Practical Reason's Dependence on Theoretical Reason in Validity and Independence in Perception

The origin of validity for the statements of ethics and laws, being perceived by practical reason, has been considerably focused on in meta-ethics and philosophy of laws. The only way for their validity lies in their being based upon the self-evident statements of theoretical reason. Yet, remain a question: is such an explanation possible? Some philosophers like Hume and Kant have disagreed it. Some others have rejected the perceptions of practical reason to be based upon theoretical reason in origin. They have classified the perceptions of practical reason into self-evident and theoretical; the validity of the former lies in their being self-evident and that of the latter in their state of being based upon the former. Knowing the judgments of practical reason as being based upon theoretical reason necessarily, and viewing all cases of ought to as being rooted in the cases of is, has emphasized on the fact that though practical reason for validity of its statements is depended upon theoretical reason, it is not dependent upon that in perceiving its judgments. In the sense that man really has two types of perception; but one is epistemologically in need to the other as is the case of five external senses being independence in sensation and at the same time being in need to reasoning power for their validity.