مجله فلسفه علم
سال چهارم شماره 2 (پیاپی 8، پاییز و زمستان 1393)

The extension of the mathematical argumentation methods، in recent decades، has led to an essential critique of classic definition of mathematical proof. The critics often have suggested alternative definitions، which have different and sometimes incompatible presuppositions and implications. Such a situation has exposed mathematics to relativism. The problem of multiplicity of definitions، therefore، can be considered as one of the most important epistemological issues in mathematics. In this paper، we try، from third order or meta-methodological position، to answer this question: ‘what is the meta-criterion for choosing the best definition of mathematical proof? ’ by answering this question we will be one step closer to a justified definition of mathematical proof. The authors will show that the explanatory power meta-criterion، compared to the two other rivals، i. e. the equivalence meta-criterion and the consensus meta-criterion، is more tenable.

Quine’s article in 1951 entitled ‘Tow Dogmas of Empiricism’، based on an unexpected critique of analytic-synthetic distinction، rules against using ‘analyticity’ to explain the necessity and the a priori. Quine refused any attempt to display any distinction between analytic and synthetic statements without a vicious circle among them. According to his viewpoint، concepts as ‘synonymy’، ‘contradiction’ and ‘meaning’ which were used in the definition of the analytic statements، aren’t clear enough and there is a vicious circle between them. Quine argues that a holistic attitude toward any ‘individual statement’ entails that all propositions can be in touch، in some way، with the empirical boundary of our belief web. It implies the possibility of revision all statements and consequently the destruction of familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. In this article we first review Quinen’s viewpoint on the rejection of analytic-synthetic distinction and then will examine the main challenges of his critique.

This paper، aims to formulate a philosophy of nanotechnology، addresses definitions، historical contexts، applications، and implications of nanotechnology، and its relation to philosophy as well. I explain some philosophical aspects of nanotechnology (as a branch of technology)، which are discussed through metaphysical (ontological)، epistemological (and methodological)، and axiological (theory of value) attitudes. It is concluded that the philosophy of nanotechnology consists of some philosophical inputs (or foundations) and some outputs (or implications)، which covers the general philosophy of technology، and since the close relations between nanotechnology and modern science it also consists of some aspects of general philosophy of science، and philosophy of special science، philosophy of physics، in particular.

The viewpoints of Kuhn and Feyerabend، as two philosophers of science، are similar in many aspects، even the same in certain problems. They do not believe in any objective and universal rationality، hence، their views are regarded relativistic by many other philosophers. These two philosophers، belong to the second half of the twentieth century and are considered as a response to positivism and negativism. Despite the extensive correspondences، there are some significant differences between them. In this paper، we have tried to derive and analyze the criticisms of Feyerabend to Kuhn''s viewpoint on science، such as critisizing the Kuhn''s ideological approach to history، the domain of his incommensurability، the ambiguity in normativeness and descriptiveness of his ideas، unjustifiable transition from tenacity to proliferation، failure in discriminating between science and non-science via theoretical entities such as paradigm and normal science، and finally restricting the scientists’ freedom throughout the normal science.

In his Scientology، Avicenna introduces medicine as a sub-discipline of natural wisdom. Medicine of Avicenna is influenced by his own philosophy. Avicenna، as a philosopher-physician، has used of his philosophical views throughout his medical works. He also at several positions from the book of Law (Ghanoon)، refrains from entering into philosophical discussions، and indicates that these issues should be discussed elsewhere، i. e. in philosophy. This shows that Avicenna although cares to separate philosophical and medical problems، but indorse that medicine cannot be understood without the metaphysical foundations. This paper، through referring to the application of some philosophic principles in his medicine، argues that Avicenna’s medicine needs his philosophy.

Campbell، as a structuralist and phenomenalist philosopher، explains the ontological structure of things based on properties. Many physicists have endorsed his theory because he introduces properties as particular and tropic entities، of which outer world is built. In this paper، first، I introduce tropes and trope theory then I will notice some similarities and differences between this theory and physician’s opinions about subatomic and fields. We will conclude that we cannot introduce subatomic and fields as properties to explain the structure of external world.

There are، at least، three problems in Kripke’s theory of reference، including: 1. the problem of proper names referring: a proper name may refer to different referents in different possible worlds; 2. the problem of reference failure; and 3. the problem of referential infallibility of theoretical terms. In this paper، first we elaborate these problems in more details. Then we show how Kripke himself solves the first problem appealing to the concept of ‘use’ and then we investigate how the other two problems can be solved with the same strategy. We also refer to Davidson’s triangulation thesis to show that linguistic community contributes in the determination of referent.