فصلنامه مطالعات راهبردی زنان
پیاپی 37 (پاییز 1386)

A stable Islamic dogma on which all Islamic schools agree is the order to women to observe hijab. Since the Sunnites form the majority of Muslims, the issue is propounded all over the Islamic world. The paper studies the positions of Sunnite exegetes and jurisprudents towards the necessity of hijab and its limits on the basis of Quranic verses, traditions, and their own inferences. Afterwards, the paper tries to answer the question whether an Islamic government or a legitimate religious government has any responsibility to enforce hijab and ban hijablessness in the view of Sunnite jurisprudents. Arguments and strategies which can be postulated on the basis of Sunnite jurisprudence are also considered in the paper. Among the most important arguments are “punishment of the guilty”, “enforcement of the good and prohibition of the evil”, and “preservation of Islamic rituals.”

Since in the recent decades some European countries made restrictions for Muslim women wearing hijab, it is necessary to explain minority rights in the international law. Thus, this paper deals with the status of minority rights in the international law and the existing barriers for religious minorities to maintain their rights. And in the light of the principle of “non-prohibition” and “equality” of individuals, article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and “doctrine of margin of evaluation” the paper critically evaluates the prohibition of hijab in the view of international minority rights law. Finally, the paper concludes that prohibition of hijab is a breach of individuals’ human rights and their religious freedom, which is because of social and political pressures.

Women’s being obliged to cover their bodies results from an overall enquiry into jurisprudential sources. However, a deep thinking over the testimonies for hijab shows there are controversies about the limits and manners of hijab. The two extremes of these controversies are too far away from each other to be considered in a single perspective. On the one hand, some believe all parts of a woman’s body, including hands, face, and even her voice, should be covered; on the other hand, others believe a sincere look at a woman’s face and her saying prayer without a head cover are allowed. The former belief may result in social problems for women and Islamic societies whereas it is necessary for the Muslim women to have an active participation in the social life. Now the question is whether reviewing jurisprudential texts and approaching the issue from inside the religion can solve some of the problems Muslim women are facing or not. The paper tries to answer some of these questions, referring to Quranic verses, traditions, and words from jurisprudents.

In many countries governments legislate laws for their citizens’ manner of wearing clothes the limits of which may vary according to the values dominant in their societies. In Iran, too, such regulations are made on the basis of established Islamic values. There is no doubt in the necessity of an appropriate type of hijab for the citizens and the government’s right to interfere in the issue; however, what is at issue here is how these regulations are made and the law breakers are treated. Article 638 of the Iranian Civil Law and specifically its rider to the unacceptable forms of hijab consider these unacceptable forms of hijab as crime. Referring to the jurisprudential foundations of the article, the paper puts forward some drawbacks in the article and criticizes the rider to this article which was codified to confront the problem of unacceptable forms of hijab. Finally, suggestions are proposed to improve this article.

Islamic hijab is a sign of Muslim women and is so important that it is considered as an established indication of Islamic rituals. What is at issue here is whether Islamic government can force Muslim women to wear hijab. Studies suggest that Islamic government should not be indifferent towards Islamic laws and should direct people towards the good. However, there are problems in this regard which this paper tries to address. Some of the issues put forward here are hijab’s being an individual and social precept, precepts’ relationship with public or private sphere, hijab in traditions, hijab’s being an instance of the good, etc.

Hijab is a jurisprudential principle and a religious necessity proposed for Muslim women, though it has exceptions too. In this paper, first, the primary principle of hijab is studied from two aspects: one, the advisability of the arguments for the obligation of hijab; two, the advisability of practical principles to which one has to refer when in doubt. Since disregarding hijab results in corruption, some jurisprudents consider the practical principle as a discretion whereas others rely on the principle of barā’a [distance]. An exception is the case of slaves and the question is whether one can consider the slaves as servants and adopted children. Another exception is the case of emasculated men, which is very controversial among jurisprudents.