فصلنامه تحقیقات کلامی
پیاپی 43 (زمستان 1402)

Kīsāniyyah was one of the first sects separated from Shiʿa and one of the important sects of the early Islamic centuries which its emergence is associated with the uprising of Mukhtār and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyyah’s claim of succession and Imamate. Talking about the relations between Kīsāniyyah and Imāmiyyah will help to understand the history and thoughts of Shiʿa. Therefore, as the main question, this research examines the relationship between these two groups during the time period of the Imāms ' presence. Since at the beginning, there was not much difference in terms of thoughts and opinions between Kīsāniyyah and Imāmiyyah and they differed only on the person of the Imām, the interactions between these two groups have appeared more in the form of convergence. However, in this period, the Imāmiyyah rejects the Imamate of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyhah and informs the Shiʿa community against Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyhah 's incompetence in accepting the place of Imamate. But due to the influence of the flow of the Ghālis (Extremists) in Kīsāniyyah, which practically transforms the original ideas of Kīsāniyyah, these relationships have come to the fore in the form of cultural and social confrontations. Also, the Imāmiyyah have strongly refused to participate in any political movements of Kīsāniyyah at this time.

Several factors have caused the tendency of religious thinkers in the meaning of God's inherent attributes to negative theology, which can be named as the bases of this theology. The most important factor is monotheism and the oneness of God's essence. Its three interpretations, namely negation of analogy, negation of partner, and negation of combination, are three important bases in the tendency towards negative theology. Tanzīh (purifying God of imperfect attributes) and negation of similitude caused some thinkers to defend negative theology. The second basis is that one should not associate a partner with God's essence, and therefore the Ashʿarī theory of ziyādah al-ṣifāt (the attributes added to the Essence), which is belief in the multiplicity of the eternals, is invalid. Affirmative theology is directly related to this theory and therefore negative theology is a suitable solution to stay away from this problem. The third basis is simplicity and negation of composition. Based on this, thinkers like Ḳāḍī Saʿīd Qomī did not accept the theory of the sameness of Essence and attributes, and by negating attributes, they have tended towards negative theology. The fourth basis is the lack of imagination of God's attributes, which has caused theologians like ʿAllāmeh Madjlisī to believe in negative theology despite basically accepting attributes for God. The fifth basis is that the word wudjūd (lit. existence) is a homonym with different meanings, and this basis has led some theologians to negative theology.

With a history of thought examining way, the present article examines the problem of the possibility of rational knowledge of God and its realm from the point of view of the thought trend of the theorizing theologians of the Kūfah school based on narrative and historical reports and has shown that theorizing theologians such as Zurārah, Muʾmin al-Ṭāq And Hishām Ibn Ḥakam and their followers believed in the possibility of a middle rational knowledge of God, which requires the negation of taʿṭīl (refraining of talking about God) and the negation of tashbīh (similitude), and accordingly, they did not oppose the view of the Imāmiyyah majority about the negation of the inherent positive attributes, which required the negation of tashbīh. However, there are clear evidences that they acknowledged the eternal knowledge of the Almighty God before the creation of the universe (negatively and in the sense of non-ignorance). In their thought system, in contrast to the inherent attributes that are negatively attributed to God, there are the act attributes of the Almighty God, which are created along with the act of creation, and their positive attribution to God does not entail any limitation. The theological stream of the school of Kūfah, except for Hishām Ibn Ḥakam and his followers, considered the act attributes of God as created and completely different from the Supreme Being, but the Hishāmiyhah stream considered the act attributes of the Real as a meaning that is neither the same to the Essence nor, like other creatures) out of It and opposite to It.

ḥabṭ or Iḥbāṭ (lit. frustration, destruction) of acts in the hereafter in the exegeticaltheological view, especially based on the primitive appearance of the Qurʾanic verse: “We shall advance upon what work they have done, and make it a scattered dust” (Qurʾan 25: 23), is considered to mean “destroying an act”. This article makes it clear that “Iḥbāṭ of an act in the hereafter” from the Holy Qurʾan's point of view, is a kind of “revealing invalidity”, not “destroying an act” in the sense of “invalidating an act by erasing its effects”. The innovative feature of this writing is the analysis of Iḥbāṭ’s nature in the hereafter on the basis of the Qurʾan based on the premises taken from the Qurʾanic verses, with the help of which the necessity of baring the above verse from its explicit appearance is justified. The logical course of solving the research problem is as follows: In the first stage, it is argued that: 1. The unchanging and common essence of the causes of ḥabṭ is "disbelief"; 2. The reality of disbelief is: nullifying and making the rights and blessings ineffective; 3. From the point of view of the Qurʾan, there is a sameness relationship between the act and its afterlife punishment. Then, on the basis of the aforementioned premises, it is argued that the truth of Iḥbāṭ in the hereafter, showing the reality of the act of disbelief for a person who commits disbelief, which God fulfills it by creating the other world, a world in which the inner truth of the act of the doer of disbelief, that is “nullifies and neutralizes” will appear for him and he receives the nullity and ineffectiveness of his acts because of disbelief. This article is organized in an analytical and descriptive way, relying on the method of thematic interpretation of the verses regarding the ḥabṭ of deeds.

The Imamate of the Imām can be proven with various rational and narrative proofs. This article only discusses evidences that are firstly narrative, and secondly, the Prophet and the previous Imām declared the Imamate of an Imām, and the latter Imam used them in cases where it was necessary to prove his Imamate. With the limitations mentioned, rational arguments or narrative arguments that were not used by the Imām himself will not be discussed. In writing this article, analytical-descriptive method has been used and based on that, three types of evidences of Imamate have been discussed: a) The arguments that were formed against the claimants of the rule after the Messenger of God. The Imāms in this era mainly referred to the words of God in the Qurʾan and the hadiths of the Prophet, which referred to the monopoly right of Amī al-Muʾminīn and his children to be the successors of the Prophet; b) The arguments against the claimants of Imamate, including Banū al-Ḥasan. The citations of the Imāms at this time were mostly centered on the Imamate's deposit pledges, last will, ritually washing and enshrouding the body of the previous Imām when he dies; c) The proofs of the imamate of Mundjī (the promised Savior), based on which, the narrative evidences for the determination of the Imamate of the Savior and the Promised One have been abandoned.