In Kant and the problem of metaphysics, he indicates a special interpretation of Kant's views according to the notion of "transcendence". In what is metaphysics? Heidegger discusses the issue through the concepts of "nothingness" and "angst", and in Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, he continues the issue via the interpretation of the "Cave Allegory". Although the released times of these three books is so proximate, Heidegger seeks the foundation of metaphysics in them through completely different approaches. In the first and second book, along with Kant’s project, he attempts to find a foundation for metaphysics through the concept of "Dasein". But in the latter book, Heidegger is in the pursuit of transition from metaphysics and calls metaphysics "forgetting of being". He explains that Plato's introducing "Ideas Theory" is an origin of metaphysics and a departure point from being and forgetting it. In this essay, proposing a general approach, we try to explain the mentioned three approaches and their similarities and differences.
  • Mohammad Ali Abdollahi, Fatemeh Farhanian Page 103
    One of the most important and novel philosophical issues proposed by Wittgenstein in his late stage of thought and in his influential book Philosophical Investigations is the issue of private language. This issue is so important that one can say the epistemology of second half of twentieth century is entirely under its influence. Wittgenstein believes that the only way to get rid of epistemological and semantic skepticism is the rejection of private language. Furthermore, the problem of other minds, which has been an insoluble problem due to acceptance of the theory of private language, becomes fundamentally dissolved by rejecting the private language. While other solutions to the problem of other minds such as the argument from analogy and behaviorism suffer from many problems.
  • Mohammmad Ali Abbasian Page 121
    One of the most important, and at the same time, popular discussions within the realm of epistemology in the last five decades, is about the issue of “the nature of knowledge”. According to the current accepted view among epistemologists, there would be no “propositional knowledge” if there exist no “true believing”. So S knows p, only if S is in th state of having true belief that p. Epistemologist's conception of true proposition and true belief, and accordingly knowledge, is result of a semantic and epistemic notion void of any pragmatic element or condition. In this paper, I try to show that this conception is not correct, and knowledge is not only a matter of semantics and epistemology but further it is subjected to pragmatic considerations. For propositions, as the content of our de re/de dicto beliefs, and their truth or falsity, are dependent upon pragmatics and its psychosocial principles.