نشریه جاویدان خرد
سال هفتم شماره 4 (پیاپی 17، زمستان 1389)

Unlike FΪrΪbi and Ibn SìnΪ, who thought that knowledge of things is sufficient for their actualization, or Suhrawardì, who thought that knowledge of actions is sufficient for their actualization, MullΪ ĢadrΪ had a comprehensive or holistic view of Being and the human state in both the theoretical and practical aspects of his philosophy. He did not agree with the Asha‘rites who thought that volition and practice are primary and essential, and reason and theory are secondary and peripheral. Nor did he agree with the Mu‘tazilites who thought that reason and theory are primary and essential, and volition and practice are secondary and peripheral. Rather, MullΪ ĢadrΪ considered the soul as a unified being with dual aspects of theoretical and practical reason. It is on the basis of such a view that he discusses the relation between theory and practice and propounds various theories different from those of previous philosophers on ‘practical reason’, ethical philosophy, political philosophy and the qualities of ruler.This paper aims at exposing MullΪ ĢadrΪ’s view on the relation between theory and practice and its philosophical implications in the area of practical reason. In this connection, ĢadrΪ’s thought is presented as one in which rationality, spirituality and the religious value system find a unified and holistic interpretation. This paper also tries to analyze various aspects of MullΪ ĢadrΪ’s view in relation to those of previous philosophers, and the way it encounters and treats new practical questions and problems. It is contentious to maintain that ĢadrΪ did not pay enough attention to this part of philosophy, did not deal with it thoroughly, was more inclined to talk about individual ethics with a mystical or esoteric tone, or that he did not take the practical aspect of philosophy as seriously as he took its theoretical aspect. A final goal of this paper is to show that, if we allow ourselves to revise the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and offer a different view from those of FΪrΪbi, Ibn SìnΪ, or even MullΪ ĢadrΪ on the relation between theory and practice—as ‘AllΪmah ĤabΪĥaba’ì did—we would be able to elevate the status of practical philosophy in contemporary discussions.

‘Conventional concepts’ (idråkåt-i i‘tibårì) is the title of the sixth essay of the book The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism by ‘Allåmah Ĥabåĥabå'ì. Since the publication of that book, 'conventional concept's has been an idea synonymous with philosophical innovation, the adherents of this view having said much about it. This present work takes a different look at that essay, investigating its relation to the sources of ‘Allåmah Ĥabåĥabå’ì’s philosophy, and discussing its connection with practical philosophy (ĕikmat-i ‘amalì). Moreover, this article, by recourse to the existential approach, for the first time considers practical and theoretical philosophy from the unified perspective of the existence of the human being. It regards all ‘conventional concepts’, whether theoretical or practical, as instruments for developing and promoting human existence; and explains the possibilities inherent in the idea of ‘conventional concepts’ for opening new windows for philosophical thought in the human sciences.

This paper discusses the confrontation between two major approaches toward mysticism and mystical experience, namely those of experientialism and anti-mysticism. In the first part of the paper, the chief elements of the two approaches are introduced and discussed. On the one hand, experientialism, influenced by William James, underlines the role of individual and extraordinary experiences and ecstatic states, and identifies mysticism through such experience. On the other hand, anti-mysticism, chiefly reflected in the works of Denys Turner, criticizes experientialism on several grounds. According to anti-mysticism, the mystical approach is actually based on communal acts and thoughts, not individual experiences. Based on this view, anti-mysticism criticizes experientialism in its analysis of the role of experience in mediaeval spirituality, the shift in Christian spirituality, its reading of Christian spiritual history, as well as its reading of mediaeval texts. In the final part of the paper, both approaches are evaluated and adjudicated.

Al-AĕjΪr al-shidΪd is a short work of MullΪ Muĕsin Fayą KΪshΪnì, which was written to show the falsity of the theory of ‘a part which cannot be further divided’ (juz’ la yatajazza’u) or the theory of the ‘atom’ or ‘indivisible part’ (jawhar-i fard). This treatise, which has not been published till now, contains twenty-three philosophical proofs for the non-existence of the atom, and responses to seven doubts and demonstrations by the adherents of this view. The present critical edition was prepared on the basis of two manuscript copies, which so far may be counted as the only known copies of this work. Moreover, in analyzing the contents of this treatise, the sources used by KΪshΪnì in its composition have been identified.

The question to be posed in this article is whether there is such a thing as an ‘oriental philosophy’, and if so what are its main features and distinctive marks, and most important of all, can we rethink philosophy in an oriental way? This question was answered by Muslim philosophers when they encountered the vast heritage of Greek science and philosophy and, having themselves imbibed the gist of Greek philosophy, tried to maintain and transcend it to reach what they called Oriental Wisdom. Having traced the history and development of this idea in Islamic philosophy, we have tried to answer the question as to how it is possible to apply the principles of the so-called Oriental Philosophy first to broaden and deepen our conception of philosophy, and again to achieve a unified conception of philosophy which might embrace both the eastern and western traditions of thought.

The present article is an attempt to shed some light on the Neo-Platonic elements of two philosophers of the world of Islam and the world of Christianity—Murtaąå Muĥahharì (1919-1979) and St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.)—in dealing with the problem of evil. The former was a contemporary exponent of Islamic philosophy whose point of departure was Mullå Ģadrå’s al-Ĕikmah al-muta‘åliyah (Transcendent Theosophy). In his intellectual life, he sought to resolve the religious and intellectual problems of contemporary Muslims, and even approached theological issues in a rational manner. The latter, one of the most important Christian philosophers to have ever lived, sought to give Christianity a firm intellectual foundation in Neo-Platonism, and inspired the West for centuries.It is well known that the problem of evil is at the heart of theodicy, an issue that concerns not only the world, but also the conception of God. The central question may be stated simply: how can both God and evil exist at the same time? To find a solution to this problem, Augustine at one point in his life took recourse to the Manichaean worldview, and considered evil as a separate entity from the Good, with a separate source. Later on, however, he became attracted to Neo-Platonism and came to consider evil as a privation of the Good. In Neo-Platonism, the Good is equated with Being, while evil is associated with privation of the Good, and thus ‘non-Being’. With reference to Neo-Platonic ideas, both Muĥahharì and Augustine considered evil as a privation of the Good and affirmed the identity of Being and Goodness. Apart from Neo-Platonic ideas, they also independently developed their own ideas with regard to the problem of evil. Augustine approached Neo-Platonism with reference to Christianity, and in certain cases disagreed with Neo-Platonism in order to show his commitment to Christianity. Nevertheless, some Christian thinkers undermined Augustine’s claim to be grounded in the authority of Scripture, and insisted that his Neo-Platonic philosophy has nothing to do with orthodox Christianity.