فصلنامه فقه
پیاپی 116 (زمستان 1402)

Contemporary jurists have presented different viewpoints about the permissibility and impermissibility of organ donation according to the verses and narratives and the examination of jurisprudential texts. According to the findings of this study, the organ includes any part of the body such as cells, tissues, and bones along with meat. In addition, the primary ruling on organ donation is based on the principle of Ibahah (permissibility) because there is no reason for it to be haram (prohibited) and the title of loss is not true for any type of organ donation. In this research, by referring to the verses, narratives, rulings of reason and the taste of the Shari'ah, which is based on the verbal appearance of all the arguments, and its validity is a customary and documented matter according to the way of reason, the sufficient obligation of organ donation has been proven. By looking at a set of narratives such as narratives regarding helping the believers, oppressing and humiliating a believer as a haram act, avoiding harm from the believer, taqiya ( a precautionary dissimulation or denial of religious belief and practice), narratives of false swearing to save life, property and the believer, narratives of opening a corpse's stomach to remove the fetus, narratives about the prohibition of not answering the believer, as well as looking at the issue from the perspective of government jurisprudence and government ruling, it is confirmed that the sufficient obligation of organ donation to save the life of a Muslim and to meet the needs of a person who is living a difficult life is part of the religious will of Share’e (lawmaker).

Sodomy is one of the hadd crimes, which in Islamic criminal law, its realization (occurrence) and, accordingly, the proof of punishment for it, depend on several conditions. One of the most important conditions in the realization of this crime is the realization of Iqab (anal intercourse) as a material element of the crime. Most jurists have considered the total amount of foreskin to be the criterion in the realization of sodomy crime, and if it is less than this amount, the hadd of sodomy is ruled out and the crime is put forward under the title of tafkhiz (rubbing penis between thighs). In other words, based on most jurists’ view, the way of punishment can be considered as a changing factor of the crime and, accordingly, a changing factor of the punishment. However, another group of jurists have considered the criteria in the crime of sodomy to be absolute, regardless of the condition of the occultation of foreskin and with the assumption of realization of Iqab, regardless of how it occurs, in any case, they consider the crime of sodomy and, accordingly, the hadd of sodomy to be proven. Due to the necessity of explaining the problem in detail and considering the existing research gap related to it, the present study has examined this matter in a descriptive-analytical method. The result shows that absolute Iqab is the criterion for the realization of the crime of sodomy - regardless of the amount of penetration of the foreskin. In other words, with the occurrence of Iqab, even if the amount of foreskin is not penetrated, it will be considered as sodomy crime, and the realization of crime of tafkhiz will not be true.

One of the important elements that is considered in worship and other things is the element of intention. The presence or absence of intention or the manner or change of the intention can play a role in the validity and invalidity of worship. As in non-worships, the same conditions can have some situational effects. In addition, in both, there are some obligatory effects. What is considered now is the effect of the intention in proving the guarantee. Although this effect has not been considered to be normative, by examining the branches of jurisprudence and the opinions of jurists, we can find criteria for this effect. These criteria sometimes refer to the intention alone and sometimes refer to the intention combined with the action. The first category is the interference of the intention in the realization of the title of the guarantor, whether it was just or not or its change is the cause of guarantee and non-guarantee. The second category is such as the lack of intention or its change in the titles of intention, after which the performed behavior becomes a guarantee. Determining the domain and titles of lack of guarantee can be the reason for the effect or the extent of this effect.

The difference in the views of the jurists in recognizing the religious ruling is one of the most important areas of disagreement. This diversity of theories has emerged in the recognizing jurisprudential subjects in different positions, including the issue of absence. The viewpoints of the jurists through some brokerage analysis, adoption of foundations in the evaluation of textual documents and differences in role identification and custom arbitration, as well as accepting or not accepting the position of verbal viewpoints, have led to not reaching a precise definition of the subject and, in the next stage, to a disagreement in deriving the religious ruling. Based on the descriptive, analytical and exploratory method, this article has analyzed the arguments for the difference of the jurists’ viewpoints on absence. The finding suggests that the field of subjectology or the ruling does not have a desirable achievement and the role of some jurists must be rethought, and in this regard, the correct identification of the criteria for understanding the subject is effective in reducing the disagreements and achieving the same results.

This research aims to analyze the jurisprudential arguments of the use of poetry in the five jurisprudential Schools of Hanafiyah, Malikiyah, Shafiyah, Hanbali and Imamiyah. This article, via descriptive and analytical method, while inferring the views of the five schools of jurisprudence on issues related to the first rule of using poetry, its jurisprudential ruling in different situations, including while circumambulating God's house (Tawaf), in the mosque, as well as the ruling of arranging the Qur'an and the ruling of accepting the poet's witnessing, examines and presents various arguments and viewpoints. The result suggests that the obligatory ruling for using poetry is permissible, but in different situations, it has its appropriate rulings. The use of poetry in the mosque and in the state of tawaf depends on its meanings and content. Arranging the Qur'anic texts according to the jurisprudential schools of thought is religiously illegitimate, but arranging the meanings of the Qur'an, including its translation and interpretation, is religiously legitimate according to the majority of jurists of different schools of thought. Guaranteeing and adopting Quranic verses in the form of poetic order is also permissible by the majority of jurisprudence schools - except for the majority of Malikiyah jurists and some jurists of other schools of law. Haram (Forbidden) poetry causes the rejection of witnessing.

One of the topics discussed in Imamiya jurisprudence is marrying an adulteress. There are two main views about the ruling on marrying adulteress among Imamiya jurists. Most Imamiya jurists, by referring to the principle of permissibility and some narratives, have considered it permissible and Makrouh (disliked) to marry an adulteress, even if they have not repented. On the other hand, a group of Imamiya jurists, according to the third verse of Surah Noor and some other narratives, have considered this practice haram (forbidden). In this study, by re-analyzing the arguments of two views, especially the verses of the Holy Qur'an, which is considered the main source of the legislation of divine rulings, the second view is considered to be the correct and preferred theory in this regard. Therefore, while examining the arguments of the first point of view and criticizing them, the latter point of view has been confirmed and strengthened from the perspective of other specific and general verses of the Holy Qur'an and some narratives and it has been proven that marrying an adulteress characterized by this quality is forbidden (haram) in Islam and a believer cannot marry adulteress women before repenting.

The possibility of sciences interacting and exploiting each other is one of the topics of the philosophy of science, and jurisprudence is no exception to this rule. Therefore, jurisprudence also requires the use of other sciences in different fields, especially in knowing the subjects of jurisprudential rulings, which has a wide scope. However, this article only deals with the mechanism of jurisprudence's use of intellectual and narrative sciences in knowing customary subjects and according to the necessary stages in knowing the subjects of jurisprudence, in each of these stages, it has dealt with the sciences and how to use them. The result suggests that jurisprudence can be used in the stage of identifying the type of the subjects, in terms of whether or not it is prescribed by Usul, in terms of the Shariah using some sciences such as tafsir and hadith, in the stage of distinguishing the subjects from tafsir, hadith and history, and in the stage of distinguishing the concept and nature of subjects from intellectual sciences such as logic and narrative sciences such as tafsir, hadith as well as sciences such as statistics and new technologies.