فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال دوازدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 46، زمستان 1393)

One of the most important issues in philosophy is a discussion on the unity and plurality of existence. There are different views common among philosophers, ranging from the view of difference among beings to the view of the particular unity of existence. The theory of ‘unity of existence’, with its mystical origin, has an important status in Mulla Sadra’s transcendental theosophy. This theory, however, is not an axiomatic one and needs to be proved. Mulla Sadra attempts to prove this theory by putting forward some arguments and to use it in various philosophical discussions. Along with philosophical arguments, he has presented numerous transmitted evidences to show the verity of this theory. The present article is a review of the Quranic verses and traditions adduced by Mulla Sadra for unity of existence and its implications. These evidences can be classified into five categories. Naturally, we can accept the Quranic verses and traditions as evidences for this claim only if there is no flaw in inferring unity of existence from these texts.

Mulla Sadra has nullified the theory of eternity of soul, believing in origination of soul on the one hand, and holding that soul – in previous origin, before its origination in this world – enjoyed intellectual existence. In the present study, we attempt to find the way out of this seeming disparity between the two theories in Mulla Sadra’s thought. This is because Mulla Sadra has dealt with this issue on numerous occasions, stressing that each of these two theories, in a certain meaning, can be proved for soul. In other words, soul is eternal because of its intellectual existence, and at the same time, is originated with physical origination because of its very being soul and in view of its belonging to worldly origin.

The present article investigates the question of what the reaction of the Islamic philosophy to the problems facing the religious epistemology is. Is it passive to them? Does it justify them and withdraw or it solves the problems and presents rational and wise solutions? The authors, after their constant efforts in a few decades, have found that the Islamic philosophy, with its broaden domain, has the ability to solve the problems of philosophy of religion and religious epistemology. The collection of solutions it presents can, at least, be considered as alternate solutions – along with other solutions – by those thinkers who do not favor this disposition. After stating a list of problems and their answers based on the Islamic intellectual and philosophical tradition, the present study investigates, for example, two reasons among the most important reasons for disability of intellect and intellectual reasoning in [proving] God’s existence (i.e. the meaninglessness of the words and concepts of necessary and possible [being] and denial of predicative existence) and presents answers based on that tradition.

The present article is a description of a contrast between the views of two famous figures in the sphere of theology and atheism. One of these two, i.e. Richard Dawkins, attempts, in his book entitled The God Delusion, to use all his expertise in evolutionary biology in arguing for atheism. Conversely, Alister McGrath attempts, by writing his book entitled Dawkin’s Delusion, to fairly review that book and show the readers that empirical sciences, and specially the theory of evolution, are not inconsistent with theism. It is worth mentioning that both of these figures have worked in Oxford and both have experienced atheism. The difference between them is that the former is stilling insisting on his atheism as the most famous atheist in the world, while the latter, in spite of his expertise in empirical sciences, has given up atheism to become a vigorous defender of theism.

Unlike Frege and Russell, Kripke holds that proper names and generic names do not have the role of giving meaning; rather, they denote something and serve as labels. He maintains that these two types of names are fixed designators denoting one single thing in all possible worlds, with no change in what they designate. So, they cannot be equal to epithets which are changeable designators. In the light of principality of existence, one can defend Kripke’s belief on proper name. According to principality of existence, just existence has filled out the outer world, not nature and epithet. Thus, proper names are the names denoting external realities with true existence that denote one single thing everywhere. Generic names, however, are those names denoting the nature which is an abstract and general thing.

As a mathematician, Frege enters a disputable discussion that has preoccupied important philosophical schools – including realism, idealism and empiricism – for years. This discussion that can be generally called ‘the relationship between mind and entity’ is put forward by Frege in order to present an acceptable explanation on the basis of mathematics. In Frege’s view, a disciplined thinker who finds himself interacting with others in the world, the theories put forward in this regard are not satisfying. These theories – which lead to psychologicism, subjectivism, relativism, and restricting beings to sensible ones – are not capable of explaining the basis of knowledge and perception and their relationship. Frege seeks a basis of thought that is not merely restricted to some postulates and works on objective things available for all, a basis that can strengthen the scientific explanation. In this essay, while stating a background of objectivity on Kant’s thought, we investigate the explanation of objectivity in Frege’s thought, referring, accordingly, to availability of objective meaning, unlike what is common among the hermeneutists.

In the present article, the effect of value on knowledge has been discussed. This can be challenging in its relationship to “objectivity of knowledge” on the one hand, and in its relationship to the indigenous and/ or religious knowledge. Nevertheless, any progress in this domain is contingent to precisely specifying the meeting points and assumed mutual effect of knowledge and value. The definite question of this article is as follows: “is knowledge value-laden?” The article’s answer to the question has been presented with the following approach: no single prescript can be issued on this subject. It means that the answer would be different from one case to the other, and part of this difference is related to the typology of values.