A Model for the Way of Epistemic Reference

The present paper is an attempt to review on solution of foundationalists in dealing with the criterion for truth of theoretical propositions providing a pattern for epistemic reference on the chosen foundationalism. By epistemic reference is meant to justify theoretical propositions by reference to self-evident propositions, which is referred to in logical jargon as "analysis". In contrast with this mental activity there is epistemic activity in which one starts from self-evident to the theoretical which is named "synthesis or combination". The pattern concerned is as follows: a philosophical system or structure consisting of analytic propositions is possible. This pattern can be presented in philosophy before science. For instance, one can analyze the arguments for the existence of God into self-evident propositions and reduced to a few limited principles. This philosophical system consists of analytic propositions that are real but in themselves do not indicate the realization of and correspondence to their external instances. Both the realization and correspondence are in need of argument. The most important problem one faces in this solution is how such analytic propositions and statements can be related to external world. The paper continues to provide a solution for the above-mentioned problem.