مجله نامه مفید
پیاپی 74 (آبان 1388)

Some physicists, notably Adolf Grünbaum, have claimed that the process of formation of new matter in the steady state theory can be explained purely physically. In effect, the central idea of this approach is that the laws of nature such as density-conservation are sufficient causes of the continuous creation of matter out of nothing. In this paper, however, it will be shown that this approach encounters insoluble problems, and the process of “creatio continua” of new matter out of nothing in the steady-state theory cannot be explained physically.

John Hick has based his Hypothesis of pluralism on three philosophical Principles, namely: Swinburne's principle of credulity, Wittgenstein's seeing-as, and Kant's Epistemology of perceptual Experience.But application of these principles on religious pluralism entails several problems as Follows: acceptance of contradictory ideas about religious experiences, which is not resolvable with referring to other experiences, intellectual arguments, and logical Possibility and the like. In the principle of credulity Hick has extended Wittgenstein’s seeing–as to the experiencing as and believes that it includes all human experiences which is formed according to individuals’ mental conceptions and religious systems.This approach leads to the improvability of the supreme Reality and denying the joint cases of religions. According to Kantian epistemology, Hick accepts that noumenal reality is ineffable and all descriptions and experiences belonging to the manifestations and phenomena. So, this idea results in polytheism or atheism. In this paper, firstly, three mentioned principles and their application in the pluralism have been explained and recited, and finally, there are some critiques which have been considered.

The Article seeks to demonstrate how theological theoretical systems which formed around many historical religions and therefore, we must distinguish between the theoretical systems and the main and intellectual esprits of the religions themselves¬ that interpret history and historical events and personalities on the base of their frameworks of belief. They speak about the history as it must be and not as it is. For this reason, namely because of the commitment to a theological system, its believers, as well as followers of an ideology in modern time, have an instrumentalistic approach to history and its events and use history not just as an essential source for knowledge but as an instrument, in order to find some historical confirmations of their believes. In this approach to history, it is easily denied all historical cases which refute their believes. Because of the theological aspect and its characteristics, namely being polemic, circle, arbitrary, dualistic, and system-maker, the partial interpretations of the believers of theological systems must be conceived as a kind of "history-making" or "forging holy lies". But it must be attended that the expressions like "history-making" or "forging holy lies" must by no means conceived as attentive and moral actions, but as an unconscious action and a epistemic failure. However, in theological systems we lose history a main source of our knowledge.

The ideational theory of meaning is the theory according to which the meaning of words is subjective ideas. This theory whose main defender (though not innovator) is Locke, has not been regarded greatly nowadays, because there are several problems which have not been resolved. In this paper, we focus on a specific aspect of this theory, namely: the semantics of general terms. First, we explain Locke’s definition of "Idea" and his position on "General Terms"; then we propose some suggestions that we believe could support and modify this theory. Finally, by using the concept of “Class” we show how some problems of the ideational theory of meaning can be resolved.

Frege's main philosophical goal was to understand and determine both the ontological and epistemological status of mathematical truth. He proposed the doctrine of logicism for this goal. The doctrine of logicism explains that: 1. all the truths of arithmetic can be expressed using only logical notions. And 2.all arithmetical truths can be obtained from purely logical axioms using just logical laws and definitions. In order to defend this view, it would seem to be essential to provide a definition of the number of words in purely logical terms. But his definitions of the number of words, apart from other defects, were in conflict with the Caesar problem. The Caesar problem is the possibility of identity between mathematical objects and concrete objects; shown by the statement: 'is Caesar a number?' Frege's definitions and other contemporary solutions do not provide us with any answer to this question.In this essay, we divide the Caesar problem into a variety of epistemological, metaphysical and semantically dimensions and we also show that a right solution must give us a sufficient answer to all these dimensions. Then we test Neo- logicism and show that this solution cannot solve this problem.

McDowell thinks that speakers, when they are uttering a sentence intentionally, in fact, are expressing a thought which the sentence is used for communication. In McDowell’s view, we must take speaker’s linguistic behavior as a performance of a speech act with a specific content (various thoughts) and specific type (such as expressing a thought, asking a question, and so on). McDowell defends a modest theory of meaning and argues that an interpreter or a theorist should be seen as a person who has and has had a prior grasp of a language. But, Dummett believes that a theory of meaning should not take for granted some piece of a language or presuppose having some primitive concepts of that language by a speaker. A theory of meaning, as Dummett says, must explain all primitive concepts which primitive terms of the language in question express, and describe what it is to have these concepts by a speaker. McDowell by criticizing this view insists that, this approach to meaning falls in the mere behaviorism and then, Dummett is forced to explain meaning in reductive and non-intentional (behavioral) terms. McDowell urges that giving this behavioral account of meaning attacks our intuitive and common sense view that language and meaning are normative and rational. Thus, giving an immodest theory of meaning, in McDowell’s view, is impossible. In this essay, after describing McDowell’s and Dummett’s views on workings of a theory of meaning, I will describe McDowell’s argument against possibility of giving an immodest theory of meaning and eventually, I’m going to evaluate the plausibility of the argument.

The impact of Plato in evolution of philosophical and political thought is so, that still current political, social and philosophical schools are being evaluated with his thought. The dialogue between Republic, Statesman and Laws are three of his most important works. These three works, especially, are so important in the field of political thought and by writing these works, Plato, is known as the founder of political thought. His different form and context are caused that his political thought would be interpreted differently. It seems that leaning on the theory of Transmission from political philosophy to politics in Plato’s thought and emplacing these three dialogues in their proper stance would solve most of the problems and help to enlightening dark aspects of his thoughts. Special attention to Statesman is among the features which distinguish the theory of transition from the others. According to this idea, Statesman dialogue intermediates Plato’s political philosophy in Republic and politics as well as one of the distinguished role in connective segments. In this article, we try to represent a more accurate interpretation of Plato’s political thought of transformation by reading and interpreting the statesman in virtue of `Transmission Theory` from political philosophy to politics.