Conflict between Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī and Ghīyāth al-Dīn Dashtaki over the Explication of Suhrawardian Definition of Body

In an epoch considered by some as the eclipse of Islamic philosophy, debates, dialogues and often disputes either oral and written or in-person and in-absentia occurred between Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī and Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī at Shiraz school of philosophy, which consequently brisked up Shiraz field of philosophy at that time and deepened Islamic philosophical discussions over succeeding eras. Interpretation of Hayākal al-Nūr (temples of light) was one among the discussed topics. The present paper specifically analyzes the two philosophers’ interpretation of Suhrawardian definition of body. It is observed that interpreters have differing opinions over the meaning of two terms qaṣd (intent) and ishāra (allusion). Further, the distinctive and similar aspect among bodies to Davānī is hyāt-i lāzim (dependent states), whereas Dashtakī refers to hyāt-i qayr-i lāzim (independent states). The third opposing point is juz’-i‘lā yatajazī (the indivisible). Davānī believes what receives sensory allusion divides into triple directions; however, as Dashtakī articulates, sensory allusion includes the possibility of division into triple directions. Drawing on the conflicts, the study takes a descriptive-analytical approach to examine the opposition between the two interpreters and ultimately discussions are weighed.