The Relationship between privatization and Corporate Governance Mechanisms with Speed of Corporate Financial Reporting and Financial Performance

Privatization as a method for reallocation of assets and functions of public companies has an important role in structural reforming in developed and developing countries. It certainly cannot be stated that privatization in developing markets improves financial markets as the minority rights are not protected in such markets. Information asymmetry results in inefficiency of the markets and block trading usually takes place which removes some needs to financial markets. Privatization increases the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in previously public companies. Corporate governance compels management to make decisions in order to maximize shareholders’ wealth with respect to the rights of other beneficiaries. Research Hypotheses: The following hypotheses were formulated for the research based on the literature: First hypothesis: Financial reporting speed of previously public companies increases after privatization. Second hypothesis: Financial performance of previously public companies increases after privatization. Third hypothesis: There is a significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and changes in legal status and the speed of financial reporting in previously public companies. Fourth hypotheses: There is a significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and changes in legal status and financial performance of previously public companies. Research This Research is applied because of its objective, and descriptive-correlative because of its method. Model 1 The following model was used to test the first hypothesis (Al-akra et al., 2010): Lagit= β0+ β1PRIVit+ β2Sizeit +β3 Growthit+εit Lagit: The difference between the year end's date and general meeting of shareholder's Date for resolution financial statements that is called Reporting Lag as well (Mehrani et al., 1389; Mahdavi & Jamalianpour, 1389). PRIVit: = A score of one for the year in which more than 30 percent of government shares have been offered and for the subsequent years and a score of zero if otherwise (Al-akra et al., 2010; Danesh Jafari & Barghi Oskooei, 1389). Size = Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets at year end which is a control variable. Growth = The percentage of changes in book value of total assets at year end, compared to the previous fiscal year (Kordlar & Aarabi, 2010), which is a control variable. Model2 The following model was used to test the second hypothesis (Al-akra et al., 2010): FPit= β0+ β1PRIVit+ β2Sizeit +β3 Growthit+εit FPit: Combination of five proxies include returns on assets, returns on equity, Tobin's Q ratio, annual stock return and market value added (Kumar & Goel, 2000; Ghaemi & Shahriyari, 1388). Model3 The following model was used to test the third hypothesis (Al-akra et al., 2010): Lagit=α0+α1PRIVit+β1Owconit+β2PRIVit*Owconit+β3BINit+β4PRIVit*BINit+β5Mowit+β6 PRIVit*Mowit+β7Iowit+β8PRIVit*Iowit+β9AuDit+β10PRIVit *AuDit + β11Sizeit +β12 Growthit+ β13 CHlowit + β14CHlowit* PRIVit +εit Owcon: Percentage of free float shares (Bugshan, 2005; Ginglinger & Hamon, 2007). BIN: The ratio of non-executive members of the board of directors to total members (Bugshan, 2005; Setayesh et al., 1388). Mow: Percentage of shares held by board members (Bugshan, 2005; Mojtahedzadeh, 2011). Iow: Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders (Al-akra et al, 2010). AUD: A two dimensional variable, including the probability of selecting an audit organization (Big Audit Organization) as a criterion for quality (Success = one) and the probability of the selection of other audit organizations (Failure = zero) (Al-akra et al., 2010). Chlow: A two dimensional variable as the control variable and was given the value of one for the year 2007 and subsequent years (following the approval of corporate governance mechanisms), and a value of zero for all other years (Al-akra et al., 2010). Model4 The following model was used to test the fourth hypothesis (Al-akra et al., 2010): FPit=α0+α1PRIVit+β1Owconit+β2PRIVit*Owconit+β3BINit+β4PRIVit*BINit+β5Mowit+β6 PRIVit*Mowit+β7Iowit+β8PRIVit*Iowit+β9AuDit+β10PRIVit*AuDit+β11Sizeit+ β12Growthit+ β13CHlowit + β14CHlowit* PRIVit +εit Results of Testing the Hypotheses: First Hypothesis: Considering the insignificant level of coefficient, there is not any significant relationship between financial reporting speed and privatization. Therefore, the first hypothesis is not approved. Second Hypothesis: Considering the negative and significant level of coefficient, there is a negative and significant relationship between financial performance and privatization. Therefore, second hypothesis is approved. Third Hypothesis: Due to obviate co-linearity between independent variables, the sample was segregated based on privatization variable and the following model was used based on model3 in each sample: Lagit= β0 +β1Owconit+ β2BINit+ β3 Mowit+ β4Iowit+ β5AuDit+ β6Sizeit +β7 Growthit+ β8 CHlowit +εit Considering the insignificant level of through, and coefficients before and after privatization and negative and significant level of after privatization, it can be concluded that there is a positive and significant relationship between speed of financial reporting and institutional ownership in previously public companies. Therefore, the third hypothesis is approved only for one corporate governance mechanism. Fourth Hypothesis: Due to obviate co-linearity between independent variables, the sample was segregated based on privatization variable and the following model was used based on model4 in each sample: FPit= β0+ β1Owconit+ β2BINit+ β3Mowit+ β4Iowit+ β5AuDit+ β6Sizeit+ β7Growthit+ β8CHlowit + εit Considering insignificant level of, and coefficients before and after privatization, positive and significant level of coefficient before privatization, positive and significant level of coefficient after privatization and significant level of coefficient before and after privatization and decline in it after comparison to before privatization, it can be concluded that a positive and significant relationship exists between financial performance and independence of board of directors and audit quality in previously public companies and a negative and significant relationship between financial performance and ownership concentration. Therefore, the third hypothesis is approved for three corporate governance mechanisms. Conclusion and suggestions: Independence of board of directors, institutional ownership and audit quality as three corporate governance mechanisms for monitoring have positive effects on corporate governance strength. Capital market has an important role for gathering and managing public capitals if it can create confidence in investors for earning suitable returns by protecting them. Therefore, implementation of appropriate internal and external corporate governance mechanisms is an important subject in capital markets. Then, it is recommended to TSE to take required actions in this field through preparation and confirmation instruction codes.