فصلنامه شیعه شناسی
پیاپی 45 (بهار 1393)

The contemporary Islamic movements have a special status in evolutions in Middle East. Among them, the revolution of Bahrani people, especially the main axes of it, have had a considerable role in Shiite geopolitics and as the social forces, groups, individuals and independent opposing groups in conflicting the royal regime governing that country.The present article aims at explaining and analyzing the Shiite geopolitics and its status in regional and global evolutions, especially in recent movements and revolutions in Islamic countries, with an emphasis on the revolution of Bahrain. The Shi’as of Bahrain, while they form the major part of the population of Bahrain and are mainly low-paid workers, have been socially and politically marginalized in comparison to the urban rich minority of Sunnis who have the governmental power. An attempt to obtain proper political and social rights as well as changing the autocratic royal regime governing Bahrain has led to formation of the public revolution, especially among the Shi’as of this country as opposed to the ruling Āl-e Khalifa. In spite of having features such as publicity and seeking democracy, this revolution has faced with silence and even negative reaction from western countries as well as the severe military reaction from Arabia. The present article is seeking to analyze the reasons for western’s dual dealing with these evolutions while adducing a redefinition of the geopolitical evolution of Shiism, especially the status of revolution of Bahrain in this process.

For the author, imposing the notion of “geopolitics” on the Shiite epistemological and doctrinal discourse is among the innovations of the Francois Thual’s book entitled Shiite Geopolitics. Francois has attempted to adjust the older notions of Iranian Islam and Arabic Islam to Iranian Shiism and Arabic Shiism in a narrower circle. His main goal in this book is to display the Shiite geopolitics with Iran’s heartland. To do so, he has ignored many of the realities of the Shiite societies, and his errors in reporting the Shiite history are quite obvious.

With the establishment of Twlever Shiism under Safawids, there emerged a dual procedure as for the power in religious system. As soon as legitimizing the government went under the scholars, and with the diffusion of rites and rituals, criticism and negation of power came under the main symbols of Shiite rites in Āshūrā and Muharram.The writers of the present article claim, based on the approach of religious functionalism, that it seems that in a historical change, with diffusion of rites and rituals, Shiism has shifted from legitimizing the government into negating it. A great part of this change has been affected by the symbolic diffusion of negating political power in religious rites and rituals.Iranian kings in Safawid and Qajar periods would help to diffuse Shiite rites to enhance their own power. However, with the people’s attention to these rites, criticism and negation of the king’s absolute power turned into the most important symbol of Shiite rites.

All over the world, Shi’as would hold the ceremony in memory of Karbala Martyrs in Muharram. The Afghan Shi’as would also hold this ceremony in mourning for martyrs of Karbala, and this has been done since the Shiism came to this country.The present article has dealt with this in two parts: the first is a short mention of the historical course of mourning for Imam Hussein in Afghanistan and especially in Kabul. In the second part, we have dealt with the style of mourning, the signs and symbols, females’ mourning, the structure of Tekyas (the buildings dedicated to mourning for Imam Hussein), and the way people hold this ceremony in Kabul. This part is based on the writer’s observations and his interviews with informants.

Diffusion of the Shiite culture and beliefs throughout history among various regions and peoples of Iran has covered different paths. In Gilan, because of government of Diālama and Āl-e Kia, the growth and diffusion of Shiite beliefs among the peoples of the region has been more long-lasting and deeper. One of the most prominent Shiite symbols is the incident of Karbala, an incident among the deepest and the most disastrous religious incidents in human history. The reflection of this incident in Shiite societies has been variously found throughout history.In the manifestation of their Shiite interests, the people of Gilan would gather in holy shrines of Imams’ children and those of Sayyids to implore the Prophet’s Household while holding Shiite rites in those places. Besides, to protect the epic of Āshūrā, they would inscribe the themes of this great incidence on the walls of those shrines. The Shi’as of the region would regard the disaster of Karbala as their own disaster, attempting to display it in their paintings. These inscriptions are the instances of respecting the one buried there as well as restating the pure beliefs of the people. This tradition of drawing portraits on the walls of holy shrines is an old tradition with two centuries of antiquity. Dealing with religious themes of the everlasting epic of Āshūrā in inscriptions of holy shrines has been done with love and affection towards them, without any historical documentation. Here, the emotional aspects have been dealt with. The inscriptions have had a sacred dimension, with an effective role in nurturing their Shiite beliefs and their traditional rites.The present article is emphasizing the fact that reflection of Āshūrā’s themes in inscriptions of holy shrines shows those people’s affection towards and their belief in the Prophet’s Households as well as its effect on the Shiite beliefs of Gilan’s people. Most of the inscriptions can be evaluated with a symbolic and mythological view of the people since they are related to the folklore of the Shiite culture.

Islam has always been a key element in the cultural identity of Malaysia; it has created the everlasting and most influential ethnic characteristic. There are two views (old and new) on emergence of Shiism in Malaysia: some believe that with coming of Islam into the southeast Asia – brought by Iranian, Arab, and Indian Muslim merchants in the early years of 15th century – Malaca province started its activity as the Islamic center in this region. Some others hold that the background of Shiism in Malaysia goes back to the activities of a Pakistanian Sayyid who implanted the Shiism in Malaysia with his books and pamphlets. The victory of Islamic revolution of Iran attracted the attention of many elites to Shiism, after which much attention would be paid to Shiims in Malaysia. The present article focuses its attention to investigating the society of Shi’as in Malaysia from the political, cultural, and economic viewpoints.

In the present article, “the historical evolutions of presence of women in mosques and Islamic places and its effect on architecture of mosques” has been studied.First, we have investigated the presence of women in mosques in early Islam and the Prophet’s encouraging them to be present in mosques as well as some cases of forbidding them to do so. The caliphs after the Prophet behaved in a different way; they would set limits on women’s presence in mosques. The Imams after the Prophet followed his behavior and set no limitation for women; there were some cases of forbidding women as well. The Sunnite scholars followed their caliphs and would forbid women to enter the mosques; this has gradually affected the architecture of the mosques, and there is no place specific to women in Sunnite mosques. Shiite scholars, however, followed the Prophet’s Household and prepared the ground for women’s presence in mosques.Appropriating special places to Shiite women in mosques and Husseyniyas has resulted in women’s progress in religious, social, political and cultural affairs and affected them as far as civilization is concerned. This has resulted in positive changes both in architecture of Shiite mosques and Sunnite mosques.

The conquest of Rey by Saljūqs led to the loss of power balance between Basāsiri and Ibn Moslem, the Abbasid Vizier, in Baqdad. Meanwhile, the disagreement between Basāsiri and King Rahim led to the weakening of Āl Būya. After the domination of Saljūqs over Iran, this prepared the ground for realization of their policy of diffusing domination and their entering into Iraq as well as saying yes to invitation on the part of Abbasid caliph. To preserve his political-military situation, Basāsiri grants the request by Mu’ayyid al-Din Shirāzi; however, the followings result in cutting assistance to Basāsiri: Fatimids’ economic problems, no trust in Basāsiri, Ibn Maqrebi’s disagreement with Basāsiri’s movement, and the type of view in changing the force facing Saljūqs. The head of the Shiite missioners, Mu’ayyid al-Din Shirāzi, went to Cairo in secret, but the followings led to a cut between Basāsiri and the head of the missioners: Basāsiri’s impermanent companions, their change in position between Basāsiri and Saljūqs, no loyalty towards Isma’ilite Shi’as, as well as the problems raied for Yazūri, the Fatimid vizier Mustanser. Basāsiri sends gifts to caliph in Egypt and reads sermon in the name of Mustanser; however, he keeps the Abbasid caliph as his winning card in Hadithat al-Furāt with his real companion in conquest of Baqdad, Quraysh bin Badrān. Basāsiri’s movement and proclaiming the caliphate of Fatimids was a division of political power and interests rather than a result of loyalty to Isma’ilite Shi’as.In a treaty written for Basāsiri as the head of the troops, there is no mention of commitment of Isma’ilite Shi’as. Besides, identification of Imam Mahdi with Fatimid Mustanser to proclaim the association of some Imamiyya Shi’as with Basāsiri reverses Ibn Athir’s report and results from the relationship between Mazid bin Sadaqa and Basāsiri, rather than conformity of proclaiming a live Imam in a certain time. Thus, the views of some orientalists such as Gerhard Hoffman, T. Canard and Nuggle can be corrected and completed.