فصلنامه اندیشه دینی
پیاپی 43 (تابستان 1391)

Suhrawadi has discussed happiness in his various works and it shows its importance in his view. He gives only one definition for happiness. In some of his works he has divided happiness into two kinds: eternal (concerning hereafter) and virtual (concerning this world). In some of his other works he has divided it into eternal and non- eternal. He believes in a strong relationship between light and happiness according to which he sees happiness as an analogical reality. He gives different criteria for the ultimate happiness. Although these criteria seem to be in contradiction to each other but we can find a consistent interpretation of them. Contrary to Aristotle and those who seek corporeal happiness، he says that it is impossible to reach ultimate happiness in this corporeal world.

Those who defend negative theology base their ontological arguments on God''s unity، simplicity، being not comparable، lacking of limitation، lacking of quiddity، absoluteness، and infinity. On the other side، those who defend positive theology hold that there is no inconsistency between the above mentioned attributes of God and his positive attributes. For example، they say، we can accept both his unity of essence and his multiplicity of attributes. Also we can attribute him positively from one side and accept his incomparability from the other side. Also there is not any implication between having description and being limited. There is no inconsistency between an absolute God and the God of religions; All of these are derived from confusing general knowledge and detailed knowledge of God. We will discuss that most of these criticisms do not apply to negative theology and that the critics have not a clear concept of this theology in their minds.

Intentionality of thought means that thought، really and not fictitiously، is directed towards an object different from itself. Advocates of the theory of intentionality believe that intentionality is the inalienable feature of all humans'' thoughts including sensuous، imaginary; rational perception and even apprehension of his own essence because in their opinions all humans'' thoughts originate from the sensuous perception and sensuous perception is based on intentionality. According to Avicenna sensuous perception has the property of intentionality and is directed towards an accidental object but he does not consider that this property is an inalienable feature of all thoughts. In his opinion thought without intentionality is possible too. In his viewpoint self-consciousness – based on the theory of the man floating in air- is an example of thought that is not dependent upon intentionality but upon an immaterial soul of thinking subject. He holds that not only in apprehension of essence but also in some grades of apprehension of other like intellectual perception and truthful dream، human thought is not depending upon relation to accidental object. In his opinion thought is a mental quality directed towards an object but this aboutness (intentionality) of thought is accidental not inherent. In his view، what is inherent of thought is immateriality not intentionality. Against Avicenna the author of this paper holds that essence of thought is not a negative thing but is the same intentionality. Apprehension of essence is seemingly in conflict with this idea because in the apprehension of essence the knowing subject is the same as the knowing object and the real relation is not established between these two. However with more meditation on the meaning of thought and giving a true interpretation of the quality of the apprehension of essence this contradiction may be removed.

In Mulla Sadra''s epistemology، human perception consists of three elements: the perceiver (soul)، the internal perceived image (which is known directly) and the external object of perception (which is known through the previous element). However this view is justified only by the essential objectivity in order to maintain correspondence. We have no way to justify this objectivity and the correspondence between the second and the third element but the oneness of the quiddity of these two and the active creativity of the soul in creating an image correspondent to the external object of our knowledge none of which is justified and both of which confront several questions. In this paper we will discuss whether Mulla Sadra''s epistemology can answer these questions.

Corporeal resurrection has been one of the challenges between theologians and philosophers. We can say that in Islamic philosophy، Mulla Sadra was the first one who could rationally demonstrate corporeal resurrection. He argued that human body is the lowest degree of the self disclosure of his soul. The soul''s actions are performed through the body. So the body is not independent of the soul and has a causal role in the action and therefore it is responsible for the action and is worth of punishment and reward in the hereafter. According to Mulla Sadra، this body is made by the imaginary act of the soul. One of the followers of Mulla Sadra who does not accept Mulla Sadra''s view on corporeal resurrection is Mulla Ali Zunuzi (Aqa Ali Mudarres). He holds، on fundamentals of Sadra''s philosophy، that some effects of the soul remain in the relevant body and in its parts. These effects cause these parts to move and to constitute a perfect body. This body will join again to the soul in hereafter life. So، for Zunuzi، corporeal resurrection means re-joining of the immortal and worldly body to the soul. In this paper we will compare these two views with each other and conclude that Mulla Sadra''s theory possesses p0hilogophicaly more internal consistency.

In this paper we will discuss whether God has knowledge in the level of his essence and we will compare Plotinus''s and Sadra''s views on this problem. Plotinus''s approach is completely different from that of Mulla Sadra. Plotinus does not represent any clear and specific argument for the essential knowledge of God. But he does not attribute ignorance to God at his essence level، and based on his negative theology concerning the «One»، he accepts that God possesses a kind of witness at this level. On the other hand، Mulla Sadra initiates a new method discussing God''s knowledge and represents several arguments in this relation. In the final step we can find a kind of similarity between these two thinkers in attributing a sort of knowledge by presence to God.

Aesthetics as a discipline has been in the center of studies and researches of different groups of thinkers. One of the problems in this relation is the domain of beauty. Does beauty extend to all existent things or it is limited to some and the others will be regarded as ugly? The answer to this question depends on our view in ontology from one side and aesthetics from another side. One of the approaches to this problem is that of Islamic Mysticism. Based on the revealed scriptures، Muslim mystics have represented cognitive answers to this question. Since among Muslim mystics Ibn Arabi has been the most influential one، we have focused our discussion on his ideas in this paper. We will study his views on the «domain of beauty in the cosmos». We will approach his views from ontological and aesthetic dimensions. We will show that from his point of view، beauty is identical to existence and there is no ugliness in the world.