The Certainty and General Acceptance of Value Propositions

Great scholars such as Avicenna, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Muhaqhqheq Isfahani and al-Muzaffar have regarded the value propositions such as those suggesting the goodness of justice and evilness of tyranny as "the generally accepted propositions in the narrow sense" in contrast to "certainties". "The generally accepted propositions in the narrow sense" have no reality beyond the unanimous acceptance over them and are used as the base of polemics. Thus a controversy has been raised whether such a theory goes to oppose the celebrated theory of the Shite that the goodness of justice and evilness of tyranny in value propositions are essential and rationally defendable. In order to remove the apparent antinomy between the two theories, two justifications have been offered each of which carries a few evidences. The first justification suggests that what they mean by general acceptance of goodness of justice and evilness of tyranny is no more than the fact that they are accepted by the wise people. The second justification suggests that goodness and badness have two meanings. In their first meaning, they refer to the inner inclination of individuals with regard to justice and tyranny which is thus backed by the mere acceptance and allow of no correspondence or none-correspondence with realities. In their second meaning, they refer to some realities in man's perfection and thus allow of the correspondence or none-correspondence with realities, in the sense that justice is compatible with man's real character but tyranny isnt. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi has used the former meaning as the practical reason and the latter as the theoretical reason.