CHOICE BETWEEN THE CRITERIA OF REGULATING CONDUCTS

The first and the most dominant function of the law is to regulate the conduct and private behavior in social life through legal commands. The choice at the rulemaking stage to frame a law command either as a rule (ex ante, limited-factor liability determinants) or as a standard (ex post, multi-factor liability determinants) does have implications for the efficient enforcement of law, given that rule-like and standard-like commands imply different sets of costs and benefits for the enforcement authority. Uniform rules limit arbitrary or partisan actions by election supervisors, canvassing boards, courts, and other decision-makers. At the same time, mechanical rules ignore important factors and can lead to the suppression of fundamental political rights. More flexible standards give decision-makers the discretion to protect political participation in particular contexts, but this discretion may also allow a decision-maker’s biases to enter the political process. The idea of a pure dualism between rules and standards is too simplistic; rather a continuum of intermediate commands exists. Therefore, there should be the possibility to detect an optimal degree of differentiation of law between the two extremes of rules and standards based on the general aims and function of the law and practical preferences. The paper investigates whether it is possible to assess such optimum and what are the determinants of it. At last, the paper concludes that it is impossible to prefer rule on standards or vice versa rather there would be a need for case by case evaluation to explore which rules or standards are likely to be preferable.