نشریه حکمت سینوی
پیاپی 49 (بهار و تابستان 1392)

The tendency of man towards worship results from his need to his true beloved and there should be a desire within it; on the other hand, religious texts have specified strongly on the obligatory character of devotional practices. The question is that on the basis of Ibn Sina’s idea on philosophy and the nature of worship what relation exists between a desire to worship with its obligatory character?On the basis of Ibn Sina’s philosophical foundations the nature and truth of worship is the perception and recognition of God; so that the philosophical reflections in – itself is considered as a kind of worship. On the relation of pleasure and worship Ibn Sina speaks of a kind of coneomitance between these two concepts. He considers pleasure, like perception, as having of fourfold sensual, imaginative, illusory and rational degrees, which the most complete of it is rational perception and rational preference has preference over the sensual pleasure, because the person seeking rational preference has preference over the person who seeks sensual pleasure. Rational perception is the stage of perception and knowledge of God most high and seeking pleasure in this stage is obtained through obedience and worship of God most high and reflection on divine attributes.On Ibn Sina’s view worship has different orders; so that the crust and form of worship is obligation and its gist and kernel is the very strong desire and rational pleasure and for those who are engaged in non-rational and sensual pleasures and ignore rational pleasure. The obligatory character of components of devotional practice brings about hardship; for they should turn their attention from sensual pleasure to rational pleasure. In the strategy that Ibn Sina offers,obligation is not removed and human being by practicing religious obligation goes from crust to kernel and likewise one should go beyond layers and repeat it so that one leave behind the superficial layers of worship and attain to the kernel of it.

Examining the logical elements in the social ethics is among the subjects that Ibn Sina has done through the explanation of ethical statements and analysis of its content. He presents society as the origin of the morality and he introduces society as a background which morality derives from it and then in the same background moral virtues are groonded. In the meantime he introduces logic as an instrument for the study and grounding these affairs. The main issue in this study is to determine the moral happiness Ibn Sina pays attention to both in its rational aspects and to its ethical aspects which includes social ethics and regulates the relation of individuals in society and with each others. To specify the limits of rationality and being rational, he presents religion as the framework of law making and by an analysis of moral statements in generally accepted opinions under the topic of dialectics considers different origins for morality. Incidentally, on this basis beside the compatibility with religion, he introduces a criterion of logical appraisal for morality. For by determining the place of moral statements in logic and specifying the value of statement which have categorizal certainty, he presents the criterion for their appraisal from the same area.

One of the important subjects in Islamic thought is the discussion about the impossibility or permission of restoration of non-being. The main issue in the present article is that unlike some theologians, Islamic philosophers are in agreement on the impossibility of the restoration of non-being. By reviewing the problem and the consideration of its place it is known that despite agreement among philosophers on the restoration, there is a fundamental disagreement between Avicenian and Sudrian philosophy in the analysis of it. It has to be noted that the basis and focus in the discussion of restoration of non-being is the subject of individuation and indentity which in the philosophy of Ibn Sina there is no proper analysis of it; because essence was considered the orbit of individuation and essential properties. For this same reason, on the basis of peripatetic philosophy an appropriate interpretation can not be offered of the restoration of non-being. As Shaykh al-Rais could not analyse the individuation of object in substantial movement and voted against it. On the contrary, by setting forth the principality of existence and making it the centre of individuation in Sadrian philosophy it is clear that despite general changing of essence, individuation of fluid and moving being is preserved and in ease this existential connection is broken, restoration of essence is not the same as the restoration of non-being. Given the relation of the subject with substantial movement, and that annihilation is only conceivable in the world of nature and in the course of movement, the place of the topic of the restoration of non-being should be left from the section on general topics of being and be placed alongside the other topics of movement and following the topic of substantial movement.

The substance of ontological arguments, from Anselm’s version to its later versions in Islamic philosophy, is typically based on reclamation of the nature of actual existence of necessary being from its very concept. The research topic in the present article is not to criticize the above mentioned reasoning, but to prove the necessary being in itself from concept of being. We have come to the conclution that any attempt in order to prove or defend these arguments has been unsuccessful. Therefore, it is inevitable that we should by the assumption of an actual being to prove the existence of a necessary being which this characteristic is only implicit. Ibn Sina’s argument of necessity and possibility and ontological argument without building on it have no way of escaping from the concept of existence and proving the objective existence, let alone proving the existence of the necessary most high. The necessary and possibility of Ibn Sina by assumption of some being and with the help of negating sophistry and vicious circle tries to improve the actual existence of necessary being and is the origin of ontological argument, not an argument beside them. Finally, by philosophical analysis of the quality of perciving the concept of being and building it on sensual perception, it can be understood as a sign of the actualization of actual sensible being and from this point by annexing Ibn Sina’s necessity and possibility to it the actual existence can be reclaimed.

The problem of evil is one of the most important problems in religions and in the area of religious studies. The importance of the subject derives from the fact that it rests on the basis and principle of religious belifs, i.e. proving the existence of God and his attributes and in a way it undermines the religious teachings. But in fact this problem rests on the misgiving of incompatibility of two religious idea that is the existence of god and the existence of evil in the world so that it can be claimed that the statements “God exists” and “evil exists” logically are not compatible. Unless we set aside the absoluteness of God’s attributes and belive in the limitation and restriction of it is attributes and accept a dualistic view, that is believe in two creators of good and evil for the world. In the present article the solutions of three Muslim philosophers i.e. Ibn Sina, Shaykh Ishraq and Mulla Sadra as the greatest philosophers in Islamic philosophy is studied and analyzed. It should be said that each of these three philosophers has had a great part in replying to this misgiving so that their rational analysis has no precedent in Greek philosophy. Given their intellectual background it follows that the privation of evil and its accidental intention is the fundamental constitutive part of these three views.

Ibn Sina and suhrawardi each in their different works have discussed the status of human souls after death in respect of happiness and wickedness. On the whole, approach of Ibn Sina to this problem in a formal way can be presented in two models. In some of his works he has discussed the problem without any systematic classificatory presentation, and in some of his other works he has presented a systematic classification. In his “Al-Mabda wal Ma,ad” he has presented a threefold classification and in the treatise “Fi al Saada” a fourfold classification and in “al-Isharat wal-tanbihat” a fivefold classification of the status of souls.Likewise Suhrawardi in some of his works without presenting a systematic classification has discussed this problem and in some of his other works he has presented a double classification, in some a threefold classification and in some a fourfold division and in some others a fivefold classification and finally a six fold classification. The differences and similarities of Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, s point of view on the above mentioned classification is studied in the present article.By an analysis of the viewpoint of these two philosophers we find that in some respects such as principles and foundations presenting a theory with a single formal model and paying attention to rational happiness there is similarity between the two philosophers. On the contrary in view of following respects there are distinctions between these two philosophers. 1-Ibn-Sina’s strong emphasis on rational happiness; 2- recognition of sensual happiness on the part of Ibn-Sina; 3- setting forth the problem of soul belonging to heavenly bodies in an explicit way on the part of Shaykh Ishraq; and 4- methodological distinction of these two philosophers in solving the problem.

Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi as representatives of peripatetic and Ishraqi schools have disagreements over different topics which the most serious of them is dispute over “prime matter “as something which lacks actuality and is mere receptibility. By reference to philosophical books -in particular those relating to Avecennian wisdom- it can be observed that at most three arguments in proving the prime matter from Ibn Sina’s works is observable that its results is a belief in the composition of body from matter of bodily form. The author of Hikmat-al- Ishraq considers one of these arguments as nothing and criticizes the other two arguments seriously and regards the body as lacking prime matter and is mere substantial connection; but he in his “Talvihat” under the influence of the ideas of Ismaili sage and Ikhwan-al safa subscribes to the existence of prime matter in bodies.Following this dual reaction, these questions can be raised: is Suhrawardi in agreement with Ibn Sina in Talvihat, but disagrees with him in Hikmat-Al Ishraq? Is his dispute with Ibn Sina on this problem a literal disagreement? The purpose of this reaserch is to present the differences of opinion between Suhrawardi and Ibn Sina, remove controvercy from Suhrawardi's point of view regarding prime matter.On this basis some ideas of contemporary thinkers are studied and criticized.