فصلنامه آینه معرفت
پیاپی 30 (بهار 1391)

Aristotle, in all his works including Metaphysics, Physics and Generation and Corruption, wherever expressing a view on an issue, makes references to Plato and other philosophers who preceded him trying to present flaws in their thoughts. To begin with critique is Aristotle’s specific philosophic method. Especially in Metaphysics, which, in his words, is the knowledge of ‘being in itself’ dealing with the what and why in all beings, he had to first consider and criticize the well-known views of his time among them the most vexatious one was that of Plato. Aristotle’s fight with Plato’s ‘theory of ideas’ started from the time he was a student of academy. His brief thesis ‘on ideas’, peri ideon, belongs to that era. The present article classifies Aristotle’s objections to Plato’s ideas trying to show their essence and intensity. To this end, the author’s have adopted a neutral stance toward the issues in their analysis and classification of the objections.

One of the important principles in theology and Islamic studies is the intellectuality or religiosity of goodness and evil. It is based on this principle that the following questions can be answered: Does the goodness and praiseworthiness of good deeds such as saving the innocent emanate from their nature? Would the killing of innocent people be considered as a good deed, if God ordered people to do so? Does God follow the natural criteria of goodness and badness or is it that whatever he does is good? For example if God punishes a child in the dooms day, can this be viewed as an evil deed? Is it the case that God transcends the ordinary human values so that none of His deeds could be considered as evil? Will those who never heard prophetic messages be punished based on innate criteria? Are people obliged to know God even before accepting religion? Is it the case that whatever is called ethical and humane is also religious? The Mo’tazelites, the Shiites and the Matoridites believe in the innateness of goodness and evil, while the Ash’arites believe in their religiosity. The present article explores Rumi’s views in his Fihe Ma Fih and Mathnavi. The claim is that his position is not consistent with the Ash’arites views and that it is more consistent with Hanafi-Matridites, Mo’tazelites and Shiites.

It was in the fourth century AH that a group of scholars called Ikhvan-al-Safa and Khollan-al-Wafa decided to write some brief treatises and send them out anonymously to publicize rational sciences, bring religion and philosophy closer together and make people aware of scientific and religious issues, all with the intention to remove deviations from the Islamic society. At that time, in spite of the numerous political and societal limitations, Moslems were developed scientifically and intellectually in all areas including philosophy and politics. Ikhvan-al-Safa, while sticking to religious thought, represented the Islamic revival and the focus on Hellenic philosophy and metaphysics. Their efforts to study religious issues within a theoretical framework to organize the components of religious epistemology including theology, prophecy, anthropology, knowledge of the soul and ethics are very significant.

Due to its focus on salvation and co-existence of the followers of different religions, religious pluralism, as an issue related to the philosophy of religion, has attracted the attention of thinkers and includes different approaches and interpretations. Mawlana’s intensive concentration on the ‘unity of being’, as one of the pillars of his belief system and the induction of tolerance among the readers of his poems, has given the impression to many people that he is a pluralist figure. However, whether Mawlana was truly a pluralist, and if he were so, what the concept of pluralism meant to him are among the question raised about him. The present study is an attempt to find answers to these questions based on Masnavi. As such, after defining religious pluralism and its approaches, the pluralists’ viewpoints on the truth of religions and their reflections in Mawlana’s thought are presented. Re-reading of Mawlana’s thought reveals the footprints of religious pluralism in his poems; however, he rejects pluralism in its modern sense, ultimately recognizing one religion as the true one. The present study concludes with the idea that the readers of Masnavi should follow his methodology with regard to cognitive and religious issues paving the way for the proximity of religions and the creation of an atmosphere which would prevent the occurrence of religious differences and conflicts.

Sohrevardi, as an illuminationist, had very significant innovations in philosophy, mysticism and spiritual thought. The essence, reality and the quality of achieving spiritual experiences, which have received special attention by different people in different cultures and schools of thought, are among the innovative domains of Sohrevardi’s system of thought. There are two major views on the essence of these experiences: first, essentialism which emphasizes their coherence and commonality among different people and schools of thought; and second, constructivism in which mystical intuition plays an important role in the creation of numinous experience. These different views indicate the differences which different schools of thought have about the quality of these experiences. From Sohrevardi’s perspective, the unity with the Light makes mystical illumination and numinous experiences possible. Accordingly, the individual’s special view on soul and his/her psychology are involved in the fulfillment of these experiences which are accompanied with illumination, observation, unity and extinction in unity. Therefore, Sohrevardi’s views on the features of numinous experience represent a kind of essentialism in these illuminations. This does not mean that the unity of these personal experiences consistent with the individual’s thought makes them different from each other. They rather have similar and common characteristics. The present study, as a library research, adopting a descriptive analytical method provides evidence which shows Sohrevardi’s viewpoints on the principles of essentialism in mystical illumination. It also provides answers to a number of relevant questions in this area of inquiry.

The method of gaining religious knowledge has been among the most disputed issues after the demise of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) and in the era of the absence of the twelfth Imam, due to the lack of access to infallible leaders. This means that if conflicts arise between the clear and decisive injunctions of the reason and the appearances of religious texts, what should be done. In such cases, there have always been differences of views and perceptions in the areas of theology and jurisprudence about the priority of the reason, or its share in understanding the message of revelation, and these differences have caused a lot of ups and downs which are still continuing. Within the scope of the Islamic thought, there are those who adhere to the appearance including Hanbalites and Ash’arites from the sunni sect and the Akhbarites from the Shiite sect on the one side and the Mo’tazelites and the thriving jurisprudence of Shiites on the other side. The present article provides a brief overview of the above-mentioned issue among the followers of the prophet’s household with a glimpse on the extremist views of Akhbari Shiites and other similar views, which do not formally oppose rationalism but in practice do not attach any value to the distinguishing power of reason. The article also examines the rival thought which, in both areas of jurisprudence and theology, emphasizes and insists on the validity of reason. It concludes with the presentation of measures which can prevent extreme rationalism which results in desecrating the lofty divine knowledge.

The otherworldly chastisement and its quality and quantity, especially the eternity of hell-fire are among the most important topics of discussion in theology, philosophy and Sufism. Ibn Arabi, as a distinguished scholar in theoretical Sufism, who, in contrast with those devoted to Islamic law and the common religious people, considers divine retribution as non-eternal. With an extra-ordinary approach, he holds that hell-fire has a relative changing state. Ibn Arabi tries to support the idea of the relativity of divine retribution and hell-fire and to show the meagerness of human deeds vis-a-vis God’s grace. He believes in the transformation of divine retribution to divine grace and ultimately to eternal peace. ‘The proportionality of divine retribution to worldly deeds’, ‘the possibility of warnings being refuted by God on the Day of Judgment’ and ‘the non-inherent nature of deeds and the essence of natural disposition’ are reasons put forward by Ibn Arabi to support his view of non-eternity of hell-fire.