فصلنامه پژوهش های اصولی
پیاپی 12 (بهار 1391)

One of the objections about theory of conditioned obligatory is that: this theory is required separation between creative proposition (Ensha) and content of what is created (Monsha). Impossibility of separation between creative proposition (Ensha) and content of what is created (Monsha) is referring to Impossibility of separation between creation and existence, or between cause and effect, or between credit to and what is credited. Many of researchers reply to this objection. This article came under scrutiny replies of researchers Khorasani, Esfahani, Eraqi, Naeini and Khouie and criticizes them. In the first era (the objection of separation between creation and existence) it is argued that the reply of the researcher Khorasani that explain by the researcher Esfahani is accepted true. According to this view it is difference between real actuate (ba’th) and virtual actuate. It seems the theory of conditioned obligatory does not require separation between cause and effect or between credit to and what is credited.

The famous idea between usulians is that when we are uncertainty to the laws of the shari’ah and these laws are probable and doubtful for us, the reason judgment is the principle of indecency of punishment without declaration. The researcher martyr Sadr rejected this idea and argued to the theory of Obedience right for share’. According to this theory, Repugnance for probable and doubtful laws of the shari’ah warrants punishment. This article argues that although theory of Obedience right is reasonable to the principle of indecency of punishment without declaration, but it seems that it isn’t true too. This essay introduces a new theory that may call “Theory of the binding testimony (tanajoz) of the reality”. According to this new theory, repugnance for probable and doubtful laws of the shari’ah doesn’t warrant punishment, but this is for real laws of the shari’ah.

Action is unit of Linguistic communication. It means that Linguistic communication could not be analyzed only by Linguistic contractions and rules of a special language. Thus every type of Linguistic communication is a type of creation and speech act. Hereupon, a Linguistic philosopher or a usuli must not content with semantic level of language for verbal analyzing, But he must discover and explicate general rules of language specially rules of application. Since meaning is specified by speech act. Therefore structure of a proposition can be specified and the meaning of affirmation and negation of a proposition can be understood only if it is regarded as a type of speech act. This article addition to explanation theory of Linguistic communication as action, try to present how understanding of reality of meaning, elements of proposition and affirmation or negation of it, is based on this theory.

This article discusses about reality of semantic change (Naql), improvisation (irtejal), polysemy, factors that produce them, and types of classification of semantic change. Also discussion about verbal change, cultural and circumstances change is confirm in this essay. In addition, after presenting factors of semantic change (Naql), this article turns to comparative studying about these factors, namely to specify existence of semantic change (Naql) and temporal era of taking place it by these factors. Finally, principle of “Non- semantic change” and four types of it, in cases that existence of semantic change is doubtful and also in cases that history of change is doubtful is studied in this essay.