فهرست مطالب

نشریه شناخت
سال دوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 61، پاییز و زمستان 1388)

  • بهای روی جلد: 15,000ريال
  • تاریخ انتشار: 1388/08/26
  • تعداد عناوین: 7
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  • M. Akrami, M. Bagheri Asl Page 7
    Incommensurability is a concept that entered into the literature of contemporary philosophy of science through Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. Any discussion of this concept is related to semantics and methodology, and brings up a debate on the possibility of translation between languages. A review of Kuhn’s works shows that, over several decades, he has presented different interpretations of the incommensurability of scientific theories, while he is mainly well-known for his early excessive position, emphasizing incommensurability between scientific mega-theories and paradigms. Indent Such a position has caused challenges in contemporary philosophy of science. Some scholars argue that Kuhn has gradually moved away from his early position, so that he has recognized, in his later positions, a kind of comparability of scientific theories and paradigms. This paper, making use of Howard Sankey’s approach, presents a comprehensive classification of different features and variants of Kuhn’s conception of incommensurability, examines the change of this concept in his philosophy of science, and shows that he, in his later positions, has restricted incommensurability to untranslatability between some terms of natural kinds. This, showing the rationality of empirical science and the process of selection between scientific theories, would make possible to do comparison between rival scientific theories.
  • N.Hekmat, F.Shahidi Page 39
    through the various eras of the history of philosophy, Ordinary quiddity has had several meanings and the philosophical terms in Farabi’s philosophy, as a bridge between Aristotle and Avicenna, do not present pose or repute perfectly their aspects and necessities. In spite of its distinction for Farabi Ordinary type quiddity is melded with and close to Existence. The evidence for This claim in Farabi’s writings is where he called quiddity “What the entity is”, “What the entity existence depends on” or “The dole of existence belong to the entity” where quiddity’s parts designate parts of entity existence. According to Farabi the absence of quiddity is the criteria of not existing and possessing an exposal quiddity is the criteria of existing. Therefore for the necessary Existent he affirms Ordinary type unity between his existence and his quiddity instead of his rejecting quiddity. In addition to “What is it?” quiddity is the answer to the questions of “Quality”, “Is it?” and “Due to what”. Moreover Farabi uses “essence”, “nature”, “substance” (correlatively), “thatness”, “definition” and occasionally “reality” in the same way.
  • M. Rajabi Page 59
    Timaeus is one of the most important of Plato’s works and includes his ideas about cosmology. After Plato, most philosophers commented on Timaeus. I explain their understanding it of and the most important notions they used about it.
  • M. Sanei, M.Reze Page 77
    The relations between Smith’s thought in The Theory of Moral Sentiments” and The Wealth of Nations, the so called “Das Adam Smith Problem”, can be investigated in terms of his theory of action and theory of virtue. We study “Das Problem” in terms of these theories, and suggest that Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments considers morality in such broad terms that we can find some aspect of The Wealth of Nations” within it. In other words, the base of economic analysis is deduced from a part of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Understanding the complexity of Smith’s accounts, we must take into consideration his situationalist insights. Which allows him to avoid absolutism in studying human phenomenon and so makes possible different interpretations. We examine this hypothesis in order to reconsider “Smith’s Problem” in terms of his theory of action and virtue.
  • A. Neuve-Eglise Page 121
    The principle of precaution has arisen in a western context of scientific and technological advances coupled with the emergence of new dangers, particularly in the realm of the environment, genetics and public health. This new context revealed the existence of a contradiction in postmodern occidental societies: an enduring and ceaseless thirst for progress, and at the same time, a rejection of its negative outcomes. Even though the principle of precaution was originally only a philosophical principle, the striving to reconcile these two contradictory wishes converted it into a political and legal principle used to palliate the possible human and environmental negative effects of an invention or of the practical application of a scientific discovery. This principle reveals some important features of today’s western societies as well as the mentality of postmodern man as a narcissistic, consuming and individualistic being. This article deals with the most important bases of this principle i.e. its specific vision of the world and epistemology, as well as its social and political consequences, notably its influence in the redefinition of the role of the state and its progressive de-ideologization.
  • H.Wale Page 147
    Sadr al Motaallehin Shirazi’s explanations of meaning in different books seem to indicate his hesitation in choosing a version of referential theory of meaning or one of ideational theory. Nonetheless, on closer examination of his assertions, based on his ontological and epistemological doctrines, a coherent theory that stands betwixt these two thereby reconciling his apparently clashing remarks in a general framework of explanation of different kinds of perception can be formulated based on his ontological and epistemological doctrines. Semantically speaking, there are two types of words: meaningful words that have both reference and sense and words that are meaningful only in virtue of having reference.
  • Y.Hoshyar Page 175
    Innate ideas are one of the basic principles of Descartes's epistemology. However he is concerned with this issue in different texts giving rise to confusion and different interpretations. This article clarifies the confusion and interprets his doctrine in a coherent and, in some aspects, new way. He understands “innate” in two different ways. The first section is devoted to some evidences to these two meanings. In the second section his view is compared with those of his contemporaries. The actual or potential existence of innate ideas, their epistemic functions and the relation between them and universals are discussed in the other sections. Finally, it is shown that this interpretation is coherent and consistent with Descartes's different texts.