نشریه متافیزیک
سال سوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 12، پاییز و زمستان 1390)

Time is one of the most difficult subjects in philosophy. Some philosophers believe that time is a reality and others assume it as an illusion. McTaggart has denied the reality of time. His argument is very famous in the philosophy of time and thus the recent discussions about time are affected by his argument. Events and moments, he thinks, can occur in time in two forms and thus there are two series of time: 1) A series in which two events and moments are ordered as past, present and future, 2) B series in which the events and moments are ordered as a priori and a posterior. The A series is necessary for time because without A series time does not exist. At the same time, A series leads to contradiction and time cannot exist as a real thing. Only one real and non-temporal series, he believes, exists but it appears as time series to us by our perception.

Aristotle presents his doctrine of prime matter in order to give an explanation for change and especially for generation and corruption. Hence, no surprise, the place to look for the origin of this doctrine is nowhere but Aristotle’s science of nature. The first three sections of this article examine the Aristotle’s explanation of this doctrine according to his teachings in the works concerning the science of nature (Physics and On Generation and Corruption) and show that why Aristotle introduces such a thing as prime matter into his science of nature and what he does mean by that. Then, in the last section, I will show that Aristotle’s explanation of prime matter as the ultimate substratum of all things, at least as far as these works are concerned, is not plausible and without difficulties.

Theories about the dawn of "principality of existence" or "principality of quiddity" stand in the realm of "confusion of term and concept fallacy". It is true that asalat as a term appeared for the first time in Mirdamad's works such as Taqwim al-Iman to mention the problem of principality of existence, but we should notice that its meaning as a concept can be tracked in Suhrawadi's works. If by the term asalat we mean having real extension, as it is used in Mulla Sadra's work, we can, without any doubt, claim that Suhrawardi is among the proponents of principality of quiddity. Proposing the distinction of existence and quiddity by al-Faraby and Avicenna, some philosophers regarded this distinction as a real one. But Suhrawardi, by presenting about nine arguments, claimed that existence remains as a mental predicate and does not have any real extension. He made use of his theory in the realm of the Necessary Being through Itself. Avicenna had claimed that the essence of God is His Existence (al-Haqq mahiyyatuh inniyyatuh) but Suhrawardi denied this Avicennan Peripatetic principle. He said that existence has no real extension and so the essence of God cannot be existence. He claimed that here iniyyah means indivisible life (al-Hayat al-Basit). It seems that Mulla Sadra's arguments for demonstrating the principality of existence posed versus Suhrawardi's arguments for the mental nature of existence.

"Eikon" (Greek word) or "Imago" (Latin word) signifies a kind of similarity or "likeness". In Plato’s philosophy, this term implies "likeness" of appearance to pattern or symbol. In semantic analysis of icon, which is correlated with Idea, we can find factors such as "perception", "imagination", "likeness", "imitation" (Mimesis), "imaginary ideas", that is, it is not possible to reduce icon to a material picture because it is supported by cultural (symbolic), perceptual and conceptual sources. The process in which an icon is established indicates a special relation between icon and imaginary ideas that is supported by symbolic sources. Then, it is not possible to regard icon as a material picture because icon is an icon of a symbol which is able to play its role visibly in relation to a symbol.

The concept of Derrida’s deconstruction is generally misunderstood and there are not many scholars that succeed to come to its true understanding. It is defined usually as a destructive criticism of philosophical texts and this is obvious in Persian translations of this term. Of course, there is some kind of truth in this conception but the more important part of truth is missed in it. In this essay, we propose this claim that deconstruction is not a method or a theory, but a strategy and an act. Also we claim that deconstruction is not just negative and a powerful positive aspect can be found in it. Then, we will try to examine and prove these claims with reference to Derrida’s works and his commentators. Finally, we will conclude that the act of deconstruction is not a theory about texts and unrelated to exterior reality. It is an ethical attitude towards the world. Deconstructive knowledge would change our active attitude towards the world and our life strategy.

Anthropology is the comprehensive aspect of Kant’s thought and it can be considered as the product of critical thinking and practical aspects of his thought. In anthropology, Kant tries to explain human nature from pragmatic point of view, and not essentially. Kant ties human nature to his social aspects such as civilization, sociability, education etc. Kant tries to provide a comprehensive explanation of social and individual aspects of human being. Therefore, anthropology can be defined, from Kant’s point of view, as a global empirical science and practical philosophy which would like to recognize, by prudential reason and observation method, human nature with pragmatic approach. In addition, this philosophy wants to educate persons who can not only acquire speculative knowledge but also be considered as a citizen of the world.

In this paper, we suggest an alternative interpretation for the state vector which, by considering temporal parts for physical objects, aims to give an intelligible account of measurement problem in quantum mechanics. This interpretation, it is claimed, has the capacity to solve three measurement problems: the problem of outcome, the problem of statistics and the problem of effect. We argue that it not only provides us with an account of measurement problem but also shows us yet another limitation of our perceptual experience, i.e. our inability to perceive unsharp reality.