فصلنامه حکمت اسلامی
پیاپی 4 (بهار 1394)

As an indisputable fact, suffering is something everybody intuitively understands. What is however of interest to human beings – who are instinctively in search of pleasure and happiness – is the issue of whatness of suffering and the way one encounters it. To answer such questions correctly, one needs to have a correct analysis of the nature of suffering. Presenting Muslim philosopher's various views on the nature of suffering, this article tries to analyze them with the aim of reaching a specific conclusion. In the end, the author puts forth a definition of suffering plus with some reflections about it. According to him, suffering is a mental quality that comes into being when are met certain conditions including the source of suffering, the possibility of knowing something abhorring, the possibility of reaching that abhorring thing and believing that that thing is really abhorring and disgusting.

This article deals with theories concerning the meanings of 'essential' in essentially good and bad and their relations with each other. Based on one theory, essential here means the same as that in isagogics, provided we accept that it is not necessary for a subject whose predicate is an essential part of it, to be an essence with genus and differentia. It can instead be a non-essence concept with a predicate tantamount to genus and differentia. If good and bad are among the essential properties of a subject then the 'essential' will denote the essential used in isagogics. 'Essential' will mean the essential of isagogics only when 'essential' is regarded as something 'considered' not as something ontological. A predication will be deemed as 'primarily essential' when good and bad are conceptually the same as their subjects. When essential means rational it implies that it is reason that understands the good and bad and when essential is used in the sense of real, it implies that good and bad are based on real expediency. Essential, however, when used as 'independent' it indicates that the good and bad of certain acts do not depend on the good and bad of other acts. Essential in the sense similar to what used in isagogics is reconcilable with rational, real, causal, independent and predicatively essential. The two meanings of essential in isagogics and essential similar in meaning to essential in isagogics are reconcilable with essential in the sense of rational, real, causal and independent, though these two meanings of essential cannot be reconciled with each other just anyone of them cannot be reconciled with the essential predication. If essential means the essential in isagogics then the predication will be a common one.

Muslim philosophers maintain that man's soul comprises natural, vegetative and animal faculties. They are also of the view that the human soul has two special powers namely the theoretical intellect and practical intellect. Very little has been said about the practical intellect, its function and status among the faculties of the rational soul. Thus, this article using an analytical – descriptive method of research concludes that the four qualities, natural, vegetative and animal faculties (numbering about twenty four faculties) are at the service of the practical intellect (at the 25th stage) so that it may also aid the theoretical intellect through its three functions (interaction, inference, voluntary actions) in four stages such as purification of the exterior (zahir), purification of the interior (batin) or detachment (takhliya), beautification (tahliya), annihilation (fanā) and the four journeys. It should, therefore, prepare the theoretical intellect to be influenced by sublime origins and to reach the acquired (mustafad) stage after completing the potential (hayulani), habitual (bil-malakah) and actual (bil-fil) stages. Thus, it becomes clear through philosophical reasoning that the world in its entirety and the practical and theoretical intellects are entirely at man's service to enable him to attain the highest degree of perfection which is proximity to Allah.

Meta-ethics deals with conceptual and confirmatory principles. In part, it deals with issues related to deduction of moral statements, such as the relation among moral statements and the relation between moral and non-moral statements. According to Martyr Mutahhari the fact that moral statements are demonstrable is among logical meta-ethical questions that are seldom treated. Explaining Mutahhari's opinion on the demonstrability of moral statements, the author says that Mutahhari intended to prove that moral statements produce certainty. Contrary to what appears from some analysis of his words, he intended to say that moral statements are rational. Albeit in his Methodology of Realism, he explains AllamaTabatabaei's words on the indemonstrability of moral statements in five ways, he however rejects all these five explanations in his Perpetuity of Moral Principles, considering some moral statements as self-evident truths of practical reason, which are, in turnendorsed by theoretical reason as well.

The concept of individuation being a characteristic that does not allow the application of a particular concept to more than one case is a positive concept related to secondary philosophical intelligibles. Philosophers are divided on what constitutes the criterion of individuation. Avicenna and [following him] Bahmaniyar assume that it is the separable accidents of a particular material being that serves as a criterion of individuation for it. They believe that the category of 'position' is inherently individuated whereas MuhaqqiqDawani and Sayyid Sanad are of the view that individuation and universality are among the features of conception. Being inspired by the principle of priority of essence, Suhrawardi takes realized essence to be the criterion of individuation. Having criticized philosopher's opinions, MullaSadra regards modes of existence as a criterion for individuation. He reduces some of the theories of previous philosophers to his own theory. Using an analytic-descriptive methodology, this article deals with this issue under discussion, explaining in detail the connection between individuation of beings and the principles of priority of beings and gradation of beings in Sadrian philosophical system.

According to the law of causality, every effect is in need of a cause. When a perfect cause exists the effect will necessarily come into being. This law is apparently in contradiction with free will we find in ourselves intuitively. This is because based on this law, the preference of doing an action over not doing it is an act in its own right, needing thus a cause with the existence of which preference is possible. Thus free will does not have a sound meaning, for the application of free will is also bound to the existence of its cause. In other words, a voluntary deed like eating food is one that definitely comes into being when its perfect cause is available. It will not however come into being when its perfect cause is not available. Thus there is no room for free will and the choice a free agent makes. That is to say one cannot equalize between eating food and not eating food and eating when willing and not eating when not willing. If it said that it is a necessary truth that a voluntary deed is caused by its perfect cause, but free will is a part of perfect cause, we can ask again: what is the cause of free will? When this cause is available then the preference will be necessary. To solve this problem, many solutions are put forth, among which are imposing restrictions on law of causality, finding a cause like intense desire for preference, etc. None of these solutions is correct. The correct answer to this problem is to say that one can inherently prefer doing something over no doing it. This preference is not in need of an independent cause. Thus the issue under discussion is beyond the domain of the law of causality. As a result, Allah causes free will and free will causes preference without needing any further cause.