نشریه متافیزیک
سال پانزدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 36، پاییز و زمستان 1402)

The issue of human happiness has been analyzed and evaluated by different philosophers and thinkers from different viewpoints. This article seeks to look at this issue once again on the horizon of the originality of existence. And show that the basis of terms that have long been used to explain this concept, such as the terms: pleasure, goodness, perfection, and understanding, is the term existence. The principle of the originality of existence as the most important achievement of transcendent wisdom along with some of its branches such as hierarchical unity of existence, substantive movement, the union of knowledge, and the known and dynamic and hierarchical nature of human existence and human being in the world in enlightening and deepening the truth of human happiness plays the most important role. The result of this article is that: true happiness requires moving in the path of perfection and intensification of existence, and concerning the presence and consciousness in the higher levels of existence, the kind of pleasure and perfection and happiness that will result, will intensify and be perfected.

In this article, with the help of Heidegger and Foucault's conceptual tools, as well as the achievements of the cognitive science, we try to examine the transition from paper reading to digital reading. This discussion can be a preparation for a philosophical understanding of the digital age. We show that Heidegger's analysis of the ready-to-hand beings and technology can help to understand the reading behaviors of paper and digital readers. We have also use Heidegger's analytical framework for text ontology. On the other hand, Foucault's reflections on the embodied technologies can explain the power-knowledge relationships that is constructed around the reader. In addition, the cognitive science has provided detailed empirical findings on the effects of reading behaviors on the human cognitive biases and skills by examining the various modes of reading. Embodied and skillful cognitive science, by going beyond the computational understanding of human beings, has noticed the various behaviors and states of the body in reading processes and highlighted their effects. To integrate these areas of research, we try to place the findings of the cognitive science within the framework of Heidegger and Foucault's technological understanding of the modern power-knowledge relationships.

Self-awareness as a philosophical and anthropological subject is rooted in anthropological foundations. In Islamic philosophy, the humanity of human is his soul; therefore, the main property of self-awareness is the human soul. In Allameh Tabatabai’s philosophical view, self-awareness is the knowledge of the presence of the self in its essence. Considering that from his view the definition of science is the presence of an incorporeal thing in the presence of another immaterial thing, in the self-awareness both are the human soul. Allameh believes that man is always aware of himself from birth to death, which includes awakening, sleep and anesthesia, and after death. Even if we do not remember anything about our self-awareness after anesthesia or sleep, it is not a reason for not having self-awareness. It seems that some of Allameh's arguments do not prove all the claims. Also, his view can be analyzed from the path of pure attention to the ontological definition of science and also the division of science into simple and compound types. It seems that the self-awareness that Allameh attributes to it during periods of anesthesia or sleep that is not remembered is a simple science and cannot be considered as a factor or criterion for human perfection.

According to the theory of the spirit of meaning, with the interpretation of Imam Khomeini, words have been established for common concepts; That is, they are not established for the concept bound to a certain reference, even if the establisher thinks that the concept is unique to one reference. Thus, there is a common component or spirit among all common words that are in a longitudinal relationship in different worlds. Therefore, from Imam Khomeini's point of view, in establishing the words for the spirits of meanings, what is comprehensive between people and the place of compatibility and sharing between them should be presupposed. But Wittgenstein expressed the idea of family resemblance when he abandoned his earlier essentialism and abandoned the determination of meaning. The concept of family resemblance is explained in the first place by reference to the concept of game. The late Wittgenstein argues that just as there is nothing unique in games that is common to all of them, there is nothing unique in the various uses of language that is common to all, but, just like games, there is a system of overlap and overlap of similarities. But the theory of the spirit of meaning, contrary to the idea of family resemblance, believes in the common essence or spirit that exists in words that have different meanings and are located in multiple worlds at the same time; The very thing that the idea of family resemblance seeks to abolish. Thus, criticizing the theory of the spirit of meaning based on the idea of family resemblance is the aim of this article.

This study is a research on Gilgamesh tragedy which is a search of deathlessness Based on Irvin D. Yalom (1931) whom is an American existential Psychiatrist – ideas on death and one’s self defense mechanism against anxiety caused by fear of death. Gilgamesh was the fifth king of Sumeria. He ruled Uruk city for 125 years after Noah’s flood. People complain to the gods about his oppression and gods create Enkidu to defeat him. The two become friends after a head-to-head fight. Gilgamesh, with the help of Enkidu kills the Bull of heaven and Humbaba the guardian of the cedar forest. In the aftermath, Enkidu dies and sad Gilgamesh seeks immortality, but in the end, the death embraces him. In this study, with Relying on descriptive-analytical method and comparative approach, The Gilgamesh tragedy has been compared with Irvin D. Yalom’s opinions that the main goal of his existential psychotherapy is to increase a person's awareness of existential concerns by expanding his perspectives on life and the world around him. The result of this study shows that Irvin D. Yalom’s ideas on death anxiety and giving a solution for overcoming fear of death are consistent with Gilgamesh tragedy.

Phenomenology is one of the most important nowadays’ philosophical movements. Although Husserl is the founder, you can find its roots in philosophers’ works like Descartes, Kant, and Bergson. Heidegger Learned phenomenology from his professor and used it as a way to understand Being. Phenomenology for Heidegger transformed from Husserlian simple form to a way to understand the truth. Part of this transformation is because of Bergson's influence on Heidegger. In Heidegger’s opinion, Bergson, with bolding the importance of consciousness for understanding life, had a part in establishing Husserl’s phenomenology. By translating Bergson’s works into German, Max Scheler played a crucial role in gathering attention to Bergson's philosophy. This effort led to Husserl’s important work, the investigations of internal time consciousness, which are partly published in Husserl’s later works. Furthermore, Bergson, by making a difference between common time and real-time or ‘duration’ in understanding life, showed philosophy a new way of understanding truth. For Heidegger, phenomenology without understanding the concept of time, and centralization of Dasein as temporality, is not conceivable. The phenomenology is one of the most complex topics in the philosophy of the 20th century, and the simplest way to understand it is to pay attention to the formation of its roots. Considering that not enough research has been done on the influence of Bergson's philosophy on the phenomenological movement, this article tries to cover as much of this need as possible.

Kripke in his famous book on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy argues, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that there can be no fact of the matter as to what a speaker means by her words, that is, no fact that can meet the Constitution Demand and the Normativity Demand. He particularly argues against the dispositional view, according to which meaning facts are constituted by facts about the speaker’s dispositions to respond in a certain way on certain occasions. He argues that facts about dispositions are finite and are incapable of constituting facts about what speakers mean by their words; they are also essentially descriptive, not prescriptive and, thus, cannot meet the Normativity Demand. Hannah Ginsborg has recently attempted to resist Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s arguments against dispositionalism by defending a new sort of reductive dispositionalism which can meet both demands at the same time. In this paper, I will argue that she would not be successful in her project.

During the second half of the 20th century, after the decline of logical empiricism, metaphysics was revived as analytic metaphysics. However, during the last two decades, significant naturalistic objections have been raised to analytic metaphysics. In the first chapter of their seminal book, Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman, Ross, and Spurrett, after taking a destructive approach to contemporary analytic metaphysics, presented a positive plan for appropriate naturalized metaphysics. For them, naturalized metaphysics is an activity to unify, under some constraints, the sciences. Analytic metaphysics, on the other hand, had its serious defenders. One of the enthusiastic advocates of metaphysics, as an inquiry with an independent method and subject matter, is Jonathan Lowe (1950-2014). At the end of his working life, he published various works in which he argued for a remarkable conception of metaphysics, that is, metaphysics as the science of the possible. In this paper, we claim that Jonathan Lowe's views on metaphysics provide a compelling stance for addressing the radical naturalistic objections raised by Ladyman, Ross, and Spurrett, and so it provides a thoughtful defense of metaphysics against those worries.

Plato’s doctrine of ideas can be considered his most important doctrine. Throughout the history of philosophy, each philosopher, according to the problem he faced, has returned to this doctrine. One of the problems that Western philosophers have faced in the contemporary world is the nihilism and meaninglessness of western civilization. Martin Heidegger considers the root of this meaninglessness to be oblivion of Being and oblivion of truth as unhiddenness and disconcealment. Heidegger believes that Plato’s doctrine of ideas is the cause of this oblivion, Plato made ideas the foundation of beings, and this has no meaning other than oblivion of Being. Using phenomenology, Heidegger returns to Plato’s allegory of the cave to elucidate the nature of this oblivion. Heidegger’s interpretation of ideas changes over time, because in his later thinking, Heidegger passes through the phenomenology of Dasein and pays attention to the openness of Being. Later Heidegger explains the idea and the eidos based on the openness of Being and considers the presence of the present dependent on this openness. In this paper, we will try to examine the relationship between early and later Heidegger's view on Plato’s ideas.

In addition to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and Philosophical Investigations (1951), Wittgenstein left a collection of notes. Some of his students have published edited versions of these remaining notes under various titles. One of the latest of these collections came to the market in 1969 under the title of "On Certainty". In this book, Wittgenstein discusses the issue of certainty from an epistemological point of view. He rejects scepticism and argues that certainty belongs to the category of non-epistemological concepts. And he adds that certainty, though meaningless, nevertheless is necessary for the formation of knowledge. A group of commentators, including Rom Harre´ and Moyal-Sharrock, have referred to this new approach of Wittgenstein as the Third Wittgenstein. The purpose of the present paper is to critically examine the development of Wittgenstein's thought from Tractatus to On Certainty with respect to the notion of certainty to show that contrary to the claims of philosophers like Harre´and Moyal-Sharrock, the Wittgenstein of On Certainty is not a new Wittgenstein, and that the basis of his discussions concerning scepticism and certainty and their meaninglessness could be traced back to his views in Tractatus and Investigations, and in particular, his discussion of private language and its denial.