نشریه فلسفه
سال پنجاه و یکم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1402)

Based on the theoretical framework of the paradigm, in response to the question of what are the foundations and approaches of ethics and family education in the philosophy of ancient China and Mencius in particular, it proposes the hypothesis that Mencius in the Confucian intellectual system, but with the innovation of the paradigm (model) and in the light of it, he has had a more spiritual approach in the analysis of ethics and upbringing, moral rules, the network of the moral system and the virtues of the family system. He has a stronger and more transparent metaphysical approach and a great emphasis on human goodness, which is very frequent and effective in educational and moral issues. From his point of view, the relationship between husband and wife is the beginning of all human relationships and has a major contribution to the peace of society. According to Mencius, harmony between husband and wife, kind treatment of children, division of labor and continuation of service to parents after death are important aspects of family. The behavior of the government in such a way that people can easily form a family; The relationship between kindness to the child and his conscientiousness and order in the country; Determining domestic affairs by the wife and business affairs by the husband; strict father and kind mother; not publicizing parents' mistakes; and graded love and affection with family priority; The findings of the research. Mencius is an ethical philosopher who thinks within the Confucian tradition; But in ontology, it has a more and more transparent metaphysical approach; Therefore, he clearly ties ethics and education and its foundations, especially in the family, with the sky and makes it relatively spiritual, then links it with the field of politics. According to Mencius, nature is the source of ethics and all ethics are intertwined in nature. In anthropology, he places great emphasis on human goodness and believes that the sense of distinguishing between right and wrong is common to all human beings. According to his point of view, the goodness of nature is internal and is not imposed from outside, and it arises from the active and spontaneous power of nature, and the neglect of goodness is due to forgetfulness and lack of thinking. According to Mencius, the four virtues of piety, wisdom, knowledge, and benevolence are among the virtues that family upbringing and ethics play an essential role in creating and nurturing. In philosophy, Mencius believes in the continuity of the individual, family and government and sees a linear relationship between them. He believes that the root of the country is in the family and the root of the family is in the individual. Layered or dubious love and affection, which has different degrees and ranks, and love for family, relatives, and relatives is at the center of it, is the focal point that passionately motivated him to criticize the competing views of the Confucian school and outline his theoretical foundations; An effort that is based on two foundations: 1. Negation of speculation and action for oneself or piety for its inherent goodness; and 2. The innateness and naturalness of love is stable. (results).

The twentieth-century prominent political thinker, Hannah Arendt, has gone through a very different course from his master, Martin Heidegger, in presenting her viewpoints on the correlation between political action (praxis) and overcoming totalitarianism. Applying a phenomenological analysis of history, she surveys the human condition from the pre-Socratic era to now in order to illuminate this correlation. As a political existentialist, Arendt presumes that the privation of true political philosophy throughout the history of Western metaphysical tradition is the consequence of trivializing the necessity of action in general and praxis in particular compared to the centrality of speculation in post-Socratic tradition, especially Platonic school. According to Arendt, pre-Socratic Polis is the ideal political community, where the uniqueness of individuals -represented through their speech and action- is celebrated while being with "the others"; however, speculation in seclusion has become far more authentic than action in public after Socrates' trial. No need to mention Heidegger’s influential impact on Arendt's critical approach to Western metaphysical tradition; however, she emphasizes the disclosure of the actors’ “who” through action and speech in the public sphere, contrary to Heidegger’s disclosure of Dasein as “Aletheia” or the revelation of the truth. To phrase it, Arendt is switching over “being” to “appearance” which is manifested in action and speech in her thought. Her emphasis on man’s presence and his interaction with the others in the plurality of the public sphere to liberate from the crisis of twentieth-century totalitarianism and alienation stands in contrast to the extravagant egoism and solipsism of Heideggerian Dasein that have been recognized and criticized by Arendt herself. The one which is albeit known as being-in-the-world according to Arendt, but it is considered as inauthentic if being presented in the plurality of Mitsein (being-with), having an “Idle Talk” with them and consequently falling into everydayness. Therefore, Dasein prefers to remain an “ideal self” in isolation and seclusion according to Arendt.Arendt maintains that Heidegger's observation of Dasein as an "ideal self" is no way dissimilar to the post-Socratic man of speculation, who is engaged in noetic thinking in his privacy, the attitude that has diminished action in favor of reflection all through the Western metaphysical tradition. Mentioning the crisis of the twentieth-century totalitarianism in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, Arendt critically assumes that ontological egoism and solipsism have eliminated politics and successively prepared the ground for the rise of the mentioned crisis, whereas totalitarianism seeks atomized and disjointed societies. Applying a descriptive- analytic methodology, the present research attempts to compare Arendt's and Heidegger's standpoints towards the above concern and elucidates Arendt's criticism of Heidegger in clearing the crisis of totalitarianism. It also adverts Arendt's solution to exhaust the mentioned crisis, "love of the world", which creates the necessary impulsion and stimulus to overcome solipsism and triggers acting in public sphere, according to Arendt.

Mullā Ṣadrā, in a discussion like the relationship between the constant and the changing, insists on constancy of the change and says that the movement is something that its being changed is identical with constancy: because everything – whatever that may be – is of constancy, although its constancy be merely constancy in being changed. In other words, there is something constant in the changing things and the changing is constant in its own changing. Thus, the changing things are related to the constant from the very constant aspect. He sometimes considers this constancy as a kind of four–dimensionalism and does not regard this four–dimensionalism to be inconsistent with presentism. Now, this important problem appears that how much the paradoxical expressions such as “constancy of the change” and ‘combination of four–dimensionalism with presentism’ are acceptable. The main purpose of the essay is to critically study the very Ṣadrian version of constancy of the change in the constant–changing relation and similar discussions. We will see that Ṣadrian commentators have had different reactions to such expressions as constancy of the change: Some, like ʻAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāyī, have accepted it and some, like Muṭahharī and Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, have not. The criticism of Muṭahharī and Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, shortly speaking, is the claim that constancy of the change is abstract and mental property not external one and that it is conceptual not extensional. We will continue to criticize the evaluations of Muṭahharī and Miṣbāḥ Yazdī: if there is not some kind of constancy in the external world as the truth–maker, our mind cannot apply the concept of constancy about the external changings. Finally, we will focus on the logical structure of the discussion in our special critique of constancy of the change to show that Ṣadrian version of constancy of the change is not merely a paradox but arguably a real contradiction. The reason is that, if the logical structures of (A) “the changing in its own changing is constant (and not changing)” and (B) “the changing in its own changing is not constant (but is changing)” are new logical structures such as (C) “x in its own being x is not x” and (D) “x in its own being x is x”, then it is resulted that (B) “the changing in its own changing is changing (and not constant)” to be true and therefore a controdiction to be appeared: both (A) and its contradictory, (B), are true. So, there is something in the material world that is controdictorily both constant and changing – while such resolutions as the difference in aspect are not applicable in the case of this contradiction. But, if, on the contrary of Ṣadrian Philosophy, we consider constancy of the change merely as an external time permanence and does not confuse this time permanence with real constancy, there will not emerge the non–material constancy contradictorily from this intensity of the change.

Ḥakīm Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Lārī (979/80 AH/ 1572 CE) was a 10th AH/16th Century AD philosopher and historian. His extensive travels across the Safavid realms in Iran, the Gurkan domains in India, and the Ottoman territories in Asia Minor provided him with a profound cross-cultural perspective, deeply influencing his philosophical thought. As for the Life of Ḥakīm Lārī, a paucity of extensive biographical information has confined contemporary research to a scant collection of extant writings. Born in the southern city of Lār in 890 AH/1510 CE, Lārī's contributions to philosophy, astronomy, and history are noteworthy. This cross-cultural experience profoundly impacted his philosophical thought, as evidenced in his writings. Lārī's intellectual formation was shaped by the teachings of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Dashtakī (948 AH/1541 CE), son of Sayyid Ṣadr-al-Dīn Dashtakī (903 AH/1498 CE), and Kamāl al-Dīn Lārī (10th Century AH/16th Century CE), a student of Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī.  One of Lārī's notable works, the The Paradigm of the Sciences (Unmūdhaj al-ʿulūm), has been identified in two complete manuscripts in two Turkish libraries. Additionally, three copies of an excerpt from this work, titled "on the Discussion of the Motion" (fī bahth al-ḥaraka), are preserved in libraries across Iran, Germany, and Turkey. His "on the Discussion of the Motion" is the twelfth part of the treatise The Paradigm of the Sciences, a comprehensive work encompassing both rational and traditional sciences, organized into twenty-one discussions. Lārī's critical approach in this work imbues it with enduring philosophical value. He engaged with the thoughts of prominent thinkers across the ages, including Aristotle (322 BCE), Fārābī (339 AH/ 950 CE), Avicenna (428 AH/1037 CE), Suhrawardī (587 AH/ 1191 CE), Qūshchī (878 AH/1474 CE), and Davānī (908 AH/ 1502 CE). In this work, Lārī establishes himself as a peer to Davānī through a philosophical dialogue with his criticisms. This work is concerned with a definition of motion, the elements of defining motion and the intimate relationship of motion to time. It examines the fluid nature of the present now (flowing now), the distinction between finite and infinite entities, and two meanings of motion: instantaneous (ḥaraka tawassuṭiyya) and continuous (ḥaraka qaṭ'iyya). It also explores a particular kind of motion in a category, including motion in quantity, condensation, and growth. The connectedness of the unit and the notion of a natural unit are carefully examined, as are the nature of a physical body, the singularity of a certain thing, and the notion of an individual entity. The methodology employed in editing the text adhered to the following principles: precedence of date, textual completeness, lexical and philosophical aspects, Modern Standard Arabic readability, Middle Arabic variants, and elimination of unnecessary orthographic differences. This approach ensured that the text's integrity was preserved while enhancing its accessibility to a modern audience.

Ibn Sina considered the way of viewing non-material (rational) beings to have a reverse process of viewing material beings. After him, Sheikh Eshraq (Suhrawardi) also explained how to observe the creatures of the imaginal world with the help of this process. Instead of the five external senses that send information to common sense, this information is transferred from the soul or the imagination in the opposite direction to common sense. The necessary condition for this is that the external and internal powers are not busy, and there is an opportunity for sensual perception to affect the brain and common sense. In this way, an unseen being is represented by the person. This process happens in two states: sleep and wakefulness. Those whose souls are strong or whose bodies are weak succeed in such an observation. Since sensual perception reaches a common sense through inner powers and imagination, sometimes imagination interferes, takes possession of it, and turns what the soul has observed into its likeness or opposite. In this case, we need an interpretation of the conditions and methods examined in this article. However, in some cases, what has been observed reaches the common sense without interference, and the person observes them. The criterion for such an observation is that closing the eyes does not prevent it from being seen. In some cases, this process requires an interpretation, and this article examines the conditions. Also, this process has various applications in Islamic philosophy. With its help, the method of observing and representing angels, jinn, and demons, as well as the method of inspiration and seeing a veridical dream, and some types of magic and knowledge of the occult have been explained. In this way, it is also possible to explain the observations and sensory perceptions and hear the sounds described by Sheikh Eshraq in the stages of treading a path of mystical conduct. The types of revelation that happen through seeing the angel of revelation and hearing his voice can also be explained in this way. In some patients, the origin of these observations is purely imaginary, and the person suffers from hallucinations and observes things that have no origin other than his brain. In this way, the delusions of some patients can also be explained. This article describes and criticizes the reverse process and its applications. It has been shown that Avicenna influences Suhrawardi in this discussion, and both philosophers have proposed similar applications for this theory, with the difference that Suhrawardi extended Avicenna's thesis, which was about rational beings, to the imaginal world.

The issue of stagnation or lack of progress in Islamic culture and civilization and its causes is one of the main issues that modern Muslim intellectuals have addressed and elaborated from various perspectives. Most of them believe that the main obstacle is Islamic philosophy(hekmat) and mysticism, which have hindered the progress of Islamic countries compared to the so-called Western countries. This research does not focus on the well-known factors such as scientific, social, political and geographical factors that are usually relevant for the development of civilization and culture. Rather, it investigates and analyzes this issue by arguing that the concepts of progress, civilization and culture are novel and modern concepts that are based on specific (modern) philosophical principles that originated and spread in Europe and have no precedent in any civilization and thought of non-European peoples, including Islam, even in the Christian Middle Ages. It is a novel initiative that was launched in the Western world history, and in essence, neither Islamic, Christian, nor Chinese or Indian wisdom and mysticism have obstructed its emergence. Contrary to what is claimed, in the pre-modern era, the source and basis of what is called culture and civilization in the modern era, for example in the Islamic world, were their wisdom and mysticism. To do this, the article first provides the historical background of the advocates of this opinion, who saw themselves as religious reformers or the so-called Islamic Protestants, such as Sayyed Jamaluddin Asadabadi. It also explains the history of the main concepts of this opinion, namely civilization, culture and progress, in the modern Western thought and their novelty in the non-modern thought and among the predecessors. It deals with the teachings of the great mystic Rumi as the one who is wrongly labeled as an opponent of science.The article also gives some examples of how the views of two Muslim philosophers, one from the west, Ibn Rushd, and the other from the east, Mirfenderski, could have contributed to the emergence of modern science and technology among Muslims, but they did not. The study concludes that this opinion and judgment is fundamentally flawed and is mainly due to the lack of comprehension of the foundations and principles of modern thought and secondly, Islamic philosophy and mysticism.

The truth and reality are two fundamental philosophical concepts upon which pragmatists have specific and important discussions. This paper compares Peirce’s and James’s ideas – both of which have proposed theories that challenge traditional metaphysics - on these two fundamental concepts in order to answer two questions of (1) why James has a wider reputation, his thoughts are more pursued, and is also called the founder of pragmatism, while Peirce is the founder of Pragmatism; and (2) whether the two philosophers’ pragmatism in the theory of reality and truth has been able to free itself from metaphysical philosophy? To answer these questions, this paper addresses these two philosophers’ point of views toward the theory of the truth. Although, it seems that the two concepts of truth and reality have clear meanings, there is a difference of opinion among pragmatist philosophers. Therefore, investigating the meaning, types, criteria, and position of the truth and reality in pragmatism reflects these philosophers’ opinions on these two concepts and also, answers the research questions of this paper. To answer the research questions, this paper applied a qualitative method, used a desk study, reviewed previous studies on relevant topics, and applied analytical arguments and interpretations. This paper shows that pragmatism is based on the pragmatic maxim that Peirce wrote and James also accepted. The overall criterion of this maxim is the practical impact that are reflected in propositions, believes, and notions to evaluate their practical consequences. In their views, although there are some literal dissimilarities between different believes, they have the same practical impact and address the same matter. Thus, they made a link between the theory and practice.  However, their views on traditional metaphysics make a distinction between these two philosophers. Peirce considers the pragmatic maxim as a logical principle, connects it to the theory of meaning, and offers different criteria - such as correspodence, compatibility, coherence, and consensus of scientific community – for evaluating the truth. Therefore, he gives a social character to the truth and takes the traditional metaphysics away from his philosophy. James, however, ties it with the theory of the truth that make it incompatible with the traditional metaphysics and Pierce’s criteria. These characteristics put James’ pragmatism at the top of the later pragmatist thoughts. In addition, this article explains that although both, Peirce and James, proposed new and effective views on the truth and reality and relations between them and they challenged some of the principles of metaphysical philosophy. Therefore, they did not think outside the framework of metaphysical thinking, could not withdraw this position, and did not propose totally novel ideas.

Phenomenologists enumerate the four main topics of Husserl's phenomenology and discuss them in detail: phenomenology, categorical intuition, the meaning of the a priori, the phenomenological principle. The importance of categorical intuition shows itself in the link between phenomenology and ontology. The first aspect in the importance of categorical intuition is related to the interpretation of truth in phenomenology. The interpretation of truth in this point of view is close to the view of the Greeks, who attached real value even to simple perception. Another aspect of the importance of discussing categorical intuition is to emphasize that when expressing sensory perception and passing judgment,  there are things that cannot be perceived; for example, in the sentence "This table is blue", we see neither "this" nor "is". The third aspect of the importance of categorical intuitions is that these intuitions constitute the new perceived objectivity; That is, they make simple objects more original. The perceived objectivity that manifests itself in such a categorical intuition is itself a mode of being objective; so, with the discovery of categorical intuition, the concept of objectivity expanded and with the phenomenological research, the way of research that the former ontology was looking for is obtained. There is no ontology parallel to phenomenology; rather, ontology is not a science except phenomenology. In Husserl's opinion, any action that fills the presentation and confirms itself is called "perception"; and every fulfilling act is called "intuition"; and "object" refers to any kind of intentional correlate. Husserl discusses "categorial intuition" in the sixth investigation of Logical Investigations. In categorial intuition, we are dealing with sensory perceptions with the surplus, which is added to a predicative assertion at the stage of transferring sensory perception. The problem of the present article is to explain the position of categorial intuition and its relationship with perception from Husserl's point of view in his Logical Investigations. The necessity and importance of this issue is such that it can be considered as the foundation of phenomenology and any future knowledge theory, and even Heidegger considered it one of the four main issues of Husserl's phenomenology. The discussion begins with an explanation of the difference between "perception", "intuition", "object" and "fulfillment". Then, using the analytical-descriptive method, the relationship of categorial intuition with the categorial elements of thinking, the contrast between simple and categorial acts, the stages of acts in synthetic categorical intuition, the important role of sensation in categorial intuition, and eidetic intuition will be investigated next to synthetic categorial intuition. One of the achievements of this article is the exposition of the three stages of synthetic categorial intuitions: simple perception of the whole, subdividing perceptions, and categorial synthetic intention. The innovation of this article is that, according to Husserl, we have intellectual and categorial intuition just as we have intuition of sensory objects.

In contrast to other theories, the theory of holistic view has not been properly considered in Islamic philosophy, especially transcendental wisdom. The ideas about the existence of the whole or the total as something derived from individuals, in order to confirm or reject its real existence, are implicitly acceptable during some issues that arise in the Supreme Wisdom and according to their requirements. Exploring these related theories gives two conflicting positions of Mulla Sadra's theory about the being of the "whole": Some expressions clearly express the negation of the existence of the whole, Mulla Sadra, in the position of criticizing Ibn Sina's proofs of the falsification of sequence and Suhrodi's proof of necessity, which take the existence of the whole as the premise of their proof, and also proofs It runs away from the plateau that has been set up to prove the existence of the whole and emphasizes that nothing but unity exists outside, and multiplicity is not compatible with existence. and others implicitly or explicitly acknowledge its existence. some other expressions of Mulla Sadra, contrary to the above opinion, are in line with the acceptance of the external existence of the whole; That is, his expressions have provided a platform for description and interpretation dependent on the external existence of the whole, each of which is examined in detail.  The present article aims to use analytical-critical method, after considering Mulla Sadra's conflicting expressions in this regard, by paying attention to the coordinates of the principle of gradation of being, to criticize her point of view and to verify the theory of holism. The result of the research shows that the belief in the existence of the whole is one of the essentials of the principle of gradation of being. Longitudinal and latitudinal multiplicity that exists with regard to the three basic components of the principle of suspicion; That is, unity, multiplicity and objectivity of both can be explained, it shows the true existence of the whole as certain and its negation and the exclusivity of the existence of the whole in the existence of its individuals is incompatible with the coordinates of existence. The whole is a mental validity that is considered by differentiating and considering the plurality of people and not the plurality of gradation, and in this mental and epistemological consideration, ontological explanations, including gradation, do not interfere much. If someone believes in the originality of the essence or the difference of existence in the external objective truth or has a special doubt or special gradation, can credit all of them. This mental validity does not have an objective realization, and this is different from plurality or unity.

History, under the influence of Hegel's thoughts in the 19th century, took a high place. In the following, some historians with a positivist way of thinking proposed the idea of scientific historiography. Based on that, history becomes a definite science and, like natural sciences, it is separated from the researcher's mentalities. The problem starts from here that German historicism, believing in the normative force of history, emphasized the importance that the historian should provide a direction for society and culture by discovering the pure facts and revealing their historical meaning.Based on this idea of history, the social and cultural function of philosophy was challenged. In this chaotic situation that made philosophy face the crisis of identity, Nietzsche's and Dilthey's projects, i.e. the broad and diverse movement of "philosophy of life," became the driving force of the renewal of philosophy in the 19th century.Nietzsche and Dilthey agreed on the issue that comprehensive historiography in its understanding of human beings has created the problem of relativism, which causes "dissolution" and "pessimism" and cannot predict the future of human culture. Therefore, they called for a new philosophy that should reveal the purpose of human culture and support its progress towards reaching its goal. Although they chose a similar path to confirm the cultural authority of philosophy against the results of historical criticism, they arrived at a completely different solution.Nietzsche calls the antidotes against historicism "supra-historical", which includes the art of forgetting history and living in an enclosed and determined horizon; It means having the talent to know when to sense history and when to leave it aside.In his opinion, both of these methods are equally necessary for the health of a person, the health of a nation and culture. Dilthey, unlike Nietzsche, considers history to be an antidote and a cure for the failures of the philosophy of life: If history creates a wound, it must also heal it.

This article asks: can there be a scientific concept of ideology? This question—which is also the title of an article by Paul Ricoeur—is framed in such a way as to challenge prevailing conceptions of ideology in favor of a phenomenological approach. Employing the popular but difficult idiom of phenomenology—return to things themselves—and deconstructing the extant logic of ideology established and coined by Destutt de Tracy, this paper argues that a scientific conception of ideology becomes possible. In light of such a possibility, this paper further argues that this scientific conception paves the path for stepping beyond the dichotomy of interpretation and change, or theoretical and practical research. At the very least, a scientific concept of ideology will allow for the development of a kind of science—which, despite not claiming any superiority to other sciences (thus contrary to De Tracy’s contention)—will nevertheless reflect fundamental differences from other sciences in subject matter, methodology and logic. After an exegesis of de Tracy’s thought on the sources, methodology and logic of ideology, this paper examines the claim of the superiority of ideology to other sciences and his Baconian project of reconstructing human understanding and nature. It is clear that the epistemological foundations of ideology are not defendable today and face critical questions. Questions such as, if ideology were to examine sources of human consciousness (knowledge, understanding, intellect), why and how could intellect itself and its foundations, which are supposed to carry out such a process, be excluded from the arbitration process? Of what nature are those intellectual foundations and why is there not adequate discussion about them? Why should that particular way of reasoning be immune to its rulings on the material foundations of thought? Perhaps the whole concept of ideology is merely a biological reflection of intellect in the mind of a French philosopher called Destutt de Tracy, and has no more objective validity than that. If the claim of ideology is that reason can grasp the whole of reality, the question that arises is whether reason can have a grasp on itself and its mechanisms, or should such grasp be excluded from the scope of reason’s analysis? The science of ideas seems to have assumed a transcendental position; But it is precisely this assumption and claim that in return violates the methodological foundations of ideology. These questions lead us to the main question of this article, which is, in the words of Paul Ricoeur: “Do we have no choice but to accede to the opposition between science and ideology?” And to say that ideology is not a science? The answer to this question is that there are possibilities in ideology which can be used to postulate the notion of "ideology as a science" and that this concept also faces limitations which resist developing into a science. What is important, however, is to address the tension between science and ideology, for, as Ricoeur puts it, “we have more to lose by not dealing with this tension” (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 57). This paper concludes that if ideology signifies as an analysis of  dominant ideas , it can be merged and united with critical phenomenology (an approach that appeared some two centuries after the concept of ideology) and thereby be employed to dismantle the dichotomy of interpretation and change. In this concluding section, it will be noted that ideology has three main underpinnings: a) its contemporaneity with the philosophical-scientific tradition of knowledge; b) a critique of established ideas; and c) the emergence of relative alternatives. In conjunction with one another, these three create an ideology as science that is different in essence from other sciences; its modus operandi is the simultaneous task of interpretation and change: a quality unique to ideology— and later, critical phenomenology—present in no other science or knowledge.

Forming a government in order for humans to achieve their individual and social goals is a rational necessity. The necessity of forming a government and, as some philosophers call it, "Medina" and the existence of the head of the government, has been the focus of Western and Islamic philosophers, and Mulla Sadra, as the founder of "Hekmat Ta'alaye" has also paid great attention to this issue in various works, especially the book "The Origin and Resurrection". But the discussion about the right of sovereignty and the characteristics of the ruler has always been among the challenging topics among philosophers and sages. The purpose of this article is to analyze Mulla Sadra's opinions as the founder of Hikmat Ta'ala, in the context of the head of government and his characteristics. Therefore, the main question is: From Mullah Sadra's point of view, for whom is the right of sovereignty over the Islamic society fixed and what characteristics should it have? The answer to this question has been examined based on his opinions based on the book of origin and resurrection. This study is a type of content analysis research, which is done by referring to the written sources of Hakim Mataleh, relying on the book Mabada wa Maad. By collecting data in line with the goal and the main question of the research, and taking into account some of Mullah Sadra's intellectual foundations, such as the belief in monotheism, the right of divine sovereignty, the rule of possibility, the levels of reason, the rule of unity, the originality and doubt of existence, and the meaning of happiness and true perfection. It turned out that according to Mulla Sadra, first of all, the existence of a head of government is a necessity to run the society and lead people to the true happiness and perfection of mankind, and secondly, since the right to rule belongs to God, only a person has the right to rule over the people who is authorized and be appointed directly or indirectly by the ruler. Such a person is either a prophet of God who, relying on his knowledge, knows the true happiness and the way to achieve it correctly, or an authorized imam appointed by him. He then lists some of the characteristics of the ruler. This study can determine the task of governance and the type of governance in Islamic society and establish a governance model based on the principles of transcendental wisdom.