Reflecting on the views of Ibn Sinā and Shaykh Ishrāq on the Essentiality of Existence/Quiddity

The question of the essentiality of existence or quiddity is one of the most debated and most basic questions in philosophy. This issue is raised by Mir-Dāmād and Mullā Ṣadrā as an independent issue; however, its foundations can be traced back to other philosophers as well. The authors in this article try to investigate this issue in Ibn Sian and Shaykh Ishraq. They claim that Shaykh Ishraq was mistaken when interpreted Ibn Sina’s idea of the occurrence (‘urūḍ) of existence for quiddity as an external occurrence, as he made a mistake when he ascribed to peripatetic philosophers the idea that existence is both subjectively and objectively different form quiddity. Then he rejected such a difference in a way that led to the rejection of existence, and the idea that quiddity was the real thing in the world and the source for abstracting the concept of existence. The authors try to show that Ibn Sina had emphasized on subjective (and not objective) occurrence of existence for quiddity, and therefore, he admitted existence as the external thing in the world.