فصلنامه حکمت اسلامی
پیاپی 38 (پاییز 1402)

The terms proof, a priori proof, a posteriori proof, absolute a posteriori proof, and argument have specific definitions in logic. However, when some of these terms are transferred from logic to philosophy, philosophers have applied changes to these terms, retaining the division of proof in logic into a priori and a posteriori. There is evidence in the discourse of Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā that indicates the evolution of these terms in philosophy. In philosophy, proof (burhān) represents an “absolute a priori proof” and argument represents a “non-absolute a priori proof”.  The syllogism similar to proof in the discourse of Ibn Sīnā corresponds to the “absolute a posteriori proof” of the third kind in logic. The accidental proof in the discourse of Mullā Ṣadrā is a kind of "non-absolute a priori proof". Mullā Ṣadrā's burhān-i siddīqīn (Proof of the Veracious), which begins with the reality of existence, corresponds to the "absolute a posteriori proof" of the third kind. Mullā Ṣadrā calls it as the "proof similar to a priori". In philosophy, proof is divided into two branches: "essential" and "accidental." The argument specific to the argument from contingency to prove the necessary being, is considered by Mullā Ṣadrā as an "accidental a priori proof", and not an "essential a priori proof." Paying attention to the evolution of these terms from logic to philosophy opens the way for a precise interpretation of expressions that philosophers have used in philosophy.

The reality of free will is an intuitive and self-evident matter that all humans perceive through simple presential knowledge. However, analyzing and interpreting this reality and providing a detailed explanation is quite challenging and remains a matter of dispute among scholars. Recently, some scholars of the School of Tafkīk (Separation), by rejecting the philosophical and mystical teachings, have presented an analysis of the intuitive reality of free will, which in some ways is similar to Ash'arite viewpoint. This analysis, while presented with a seemingly rational appearance, has numerous rational flaws. Some of these flaws are attributed to the manner of interpretation of the followers of the School of Tafkīk. In this article, using analytical-descriptive approach, we have demonstrated that the idea of the School of Tafkīk regarding the reality of free will and real free will is incorrect. Consequently, all claims made by the followers of this school based on this idea are groundless and unfounded. It is worth mentioning that in this paper, we have firstly considered the perspective of the School of Tafkīk based on the ideas presented in the book "The Issue of Divine Knowledge and Free Will". Secondly, we have refrained from repeating the criticisms that philosophers and theologians have previously raised in criticizing this perspective

According to Allamah Tabataba’i, expediency means something being in accordance with its real nature, leading to its deserving and befitting goodness and benefit, without becoming corrupt that would deprive it of its positive effects. This definition can be semantically analyzed into three main elements: “expediency, being a state of existence”, "in accordance with the real nature of things" and "the real nature of things leading to deserving goodness and benefit”. Additionally, two secondary elements can be identified in this analysis. The consequences of this analysis become clear in the domain and instances of expediency. Although the provided definition is precise, it seems not to be comprehensive and only encompasses existential (takwīnī) expediency. Therefore, if we aim to provide a comprehensive definition, we should state that "expediency is the worthiness and appropriateness of every matter in accordance with the actual reality of the thing". This definition can be analyzed into three main elements: "expediency, being an existential and non-existential matter appropriate in accordance with the actual reality of things", "in accordance with the actual reality of things," and "the dependence of the levels of expediency on the degree of worthiness and appropriateness to the actual reality of things". Additionally, three secondary elements can be identified in this analysis. The consequences of this analysis are also clarified in the domain and instances of expediency

In Transcendent Philosophy, the human self or soul (nafs) possesses a unity amidst multiplicity, just like the existential system. The unity of existence is the natural result of the fundamentality of existence and its gradation. However, whether Mullā Ṣadrā has gone beyond the idea of gradation to reach the particular unity of existence or not has been a contentious issue requiring clarification. Since understanding the soul paves the way for the understanding of existence, analyzing its characteristics can provide answer to the question that whether the unity of the soul resembles more to the gradational unity or to the particular unity of existence. Through this answer, the type of unity of existence also becomes apparent. The soul has a kind of unity with the body and its different stages, as well as with its faculties. Examining this unity through the application of the theory of substantial motion and the gradual development of the soul, reinforces its gradational nature. While, on the other hand, numerous evidences indicate the particular nature of the unity of the soul. These evidences include the inherence of the stages of the soul in relation to it, the quality of rationality, simplicity of the soul and its presence, and the analysis of the relationship between the soul and the body.

In Ibn Sīnā's philosophical system, the elucidation of the nature of material bodies is based on foundations such as continuity. These foundations serve as steps toward reaching Ibn Sīnā's chosen theory concerning the reality of bodies, namely, the material-formalism theory. Sometimes, there is a misconception that the concept of corporeal continuity is merely considered an experiential matter by Ibn Sīnā. Due to this interpretation (i.e., attributing the proof of continuity to sensory perception and experience) and its repetition and successive transmission, Ibn Sīnā has sometimes been criticized from a scientific perspective. An incorrect understanding is that if Ibn Sīnā will be asked whether a body is continuous or discrete, his response, based on the senses, will be continuity. Then, on the basis of this response, criticisms are raised against Ibn Sīnā by showing the achievements of modern science. In this article, we will examine, explain, and analyze continuity as one of the foundations of Ibn Sīnā's material-formalism theory. The explicit question is, what is the relationship between continuity and the explanation of the nature of the body? In other words, how does continuity, as one of the foundations of the material-formalism theory, help Ibn Sīnā prove his theory? In the course of this investigation, it will be shown that Ibn Sīnā himself does not believe the continuity based on sensory intuition and experience to be acceptable. The achievement of this research is to examine and analyze the relation of network of concepts related to the concept of continuity that are involved in explaining the reality of body. Thus, in this article, while resolving the raised concerns, an attempt has been made to present a coherent reading and analysis of Ibn Sīnā's discourse using his discussions on the concept of continuity and related concepts, such as potentiality for divisibility, the type of divisibility, the relationship between continuity and divisibility, and more.

According to Aristotle, a body is a reality composed of two substances (jawhar) called "material form" and "primary matter." This belief has been accepted by the majority of Muslim philosophers, and they have made significant efforts to prove this theory. The proof of "fasl and wasl" (disjunction and conjunction) is one of the most important arguments for proving the existence of the primary matter and the composition of a body from matter and form. This proof was first put forward by the Muslim philosophers and cannot be found in the works of earlier philosophers. In this argument, based on the continuity and discontinuity of the body, the existence of a constant element called "matter" or "primary matter" is argued, which guarantees the unity and identity of body through its everlastingness. It seems that despite the extensive efforts of Muslim philosophers to strengthen this argument and eliminate its doubts and ambiguities, ultimately, it faces serious challenges and is unable to prove the existence of the primary matter.  In this article, we first elaborate on the interpretation of the proof of "fasl and wasl" (disjunction and conjunction) and then critique it. The criticisms raised include the failure to prove the separability of the body, confusion between the meanings of connection, lack of exclusivity of potential connection and disconnection in primary matter, the contradiction of the proof with the matter itself, and more.

Among philosophers, figures like Sheikh Ishrāq, Allamah Ḥillī, and their followers believed in the principality of quiddity (māhiyyah) and naturally considered existence to be a secondary intelligible. However, with the emergence of transcendent philosophy and the endorsement of the principality of existence, it was expected that proponents of this perspective would not categorize existence as a secondary intelligible. Nevertheless, we observe that Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers in transcendent philosophy still consider existence as a secondary intelligible. The aim of this research is to answer whether these two perspectives are conflicting and contradicting each other or not. In case of a contradiction, how does Mullā Ṣadrā reconcile and justify his statements. Naturally, our method in this research is descriptive and analytical. Based on Mullā Ṣadrā's statements and making a final conclusion of his viewpoint, we could say that, firstly, there is no doubt that he endorses the principality of existence and concurrently consider existence as a secondary intelligible. Secondly, from the perspective of the writers, based on the fact that Mullā Ṣadrā not only acknowledges the attribution of the secondary philosophical intelligibles to be external, but also considers their occurrence as external, there is essentially no fallacy or contradiction remaining. Hence, there is no need to reject any one of Mullā Ṣadrā's ideas.

Scholars have provided various responses to the dilemma of evil. George Mavrodes, in his book "Belief in God: A Study in the Epistemology of Religion," addresses the problem of evil. He links the issue of evil with "belief" and asserts that this problem is related to belief, which, in turn, is dependent on the person and has personal diversity. Based on this, the dilemma of evil should be considered among epistemic dilemmas, and not a logical one. Moreover, a useful and effective solution to the dilemma of evil is for it to be able to impact belief. The foundation of George Mavrodes' thought regarding the connection between evil and anthropocentric epistemology is his particular perspective regarding proof (burhān), emphasizing that the "proof" is generally dependent on the person. This paper examines and critiques George Mavrodes' perspective. The research findings indicate that the basis of George Mavrodes' thought in linking evil and anthropocentric epistemology is flawed. The reasons for this flaw are as follows: “the necessity of epistemological certainty for the proof and the inadequacy of psychological belief as well as the difference between humans in cognition and understanding”. Additionally, his response to the dilemma of evil is also unacceptable due to the following reasons: “the relativity of knowledge, the lack of a comprehensive standard for distinguishing good and evil, and the transformation of objective evil into subjective evil"

Although Freud is not the originator of the theory that "God is a creation and projection of the human mind" (as this idea has been discussed before him), he is the founder of the psychoanalytic interpretation of this concept. Relying on his psychoanalytic findings, Freud establishes the foundation of psychological atheism, asserting that God is the product of human childish illusion. Humans always need security. This need is fulfilled through the father during childhood. But as individuals mature, this is done through a psychological process that substitutes the father figure with God. Freud attempts to support this notion by applying his psychoanalytic findings to primitive societies and subsequently to monotheistic religions. For this, he employs frameworks such as scientific worldview, Darwinism, and physicalism into his argument. In this paper, written with an analytical-descriptive approach, we demonstrate that Freud’s perspective as well as its foundation encounter significant weaknesses and challenges. One of the important challenges that this perspective face is that despite accepting scientism as a principle and considering the scientific method as the only valid means to reach the truth, Freud appears to neglect this method when expressing his own views. His perspective also lacks the conditions of a scientific viewpoint because scientific viewpoints require testability, a criterion that his perspective lacks. Furthermore, even if his perspective is assumed to be correct, it does not necessitate the denial of God.

One of the significant topics in philosophy is the discussion of "priority and posteriority," which has long been a subject of contemplation and evaluation by philosophers. Among those who have made efforts in this regard and introduced innovations is Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī. One of his innovations in the concept of priority and posteriority is "by-truth." This type of priority and posteriority varies in elucidation and interpretation in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā. In his book "Al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah," he presents a unique interpretation of priority-in-truth compared to his other works. In some of his works, he considers “priority-by-truth" as the precedence of the causal existence over the existence of the effect.He has also provided another interpretation of priority-by-truth by stating that the Almighty, with respect to His manifestation in His names as well as His descent in the hierarchical levels of His existential affairs, which are the contingent beings, is characterized by both priority and posteriority. His attribution to priority and posteriority belongs to His essence, and not to an extraneous matter beyond His essence.