فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال یازدهم شماره 4 (پیاپی 44، تابستان 1393)

By accepting motion in the substance and the essence of the soul، we may find more precise solutions for many of the rational and transmitted difficulties. The way the abstract soul emerges، the plurality of abstract souls، survival of the soul after leaving the corpus، and natural death are among the cases that may be explained and analyzed better through this special view of the soul. In the present article، we have sought to remove some of the ambiguous points in the abovementioned cases using the explicit and implicit statements of Mulla Sadra. In this way، we may highlight some of the achievements of the substantial motion of the soul in rational and transmitted domains.

Allama Tabatabaie، one of the prominent philosophers and commentators، has accepted the common sense of all beings based on rational and transmitted arguments، trying to explain it. The writer has referred to the works written by Allama Tabatabaie (especially al-Mizan exegesis) to describe and analyze his view on perception in all beings، and to investigate that view based on rational and transmitted arguments. It seems that although we may prove the common sense in all beings based on the traditions and Quranic verses used by Allama، the explanation and rational argument used by him is to be questioned. Besides، it seems that the claims of transmitted arguments in common sense of material beings is much more than what Allama has accepted based on his own philosophical foundations. Thus، the main arguments in this discussion are narrative ones that need no further investigation about their chain of narrators، because of their consecutiveness.

There have been numerous views on eternity or contingency of the soul as well as its being physically or spiritually originated. The Peripatetic philosophers have regarded the soul as an abstract substance originated along with the origination of the body while it is independent of the body. It is compounded with the body through an integrative addition. Accordingly، it has a correlation with the body. In Mulla Sadra’s view، however، the origination of soul is not as an abstract being; rather، it is the matter that is resonated in its essence. This goes on in a way that the soul، as far as the physiological features are concerned، in addition to vegetative orders and ideal abstraction، i. e. the animal order، reaches the level that deserves its becoming the rational soul and experiences intellectual abstraction. Master Fayyazi holds that the origination of the soul takes place before the body and as an abstract being. The soul، in order to be complete، dominates the body and governs it. The interest and affection established between the body and the soul results in mutual influence between them. He، due to non-efficiency of the intellect in this regard، relies more on transmitted traditions to prove his own view.

The discussion on happiness، originated from Greek philosophy، continued in Islamic philosophy. The nature of happiness was thought to be a composition of cognitive dimensions and the emotional experience. This would conform to the modern definitions of delight in psychology. Considering the two levels of emotional happiness and spiritual happiness (using the terms bahjat and farah) in Avicenna’s discussions as well as a relationship between happiness and spirituality are among epistemological achievements of Islamic philosophy. In positive views of psychology such as Lamaism، the relationship between happiness and meaningfulness of life has become so close that happiness is introduced as the goal of life for all human beings and the main element of meaningfulness of life. In a deeper analysis، however، it is clarified that happiness is the effect of meaningfulness and not its cause. It may involve in meaningfulness of life when it is linked with spirituality and higher goals of perfection، and when it is considered as the fruit of such a link. The discussions on viewing happiness as the goal of life present just a formalism of happiness، considering its teleological dimension without considering the epistemological domain.

In his works، Heidegger has frequently referred to the end of philosophy. In the present article، we seek to show the roots of passing metaphysics and the end of philosophy with a look at the historical approach influenced by Diltai and his wish to reach a pure reading of Christian doctrines. By searching in his works، we may infer that philosophy، in his view، has two meanings: in the first meaning، he regards philosophy as the synonym for metaphysics. He holds that the history of metaphysics has started by neglecting the existence and dealing with the beings and what the western human has indulge in is nothing except neglecting the reality of existence. In the second meaning، however، he regards philosophy as the synonym for thought and holds that although philosophy in the meaning of metaphysics has ended، philosophy in the meaning of thought and its new relationship with existence may be a new window for humans. In the present article، we have dealt more with the first meaning of philosophy in Heidegger’s view so that we may clarify his complex claim. And at the end، the article deals with some short critical considerations regarding his view.

In the present article، the theory of “realization” put forward by physicalists adherent to functionalism، has been investigated from the viewpoint of the extent to which it has been successful in solving the problem of mental causation. The authors show that various versions and editions of that idea have not managed to solve the problem of mental causation; rather they have recessed to typical identity and reductionism، or have involved in double causal determination. In the present article، Shoemaker’s “subset theory” presented in 2007 and Yablo’s theory of “particularism” presented in 1992 have been explained، both of them as versions of realization theory. The authors have shown that the two theorists have sought to prove the originality and objectivity of mental features (an escape from reductionism) and to present a picture of exerting a causal force by those features. Afterwards، however، by presenting the criticisms of Kim and others، they show the continuity of the problem of causal deprivation and involvement in reductionism in both readings.

In Ma’rifat-i Falasafi 10، an article is published which is entitled “Reconstructing Anselm’s Argument in Proving God’s Existence”. The author of that article had sought to defend that argument and to answer related objections (Ushaqi، 1384). Respecting views presented in that article، the present article regards both defense and answers to objections incomplete. It reviews and criticizes the abovementioned article. Therein، the deficiencies of Anselm’s argument، the insufficiency of that article’s reading of it، and the incompleteness of the answers to objections have been discussed.