فهرست مطالب ولی گل محمدی

The international role of the dollar in the global economy remains dominant. Nonetheless, there is a belief that various factors, including geopolitical changes, technological advancements, and China's increasing role as an emerging power, may challenge the hegemony of the American dollar as a dominant force. China has implemented a range of significant and diverse policies in pursuit of de-dollarization to weaken one of the key pillars of American power. In this research, we employ an analytical-explanatory method and draw upon written and online sources, as well as data from financial and banking institutions, to address the fundamental question: What actions has China taken in pursuit of de-dollarization, and to what extent have they been effective? The hypothesis proposed suggests that considering the dollar's control over the financial structure and the international payment system, as well as the world's countries dependence, including China's, on the existing financial and monetary structure, dollar hegemony has persisted despite China's confrontational policies and has not encountered significant challenges thus far. The research findings suggest that while China's de-dollarization policy is acknowledged as a potential threat to dollar hegemony, it has not succeeded in challenging the dominance of the American currency, and it appears that the dollar-based system will continue predictably into the future.

Techno-nationalism is a form of mercantilist thinking in the realm of new technologies that directly associates innovation and technological capabilities with a nation's identity, national security, economic prosperity, and social stability. This issue has become increasingly prominent since 2018 and the US-China trade war. One of the most significant symbols of this competition lies in advanced chips, or semiconductors. Given the significance of this topic, this research aims to address the fundamental question: "What impact will techno-nationalism, especially the technological battle in the realm of semiconductors, have on the economic rivalry between the United States and China?" In alignment with this research question, the hypothesis posits that "the technological contest in the domain of semiconductors, due to the acquisition of technological advantages, constitutes one of the most critical elements in the US-China trade war, and the economic supremacy of these two nations is intertwined with dominance in this sector." The results indicate that, given the importance of semiconductors in the production of a wide array of industrial products, their destiny-shaping role, and their position as a primary determinant in the economic competition between the United States and China, the West has maintained a substantial advantage over China so far. Nevertheless, China is pursuing various strategies to narrow this gap and reduce its reliance on the West.

This article studies the transformation of Israel’s Security-Defense Doctrine in order to understand the framework of the cyber capabilities in shaping Israel’s new deterrence strategy against internal and external threats. Restrictions of geographical location in the turbulent Middle East, a lack of strategic depth, and vulnerabilities due to the asymmetry of the elements of national power against enemies and neighbors push Israel to avoid classical warfare and use the unconventional deterrence tools and new defense doctrine. In the context of cyber deterrence assumptions, this article introduces the basic idea that Israel has made targeted investments in developing cyber-deterrence capabilities by redefining its security-defense deterrence tools. The cyber deterrence strategy has expanded the scope of Israel's response to national security threats beyond its borders and significantly reduced the environmental vulnerability of internal threats. Accordingly, the transition from conventional military tools to unconventional tools persuades Israel to formulate national security strategies centered on cyber capabilities to meet new threats. The military vulnerability to Palestinian Resistance Groups in the recent war has shown that in the face of a more serious challenge like Iran, military warfare is not a viable option for Israel, and cyber deterrence is predicted to have a special place in Israel's Security-Defense Doctrine in the future.

This article seeks to understand why the conflict of Afghanistan has been continued in the past decades. This research is done with qualitative method using document-library sources. The roots of continued conflict and instability in Afghanistan can be categorized in three levels. 1. Internal factors influencing the continuation of the conflict include ethnicity, language, religion, and the lack of political and economic institutions; 2. The regional factor; Afghanistan is not a full member of any of the neighboring regions but it is always affected by the neighboring regions; In other words, one of the most important factors of the continuation of the conflict in Afghanistan is the spillover of conflicts from the surrounding regions in Afghanistan. 3. The level of the international system, including the competition between the great powers and Afghanistan's neighboring to China and Russia, affecting the continuation of the conflict. The research question is, “How the surrounding areas of Afghanistan effect on the continuation of the conflict in this country?” In response, the hypothesis of the research is that Afghanistan, as an insulator state, does not belong to its surrounding regional security complexes (South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East). The location of Afghanistan in this position has weakened the shared destiny between Afghanistan and the above regions, and as a result, it has become a place for conflicts in the surrounding regions to spill.

This article aims to provide a systematic analysis of the continuation of conflict and instability in Afghanistan. The Afghan government has experienced recurrent episodes of violence and political turmoil in the past five decades. Since 1973, the country has witnessed three coups d'état and six regime changes. Afghanistan's geopolitical location at the crossroads of South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia plays a decisive role in the continuation of the conflict. Drawing on the regional security complex theory, this article argues that Afghanistan is an insulator state that does not belong to any of the security arrangements of its neighboring regions and is exposed to their security threats and interventions. The main research question is: how do the surrounding regions of Afghanistan influence the continuation of the conflict in this country? The main hypothesis is that Afghanistan's insulation from its peripheral regional security complexes (South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East) has reduced the sense of common destiny between Afghanistan and these regions and has made it a battleground for their rivalries and spillovers. The findings of the article show that the competition between India and Pakistan from South Asia, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the infiltration of non-state actors such as ISIS from the Middle East, and the presence of Islamic extremist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Ansarullah of Tajikistan and the issue of energy transit from Central Asia are crucial factors in sustaining the conflict in Afghanistan.

National power refers to a concept in which governments determine the national, regional, and international Status of a country by utilizing their potential and actual material and spiritual resources, relying on their governance methods and leadership quality within society. After the Cold War, economic strength has become one of the most important pillars for strengthening the national power of countries. In this research, using an analytical-explanatory method and relying on written and online sources, we aim to answer the question: "Considering the relative importance of the economy in global and regional competitions and its increasing role in the national power of countries, why has the role of this significant factor been weak in Iran's national power?" The hypothesis put forward to answer this question is that "although the economy has been emphasized and attended to in Iran's macro-level policymaking, it has not been a priority in the implementation of the country's governance system." The examination of theoretical foundations and the role of the economy in Iran's national power indicates that the primary reason for the diminished role of the economy lies in the increased pressure of sanctions and threats, which prioritized military deterrence capabilities in the country. Furthermore, an idealistic approach to development and the mismatch between many program objectives and reality resulted in their failure, diminishing the role of the economy in the country's national power.

This writing seeks to outline key questions and trends in Turkish foreign policy, considering its domestic and international dynamisms. What is the appraisal of Erdogan’s Turkiye of its national role and international status and in case of a change in government, what will be the outlook of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Erdogan period? There are some key statements concerning Turkish foreign policy-making: First, Turkiye’s new strategic culture does not recognize a clear boundary between the friend and foe, as it constantly changes according to environmental dynamisms and domestic political debates. Second, war in Ukraine has made Turkiye’s balancing policy face a serious challenge as it has raised ambiguity in anti-Westernism in Turkiye-Russia relations. Third, instead of being a reflection of a turn in Turkish regional policy, the process of normalization of relations with regional countries largely represents a resetting of foreign policy with Turkiye’s domestic dynamisms and surrounding areas’ geopolitical realities. If the opposition parties come to power, the new leaders will not retreat from Turkiye’s spheres of influence in surrounding areas, but policies arising from Erdogan’s personal and partisan preferences will undergo change among which reviving relations with the traditional Western allies will be given priority.

This article aims to re-think the main arguments on Russian Middle East policy. According to the mainstream views, the West plays a pivotal role in shaping Russia's Middle East policy, and Moscow's presence in the Middle East has largely been interlinked to Russia’s changing relations with the United States. Not having considering the international dynamics and complexities of the changing Middle East geopolitics, these contributions continue to argue that Russian Middle East presence is highly intended to challenge the United States and revive the Soviet’s sphere of influence throughout the region. In contrast, this paper offers a multidimensional and multivariable contribution, emphasizes on the regionalization of politics and security in the Middle East and the growing role of regional actors and emerging dynamics that inevitably lead to different options, interests and concerns which necessitates the engagement of great powers, especially Russia. According to regionalization of great powers engagement, Russia's Middle East policy and its increasing intervention in regional developments are influenced by political, security and economic dynamics within the Middle East that has increasingly become the driving force behind a variety of opportunities and threats such as terrorism, energy, arms sales, and foreign relations with the regional states. For Russia, this strong presence in the Middle East does not necessarily mean a return to the revisionist and hegemonic policy of Soviet engagement in the cold war era.

The Second Karabakh War resulted in a significant shift in the regional balance of power, as Russia and Turkey increased their influence to shape the changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran’s policy in the South Caucasus has been based on preventing a full-scale war and maintaining the status quo in the region especially in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, Tehran has never presented an initiative to mitigate geopolitical disputes or promote economic integration in the South Caucasus. At the theoretical level, the idea of regionalism in Iran’s foreign policy has usually been discussed from three perspectives: security-geopolitical, geo-economic and identity-civilizational. At the practical level, the main challenge for Iranian regionalism over the past four decades has been to create a balance between these divergent approaches. In a general view, the second war in Nagorno-Karabakh actually required the renewal of major geostrategic structures in the South Caucasus. While regional stakeholders such as Turkey and Russia aspired for a greater role through their operational-diplomatic initiatives, Tehran's passive response to regional geopolitical change made it clear that Iran had no strategic vision to shape these developments. As a result of the weak engagement, Iran is sidelined in emerging geopolitics of the South Caucasus in strategic terms.Research Question: The purpose of this article is to explain the reasons for the lack of regionalism in Iran's foreign policy in the South Caucasus. The main question is; what factors are at play in explaining Iran’s regionalism in the South Caucasus? How can we understand the reasons behind Iran's lack of regionalism in the South Caucasus in a systematic way?Research Hypothesis: This paper presents two interrelated arguments by providing a multi-level explanation. First, the Systemic pressures and lack of strategic vision of regionalism in foreign policy have isolated Iran in its neighboring regions. Second, the relative dominance of the security-geopolitical approach and at the same time, the centrality of the Arab Middle East to Iran’s regional policy, has increasingly marginalized other neighboring regions especially the South Caucasus.

In order to explain the main idea of the research, this article uses the analytical method of inductive-deductive reasoning. An Inductive- deductive mixed reasoning has been used in this article and it is tried to take advantage of the collected data in order to achieve a proper pattern for analyzing the status and implications of Iran’s regionalism in the South Caucuses.  In the prism of latest developments in theoretical literature of Regionalism, this article frames its main contribution by highlighting this main theoretical argument; Contrary to Western-oriented approaches, today the concept and requirements of regionalism are significantly different with regions and regionalism taking a quasi-autonomous role in shaping regional policies and in addressing different issues and areas with the rise of new actors and alliances in the regions. 

In the aftermath of the 2020 Karabakh war, emerging geopolitical realities convinced Iran to start rearranging its foreign policy in the South Caucasus and abandon its traditional policy of neutrality. Although the regionalism projects proposed by others could be a favorable ground for Tehran to strengthen cooperation with all stakeholders in the region, the major trend of Iran's foreign policy towards regionalism in the South Caucasus is not yet visible on the horizon.  In the meantime, while Iran has a rather open view toward the regionalist projects presented by Russia and Turkey, it views Western proposals as potential drivers of divergence rather than convergence aimed, among other things, at isolating Iran in its neighboring regions. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union had provided a significant space for regional powers to play an active role in the South Caucasus, Iran's engagement in this region and its relations with its neighbors have been limited. Except for Armenia, which has real political reasons in maintaining the balance in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabakh, Iran has not had close relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Georgia. In a general look, Iran's foreign policy in the South Caucasus has been mostly passive and a security-oriented approach. Over the last decades, Western powers, the US in particular, have made an increasing effort to securitize Iran’s regional behavior in the South Caucasus. By adopting the “everything without Iran policy”, the United States has sought to weaken Iran's role in transit corridors, energy transits and even cultural initiatives. Under the influence of the West's comprehensive Iranophobia policy, in order to weaken Iran’s strategic connections with its neighbors, a security and aggressive image of Iran's foreign policy has been portrayed in the eyes of its Caucasian neighbors especially Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Given the transition in the international system and the importance of regions in the structure of global governance, the development of cooperation with neighbors and active regionalism in the neighboring regions, especially the South Caucasus, is gradually becoming a strategic necessity in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Despite this, Iran is facing many international and domestic challenges in pursuing an active regionalism. Although the Raeisi administration seeks to develop the neighborhood policy and redefine the role and strategic position of Iran in the surrounding regions, it seems that at least in the foreseeable future, Tehran is incapable of designing and implementing an active regionalist approach in the South Caucasus independently.

The present study seeks to draw the requirements of the strategic relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its strategic partnership options with various blocks of power in a post -Western international system. Under the transition of the International System, what requirements should the macro -foreign policy approach and Iran's strategic partnership options have to consider? Due to the unique geostrategic position at the peripheral environmental equations, Iran has fundamentally affected the process of redistribution of power and wealth in the international system. Emerging powers such as Iran, once marginalized by the material and discourse of a Western order from the equations of the international system, were marginalized. They now have an unprecedented opportunity to challenge the dominant order with revisionists and to focus on international and regional change policy agenda. However, the strategic partnership of emerging powers in the transition of the international system is often limited to this unstable transition, and with another order, the contexts that form their strategic unity are transformed, and the new contexts necessarily cooperate and the transitional partnership in the strategic security areas is not reproduced. In the context of such an understanding, 'strategic loneliness' should not be considered as a prerequisite or prerequisite. Under the transition of the international system, which is the main characteristic of the redistribution of power, wealth and rewriting of international rules, strategic loneliness is not a relative advantage but a potential threat to Iran's strategic interests. “Diversity to Geopolitical Approach Foreign Policy”, “Multi-functionalism” through “Balance of Relations with Asia and Europe”, “Coalition Based on emerging issues” and ... are key requirements of the Islamic Republic of Iran's active and independent role in the Post -Western International System.

Over the last decade, some scholars began to argue that the Turkish foreign policy is experiencing a pivotal change. In a general look, their contributions are largely influenced by three major trends directing Turkey's foreign policy approaches: First, there is an unprecedented development in Turkey's relations with Eastern rising powers, especially Russia and China. At the same time, Turkey's relations with Western allies, especially the United States and European powers, are in a state of instability and tension. Third, Turkey has played an active and relatively independent role in the regional developments, especially in the Middle East, that present its leader’s assertiveness to consolidate Turkey's position as an emerging regional power in the changing Eurasian geopolitics. Accordingly, the mainstream ideas maintain that the geopolitical vision of Turkish foreign policy has shifted away from transatlantic alliance to Eurasianism. Is Eurasia becoming a geopolitical alternative in Turkey's new foreign policy? By reassessing these contributions, this article seeks to explain the geopolitical mechanisms of Turkish foreign policy pivot to Eurasia in a systematic way.

This research method is descriptive-analytic, and the data gathering procedure is based on library findings. In order to diversify the research literature, this article employs a variety of literature and data in Persian, Turkish, and English.

Contrary to the prevailing arguments manifesting Eurasianism as an international shift in Turkish foreign policy and its reorientation from the West, this paper argues that the rise of Eurasianism is a pragmatic reaction to the changing structural, regional and domestic politics environments rather than a shift of axis in Ankara's geopolitical vision. Accordingly, by the conceptualization of Eurasianism in Turkish foreign policy, this article contributes that the global power shift with the rise of Eastern powers and institutions in the structure of global governance, crisis in transatlantic relations, changing regional geopolitics, and domestic political dynamics, especially in the post- 2016 coup, have led Ankara to pursues multilateralism and diversification of geopolitical vision. In such a context, Eurasianism or pivot to Eurasia is not perceived as a geopolitical alternative to Turkey’s traditional Western orientation. Hence, a pragmatic discourse of Eurasianism in Turkish foreign policy is being formulated. In the light of this pragmatic approach, the Erdogan government is consolidating its power and securing its political regime at home and expanding its influence in the changing regional and international sphere. Although Erdogan's regime security concerns play a meaningful role in the growing tendency of Turkish leaders to pursue the Eurasianism in the foreign policy, a pivotal turn to the East does not make sense in the absence of convergent geopolitical and economic interests with Eastern powers. For the time being, Ankara has significant differences with Moscow and Tehran over the developments of Syria and the future of Bashar al-Assad's government, Middle East conflicts, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, which are not easily reconcilable. However, Eurasianism is a pragmatic tactic to strengthen Turkey's leverage in the transatlantic alliance and political bargaining with Western allies to recognize its security concerns and strategic interests.

For Ankara, the Eurasianist discourse is not an ideology or a roadmap for pursuing Turkey's grand foreign policy goals, but a means to meet emerging political and security challenges and seize economic opportunities in the shifting the international system. Turkey's strategic thinking is to strengthen its geopolitical position as a "bridge" between Europe and Asia by balancing Ankara's strategic relations with the West and the East. In this context, Eurasianism pursues to maximize geopolitical influence in the neighboring regions. Accordingly, Turkey's strategic partnership with Russia, China, Iran, and its desire to play an active role in Eastern institutions, including the SCO, does not mean severing strategic and institutional ties with the West and redefining Turkey's international position as an Eastern power. Given the main argument of this article, the prospect of Turkey’s Eurasianism will primarily influenced by the dynamics of its relations with the Western allies and the Eastern powers will play a secondary role. Rather than having decisive ideological and structural roots, Turkish Eurasianism is mainly based on personal ties and changing regional and international balances. Given the asymmetric partnership between Turkey and Eastern powers, Turkish leaders are still unsure that to what extend pivoting to the East can provides Ankara's strategic autonomy in pursuing an independent foreign policy. In the foreseeable future, Turkey is likely to remain in the transatlantic alliances, maintaining a level of strategic partnership with the EU and the United States, while expanding its economic and diplomatic ties with Eastern powers.

This article seeks to rethink the prevailing assumptions of Islamism in the contemporary Turkish politics and society. Contrary to common approaches that consider Islam as an ideology in explaining the Turkish political Islamism, this article by perceiving Islam as a social tradition and source of national identity, presents an alternative perspective on understanding the nature and function of Islamism in Turkey. In the theoretical framework of Historical Sociology, it offers two interrelated contributions; first, Islamism in Turkey is not a newly-emerged phenomenon constructed by the AKP. Second, Islamism is the result of the confluence of socio-historical structures, the ruling elite’s approaches, and the interaction of Islamists with the state and society that its multifaceted nature and complex function are explained by the concept of post-Islamism. Accordingly, Iran's approach towards Islamism in Turkey as a goal and ideology does not lead to constructive assessment on Turkey’s domestic political dynamics and foreign policy activism. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey is a geopolitical and to some-extend geoeconomic player in the region rather than an ideological actor, in which the Islam does not play a key role in shaping bilateral relations and regional interactions. Therefore, Islamism, as a source of mobilizing identity, is an ideational leverage for regime security, consolidating of President Erdogan’s domestic authority, and Turkey's active regionalism in the Islamic world.

Turkey's increasing tendency to pursue strategies independent of Western its allies and its proximity to Eastern powers in securing and defensive goals, as well as its active regional involvement in challenging the security preferences of Western powers, has raised the question of whether Turkey's international orientations are on a pivotal path or just looking to rebuild its foreign policy in a new international and regional environment? This paper, by conceptualizing Turkey's strategic attitudes and providing a framed picture of the new developments in the country's strategic culture and national security doctrine, rethinks the prevailing ideas of a pivotal turn in Turkey's macro-foreign policy orientation. In this regard, the new strategic culture of Turkey, with emphasis on the principle of self-help and national capabilities, increasingly seeks to ensure strategic independence from Western allies in the context of the international system transition. This does not necessarily mean leaving the transatlantic alliance, but rather balancing relations with the West and the East in order to consolidate Turkey's strategic position as an independent international actor.

Over the past decades, Turkish-Russian relations have been increasingly characterized by a wide range of cooperation and rapprochement. Beyond strong economic bonds, the main reason behind the recent rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow is the general deterioration of Turkey’s relations with its Western allies which is highly interlinked to the outcomes of changing global order. As American hegemony has been declining, two rising Eurasian powers, Russia and Turkey, have started to challenge Western order and supremacy in the shifting international system. This dynamic context has paved the way for the strategic partnership of revisionist powers. Many scholars even began to argue that Turkey-Russia relations could turn into a strategic alliance in the future if Ankara’s relations with Western allies strain further. However, contrary to what many believe, a persistent strategic alliance between Russia and Turkey is rather unlikely due to serious differences in the two countries’ stances on certain major issues in the changing regional and global politics. This article aims to study the changing nature of Turkey-Russia’s strategic rapprochement systematically. The current literature on Turkish-Russian relations suggests that Turkey is strategically reorienting away from the West towards Eurasia, Russia in Particular. Instead, this article seeks to explain the multi-dimensional nature of Turkey’s strategic rapprochement with Russia in a changing international system. It argues that Turkey’s growing interest in closer cooperation with Russia is taking place amidst a transforming global order, shifting regional geopolitics and domestic political dynamics. In this context, Turkey’s rising partnership with Russia does not necessarily mean an axis shift at the expense of its traditional Western orientation. Rather, this growing strategic rapprochement is the outcome of a dynamic reaction to the ongoing power transition in the international system, a rising rift in transatlantic alliances, the crisis in Turkish domestic politics, and the geopolitical developments surrounding the two emerging Eurasian powers. Although the transforming global structures have paved the way for Turkey-Russia strategic partnership, bilateral relations continue to be characterized by significant elements of conflict and geopolitical rivalry and also are highly affected by their relations with the West. Among other factors, the role of asymmetric economic interdependence, divergent energy strategies, authoritarian leadership agency, as well as geopolitical rivalries in the changing geopolitics of the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East are highlighted. In the charter of IR theories, the Neorealist school in particular and also in the changing global world order, being Multipolar seems to have facilitated the efforts of rising powers to forge a strategic partnership with each other as well as pursuing Multi-directional and Multi-dimensional foreign policies. For rising non-Western powers, being Multipolar seems to have paved the way for the formation of pragmatic and flexible strategic cooperation while viewing each other as potential rivals on some critical issues. In this theoretical context, despite historical roots of animosity and geopolitical rivalry between Turkey and Russia, as two rising Eurasian powers, Ankara and Moscow have succeeded in compartmentalizing their relations in the changing global order. However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkish leaders are keen to make a strong strategic alliance with Russia. Ankara’s gradual shift away from Western allies in recent years does not demonstrate a strong Turkish commitment to end its strategic and institutional partnership with the transatlantic alliance but it is reconsidering its international standing in more Eastern ways. On the contrary, Turkey’s strategic rapprochement with Russia should be seen as a realist adjustment to the realities of the emerging post-Western multilateral world order. This article concludes by stating that Turkey-Russia emerging strategic partnership in the changing global order faces various structural and normative constraints. The article offers four notable points in this regard: first, Turkey’s strategic relations with Russia is to a very high degree determined by the development of its relations with traditional western allies as Ankara still has a structural security-economic dependency on the West and has important disagreements with Moscow regarding the changing geopolitical issues in the Middle East, Black Sea, East Mediterranean, and South Caucasus. Second, it is worth noting that the intense personal relations between Erdogan and Putin, the two authoritarian leaders, itself is an unstable element in shaping an institutionalized strategic partnership as the two ambitious leaders have an uncompromising distrust of each other. Third, although the high volume of trade has become a key element in improving Turkish-Russian relations, the trade imbalance and asymmetric economic interdependence between the two countries, especially Turkey’s dependence on energy imports from Russia, is an obstacle to drawing the prospect of strategic cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. Over the past decade, various geopolitical developments in their immediate neighborhood with a security dimension interfere with the trade interdependence between the countries. In other words, the fluctuations in Turkish-Russian trade relations also demonstrate the primacy of politics and security for sustained economic interdependence in the longer term. Finally, with all the disagreements in Turkey’s relations with Western allies, the scale and intensity of potential threats to Turkey’s national security and interests emanating from Russia are too high as the two Eurasian powers present competitive perception and intention towards the post-Western order in the making. Although Ankara treats the US and EU differently, Turkey is increasingly instrumentalizing its growing relations with Eastern powers to gain greater diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis Western powers. Therefore, it seems that the contributions over the rising of a strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia are overstated, at least in the foreseeable future, and the recent moves in improving the strategic cooperation of the two countries should be seen as a pragmatic response to sets of common challenges and opportunities in changing regional and global context. All in all, the dynamics of strategic ties between Ankara and Moscow can rarely be stabilized.

Amidst the systematic shift in a global context and decline in the U.S hegemony in particular, the Middle East is in a transition from a post-Cold War American order to some kind of multilateral (dis)order, where has left more room for regional powers outmaneuvering in the changing regional geopolitics. In this context, Iran as a revolutionary and revisionist state has sought to challenge the liberal international order and maximize its regional influence by adopting an asymmetric strategy. In contrast, the U.S along with its regional allies has pursued the policy of maximum pressure in order to change the regional balance of power against Iran. However, the US containment strategy has not been able to undermine Iran's active regional role playing. The main question is what strategy has Iran used to maintain its position and power in the face of maximum pressure from the United States and its regional allies, and to have increasing influence? The hypothesis of this paper is that in the face of maximum pressure from the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran has chosen the policy of Anti-containment as its main strategy. The policy, implemented through "asymmetric deterrence", has been implemented in three forms: the use of proxy groups, missile capability enhancement and naval deterrence. It is necessary to mention that this research will examine the research hypothesis in the form of descriptive-analytical method

As the international environment evolves, the geopolitics of the Middle East is shifting from a post-Cold War American order to a post-American one. A situation that has encouraged regional and supra-regional powers to play an active role in changing regional politics. In the meantime, the emergence of a global multipolar order has plunged Russia and, to a lesser extent, China into the great Middle East game, further complicating the situation in the region, all of which means that other Middle East equations are not based on US unilateralism anymore. Developments after the Arab revolutions show that the American era in the Middle East is over. And with the decline of American influence in the region, regional governments no longer look to it as a source of order and security. In such a situation, each of the regional powers, by redefining its strategic role and position in the Middle East, which was once based on the model of friendship and enmity with Washington, seeks to shape the geopolitical order of the region based on strategic interests and initiatives. They are themselves. The most important outcome of such a situation is a shift in US relations with its strategic allies in the Middle East, which no longer aligns its priorities and interests with US strategic preferences. This present study aims to establish a significant link between structural changes in the international system and changes in US-Turkish strategic relations.This research tests the basic idea that the decline of US hegemony in Turkey's periphery has changed Turkey's regional role and led it to pursue strategies independent of Western allies to redefine its position as a regulatory regional power. , As it strengthens the pioneers of the transition to a post-American order in the Middle East.

This article seeks to systematically survey the logic of unstable alliances in the Middle East after the Arab revolutions. On what basis do the governments of the Middle East enter into alliances with each other and what variables influence their fluid-forming coalition behavior? Contrary to mainstream approaches to explaining the nature of alliances, variables such as balance of power, anarchy, identity, and external threats alone are unable to understand the empirical mechanisms and complexities of Middle Eastern governments' unifying behavior. Using theories of alliance in international relations, the present paper proposes an integrated framework of "regime security" as an alternative approach to survey the roots of alliance in the Middle East. Despite the changes in the international and regional environment, the main interests of each of the Middle Eastern governments are still to ensure the survival and security of their political regime. Indeed, the foreign relations and alliance options of Middle Eastern governments are based on their dynamic action to secure the ruling regime in the face of potential internal and external threats. Under such circumstances, alliances are formulated as transnational coalitions between potential allies to ensure the survival of political regimes. For test of the main idea of the article, case studies of regional alliances in the Middle East is discussed.

This paper aims to understand the key variables influencing changes and continuities of Turkish foreign policy in the post- Arab revolutions, in a systematic way. The Arab revolutions, as an exogenous shock by transforming the structure of regional power and identity, providing uncertain opportunities and threats, has severely changed Turkish assertive and soft power-based foreign policy vision. Over the past decade, regional developments have provided space for Turkey to seek a more active and assertive role in the region, though Turkey’s own limitations, policy choices, and regional dynamics have somewhat restricted its ability to do so. This shift has gradually Middle Easternized Turkey’s foreign policy directions. Through the prism of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), this paper seeks to formulate; what drivers (structural-internal) and how to shape Turkey's assertive and security-based foreign policy behavior in the post- Arab revolutions? To do so, the paper by analyzing the structural and internal determinants in changing Turkey's foreign policy approaches, highlights the role of mediating variables; especially the AKP leaders’ misperception to seize regional leadership, overestimation of their material and discursive capacities, and miscalculations of the shifting Middle East geopolitics and regional rival’s capabilities.

The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has created widespread developments in the sphere of international relations in which its critical topics and concepts such as power, security, sovereignty, culture, development, and diplomacy have experienced considerable changes. In parallel with advance of ICT, the nature of diplomacy has changed and new trends, actors, and tools of diplomacy has emerged so that new forms of diplomacy including media diplomacy, new public diplomacy, cyber diplomacy, and science and technology diplomacy have appeared. conceptual and formational developments on diplomacy have caused its function and agenda to change simultaneously in which the traditional functions have been challenged. Drawing on the conceptual framework of ICT and diplomacy, this study seeks to find a reliable answer to this main question; in the new era, what is the impact of ICT on the concept and forms of diplomacy and how has it changed the traditional function? The findings show that the ICT in the new era has provided spaces for conceptual and formational evolution of diplomacy through networking, cyber spaces and Media; diplomacy’s traditional function and agenda have been challenged and nowadays diplomacy is not just limited to peacemaking or preventing war; new types of topics such as terrorism, religious radicalism, environmental challenges, internet management, persuading public opinions to line up with given policies, nuclear disarmament, and preventing structural violence determine new diplomacy’s agenda.

The paper discusses the Turkish leadership, especially of president Erdogan, perception about the new developments in the Middle East and its influence on the country's foreign policy.
The main argument of the paper is that the founding factor in Turkey's foreign policy and behavior is not merely the concrete developments in its strategic environment but is its leadership and especially Erdogan's perception from those developments.