فصلنامه قبسات
پیاپی 66 (زمستان 1391)

Since most religions – especially Islam in the present situation – are "text centered", a new perspective regarding the investigation of these texts has been created. This new viewpoint is the literary investigation of religious texts which has gone through many changes due to the developments of the literary theory and literary criticism. The main presupposition of this research and most religious researches is the suspension of essence and that religion/religious texts are rare; this makes it a literary text. The neo-literates followed the spirit dominant on the West's tradition of research, and gradually a literary school of Quran's interpretation was formed. The "allegorical reading" of some such as Nasr Hamed Aboo-zaid and Mohammad Arkoun is the up-to-date version of this school. The main problem of this conventional look at religious texts and considering them literary texts is their base in the suspension of essence; which has created a deep separation between a devoutly approach to religion and the researching approach. The researcher cannot be open-minded in his literary study although he/she such claims, and he/she will lose his concordance with religious texts. On the other hand if we regard a text's different levels of meaning, having a literary look at the texts is a petitio principii (reasoning in circle) in which the favored result is supposed; thus there will not be enough evidence for believing in Quran or religious texts. This kind of approach is more than a special point of view; it challenges the essence of faith and religion.

I will investigate the general perspective of Sohrevardi about the destiny and fate of soul in this article. Thus first the survival of soul after the death of body is discussed and the four reasons of Sheikh Ishraq to prove this survival are elaborated. Then his opinion regarding the soul's felicity and misery and the reality of the other world's punishment and reward will be discussed. Then his transcendental view about the states of human's soul and their degrees after death are explained and at the end, reincarnation is briefly explained from his pint of view. Then I will conclude that he did not believe reincarnation – based on his peripateticist approach - from the beginning but he doubts in his theory at the end of his life. Thus he doubtfully talks about the falseness of incarnation in his last book 'Hikmah Al-Ishraq'.

Love and beauty are deeply connected with each other in the philosophies of Plato and Molla-Sadra. Based on their special philosophical bases, the two philosophers each have presented a different explanation of this connection. Despite the clear difference between the explication of each philosopher from love, beauty and God, they have created an inseparable connection between the real love and the absolute beauty and God. I will investigate the real love and the absolute beauty and their relation with God from the perspective of the two philosophers in this article; I will compare the two perspectives and will clarify the similarities and differences between the two views.

The One is either real or unreal. The real One is either an essence attributed to unity or it is an essence identical with unity such that it is impossible to imagine plurality in it and this One has a real and right unity – which is different from numerical unity. In his religious and philosophical thought, Allamah Tabatabai denies the numerical unity of God on the one hand – because numerical unity leads to some restrictions for the One – and proves the real and right unity of God on the other hand; which means that in God's essence, unity is identical with essence and the One and the united are identical. Therefore no plurality may be supposed in His supreme essence; his essence is the absolute One and may not be divided in the outside world, in mind and reason and in conjecture. I will show, in this article that Allamah Tabatabai's religious thought corresponds with his philosophical thought in the subject of God's real and right unity. I have followed this purpose with a combinational method.

One of the main theistic questions is the question of God's agency. His agency, like the agency of any other agent, is completely related with his knowledge of his action, which is another main question in theology. God's agency has been recognized by Muslim philosophers from the very first creation of Islamic philosophy. One of the main theories in this regard is the theory of agent-by-foreknowledge. One of the believers of this theory is Ibn-Sina. Molla-Sadra has also accepted it and has changed some parts of it. The theory of the mystics is another theory posed in this regard. They believe God is agent-by-self-manifestation; His action is his manifestation. Molla-Sadra has accepted this theory as well and believes there is no contradiction between this theory and the theory of agent-byforeknowledge. Allamah Tabatabai has accepted the two theories as well; yet in his accepted theory of agent-by-foreknowledge, God's will does not return to his knowledge rather his will is an active attribute. This is the main difference between his theory and Molla-Sadra's theory in this regard.

Religious theology is a knowledge which rationally thinks about religion. When it confronts experimental sciences it has passed – and will pass – through various paths and models. The most famous model presented in this regard is the Ryan Barber's model which has divided this confrontation into four levels: contradiction, independence, cooperation, and unity. On the other hand the new approaches posed in experimental sciences are part of the scientific theories which discuss the basic matters of the universe; the characteristics of these approaches are: avoiding the concept of "God of the gaps", avoiding the intervention in the domain of experimental sciences, and at the same time attempting to present a rational and deistical interpretation of it. Emphasizing on the intrinsic restrictions of experimental sciences or on the restricted domain of scientific knowledge, a new perspective regarding the kind of confrontation of religious theology and experimental science is formed. Based on Barber's model and the new approach to natural theology, I will try to model the different kinds of confrontation of religious theology with experimental sciences in this article; in other words I will generalize and reform Barber's model considering the new approaches in natural theology.

One of the famous theories regarding Quran's miracle is the theory of "Sarfeh". This theory has had pros and cons from the very past and each have presented some reasons to prove their idea. On the other hand this theory is related with some theological ideas which should be investigated. Although there are many centuries after its birth, the theory of sarfeh was gradually criticized by Quran researchers and has created a discourse which is still in process. The new efforts of some writers – on the press or in the internet – who pose some questions and present some new reasons to prove this theory, and also the questions mentioned by Seyyed Mortaza in his Al-Moozeh – first printed ten years ago – has drawn me to repose this subject. Thus this article will investigate and criticize the latest reasons of the defenders of this theory and will try to find the reality; the approach of this article is to answer the posed questions and to complete some of the answers of previous scholars. I have also paid attention to the most important questions of the ancestors which are, in some cases, the base of contemporary questions.

In this paper I assess Wegner’s view of the conscious will and the claims that he makes on the basis of it. He argues that conscious will is an illusion; An act of intention formation, to be conscious, must be available to the agent in a way that doesnt call for self-interpretation; it has to be direct, immediate and non-inferential. Wegner shows that there is no such immediate awareness. The result is that there is no such thing as conscious willing: conscious will is, indeed, an illusion. Yet this argument suffers from an obvious lacuna; “two systems theory” of decision making. According to this view, The brain is a “parallel processor” which consist of two seperate processors; unconscious and conscious. We can concede that System 1 decisions are never conscious, but still maintain the reality of conscious will by aligning it with System 2. If this theory was right, Wegner’s argument for the illusoriness of conscious will would be in trouble.