فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال پنجم شماره 3 (پیاپی 19، زمستان 1393)

This paper presents a critical-comparative analysis of Tusi’s writings on ethics. Research on various dimensions of his ethical theory requires a comprehensive knowledge of his works. Therefore, prior to any study of his works on ethics, it is necessary to critically analyze them and compare them with each other. Moreover, it is also a must to identify Tusi’s contribution to research on ethics among his written works. It is not possible to provide an extensive report of all of his works in various fields in this paper; therefore, the writer has contented herself with referring to those books, treatises, and articles that he exclusively wrote on ethics including some scattered discussions of this field. Moreover, because of the importance of Tusi’s independent works on ethics, the writer has also referred to the date of each work, the purpose behind writing it, the approach of the work, the structure, method, and references used in writing it, its publication status, its place in the history of ethical works, its bibliography, the ethical school it represents, and its Table of Contents following an analytic-critical approach. This paper also examines the relationship between Tusi’s ethical writings, particularly his three important works including Akhlaq-e Muhtashami, Akhlaq-e Nasiri, and Awsaf al-ashraf.

The question of the concept and referent of “happiness” is rooted in Man’s nature. A comparison of the ideas of two authorities in this field, one from ancient Greece and the other from among the Islamic philosophers who were contemporary with Ibn Sina, is of great importance in appreciating the innovations of Muslim thinkers in comparison to those of Greek thinkers in various fields of philosophy. This short paper, which is based on an analytic-comparative study, after explaining the philosophical and ethical principles of each of these two schools, inquires into the similarities and differences between their ideas concerning happiness. Aristotle defined the theory of virtue and happiness based on the concept of “golden mean” with reference to some components such as the intellect, joy, and friendship. However, given his non-monotheistic view of God and the world and heedlessness of resurrection, he was not capable of providing a successful model for the concept and referent of happiness. In contrast, Ibn Miskawayh tries to explain the same concepts on the basis of the knowledge of the soul, the intellect, and the divine rule in the light of his monotheistic worldview. He divides happiness into two worldly and other-worldly types and introduces divine proximity as the true referent of happiness. Both of them define happiness as the transcendent good (supreme good); however, since the basic principles of their ethical philosophies are different from each other, their philosophical concomitants are also different from each other.

One of the innovations of Farabi and Islamic philosophy is the theory of the distinction between existence and quiddity. This view was merely developed in the light of understanding the meaning of the reality of being. Islamic philosophers, particularly Farabi and Ibn Sina, because of their epistemological rupture with Greek tradition, sought to understand being differently from Aristotle and, in a way, abstained from reducing the question of being to the question of the whatness of objects. In addition to a conceptual and logical distinction, Farabi managed to develop and present an ontological distinction in the field of philosophy. Ibn Sina expanded it so vastly that some might consider this theory as one of his own philosophical achievements. After the problem of the evidence and principliality of existence, the quality of the relationship between existence and quiddity turned out to be one of the most important discussions in Islamic philosophy. At the beginning, under the influence of dividing being into necessary and possible types, Muslim philosophers tried to explain the fundamental difference between them through explaining the relationship between quiddity and existence. As a result, they considered two propositions as the basis of two interpretations of existence and the explanation of its relationship with quiddity. The theory of the synthetic nature of quiddative existents in terms of their existence and quiddity, the existence’s being superadded or accidental to quiddity, and the distinction between existence and quiddity in existents are the views that emerged in Islamic philosophy with Farabi and gradually came to the fore as the most important discussions concerning existence. Furthermore, Farabi’s discussion concerning the individuation of quiddities and the criterion for individuation, which was later accepted by all Islamic philosophers and emphasized by them, was developed under the influence of the above theories. In this paper, the writer has initially tried to provide a correct understanding of the theory of distinction through clarifying its fundamental bases. Then he has clarified its ontological and philosophical consequences and highlighted the importance of this theory in Islamic philosophy. Such an explanation necessitates an extensive investigation of Farabi’s ideas about existence, the meaning of existence, and the existence-quiddity relation.

The studies on the development of the rationalist trend in the world of Islam usually discuss the challenges of rationalist groups with exoteric groups, including Ash‘ari mutikallimun and Sufists rather than compare or analyze the trends defending reason. Among such trends, the two autonomous and revelation-based rationalist groups play more influential roles. The reason is that it is in the dialog between these two groups that the mutual dependence of reason and religion on each other is revealed. Here, the dialog moves away from a sectarian debate and comes closer to real conversations. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the favorable and unfavorable ideas of Abu Hatam Razi, Ahmad Ibn Hamdan (d. 322 AH), and Muhammad Ibn Zakariyya Razi (d. 313 AH) regarding two kinds of rationalism, namely, autonomous and revelation-based, in the third and fourth centuries, respectively. This period is of great importance in the history of Islamic philosophy because during which different philosophical debates and schools emerged and various theories and boundaries were developed. Reducing the difference of the rationalism of Abu Hatam and Muhammad Ibn Zakariyya Razi to their belief or disbelief in the necessity of prophethood is the outcome of an extremely superficial comparison which does not explain the components and nature of their rationalism. The present paper aims to inquire into the main roots of this difference and provide a clear picture of their rationalistic methods and epistemological systems.

At the beginning of the modern period, German philosophy turned its eyes, more than to any other philosophical traditions, to Greek philosophy and borrowed its most fundamental principles from this school. This Hellenistic tradition in German philosophy, on the one hand, granted a new depth to these teachings and, on the other hand, resulted in some misunderstandings about Greek philosophy. This paper is intended to formulate one of the most well-known of such misunderstandings. This misunderstanding is rooted in the bases of Heraclitus’ teachings. Some ancient philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, who studied Heraclitus’ book, believed that the doctrine of motion was the basis of all his other doctrines. This was the case while Hegel, at a time when German modern philosophy was at its height of development, tried to bring his philosophy into harmony with Heraclitus’ doctrines. However, since it was impossible, he brought Heraclitus’ doctrines into harmony with the fundamental principles of his own philosophy. For example, he considered the basis of this early philosopher’s philosophy to be, not the doctrine of motion, but the identity of opposites. This reading of Hegel was soon accepted by some of researchers of Greek philosophy. In this paper, the writer has tried to demonstrate that a return to an ancient reading of the basis of Heraclitus’ philosophy is much more justified than accepting a Hegelian reading of the nature of its fundamental principles.

The main purpose of the present article is to compare the logico-linguistic theories of Farabi with contemporary linguistic principles and theories. To this end, the writers initially review the history of the development of linguistics and its turning into an independent discipline. Then they introduce the most common fields and theories in contemporary linguistics. Finally, they compare Farabi’s logico-linguistic theories with more recent linguistic concepts and theories. Ten centuries ago, Farabi referred to linguistics as one of the sciences of his time and introduced certain fields, principles, and theories for it which bear amazing similarity to contemporary linguistic theories from several aspects. Moreover, in the science of the laws of singular words, which is the third part of his seven-part science of language, he studies letters, sounds, and words as discussed in the phonology and morphology of today. In the science of compound words (fourth part of his language science), he examines the syntactic structure of sentences and their components. His theories in this regard bear a strange similarity to Chomsky’s phrase structure grammar. By distinguishing grammar or syntax from logic, Farabi established a relationship between them which could be illuminating to the philosophers, logicians, and grammarians following him concerning some of the theories of contemporary linguistics such as the theory of the universal grammar and its principles and parameters, the theory of the language acquisition device and its innateness, and the theory of surface and deep structures. His ideas about syntax and logic and their relationship is extremely innovative and useful, and some clear traces about certain modern theories such as the concept of the phonological surface structure and semantic deep structure of sentences and the theory of the innateness of language can be found therein. This paper explains Farabi’s theories and their relationship with modern linguistic theories in order to reveal some aspects of the genius, breadth of knowledge, academic certitude, and magnanimity of this prominent Iranian and Islamic scientist, philosopher, and linguist following a scientific method.

The pre-Socratic philosophy of ancient Greece begins with Milesian philosophers and their search for the origin and arche of the world. By stating that nature likes to hide itself، Heraclitus was the first thinker who tried to learn about the truth. Parmenides was also one of the most important thinkers who، in his quest for understanding the truth، explained the way towards attaining it by showing the ways of opinion and truth in his instructional poem. Continuing the trend of pre-Socratic philosophy، the materialist Anaxagoras did not add anything to this perception of the truth; however، he mentioned that، due to their weak senses، human beings are not capable of identifying the truth. Atomists، too، did not add anything to previous ideas more than saying that the truth is hidden in a whirlpool، and we know nothing about it. All these ideas finally reach a common point by concluding that the understanding of the truth has always coupled with such words as physis، lethe، and aletheia.