unity

One of the major criticisms of the individual unity of being (wahdat shakhsi wujud) is that it’s acceptance leads one into sophistry or contradiction. By illustrating the dependent existence (bil-araz) of multiplicity, this study aims to respond to some of the issues, proposed by current scholars, on the aforementioned topic. The approach of the present research will be expressed in two modes. Initially, a reading of the doctrine of the individual unity of being will be made with attention to the understanding and distinction between intellectual trope (majaz ‘aqli) and linguistic trope (majaz itibari). Secondly, a thorough analysis on all modes (haysiat) will be made on the subject of unity of being (wahdat al-wujud) in order to express the hypothesis that the true existence (not essential) of multiplicity is due to its quality of limited mode (haysiat taqidi sh’ani) of the Divine. Thus, multiplicity, in truth, in and of itself (nafs al-amr) is dependent in its mode of existence. That being said, it should not be confused with being pure nonexistence (ma’dum mahz) or nothingness. With this finding, it appears that the mentioned conflict has been addressed and it has been proven that the acceptance of the dependent existence of multiplicity, does not pose any faults towards the theory of the individual unity of being. Moreover, a reasonable explanation of the stated theory is deemed possible only from such pursuit.

Four views exist regarding the relationship between substance (jawhar) and accident (ʿaraḍ): 1) existential unity - mental distinction, 2) existential unity - analytical distinction, 3) existential distinction, and 4) non-mutually exclusive existential distinction. This study accepts three of the four views and proposes a detailed view, such that uniform application of each of these three views to all accidents is rejected. The theory of "existential unity - mental distinction" applies only to accidents like numbers, relative categories, and dispositional qualities. "Existential unity - analytical distinction" theory applies to continuous quantity and qualities specific to quantity. Finally, "non-mutually exclusive existential distinction" applies only to accidents, such as psychic  qualities (kayf nafsānī)  and sensible qualities (kayf maḥsūs).

The following article aims to criticize the principles of the Dawani “Divine Taste” and the mystical “Oneness of existence” of Ibn Turki with a view to the principles of Sadr’i transcendental wisdom. It seems that Sadr’i’s fundamental objection to these principles has not been properly understood, in such a way that Haji Sabzevari and Allama Hassanzadeh Amoli, two Sadr’i philosophers, intend to correct and prepare the Divine Taste and extend it to the point of proving the view of the mystics, although Allama Javadi Amoli places the “Divine Taste” in the line of intuitive mysticism and considers it in the theoretical field of the type of “psychological certainty”. The question arises as to what fundamental problem Mulla Sadra saw in the taste-mystical views of the Mahowīs’ originality that he turned away from and repeatedly warned about?Our task in the present article is to examine the foundation of metaphysics. This foundation has always reminded itself from the beginning that the simple unit separated and isolated from the multiplicity deprives it of truth, emptiness and provides the ground for the emergence of nihilism. Hence, philosophers in different eras have warned about the dialectic of the one and the many or, in other words, the objectivity of unity and multiplicity, and have perhaps called it the most fundamental principle of philosophy, and the lack of attention to this principle traps metaphysics in the trap of a rigid and unresponsive foundation (mono-logue) that is indifferent to human life.

Presently, the term “concomitance” in Islamic philosophy means equality in referents alongside unity in truth. Whenever, two words include all their referents and apply to all of them from a single aspect, they are concomitants. The historical-analytic study of “concomitance” in Islamic philosophy and kalām indicates that this term was used in a different meaning before ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī and even his own words. According to the meaning given above, “concomitance’ is used in a general sense including equality in both referent and concept. The author believes that the assumption of unity in the direction of truth as one of the semantic bases of this term has only been propounded by some of the students of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. Hence, it cannot be used in its present meaning in the words of early mutīkallīmūn and philosophers. The present paper, examines the meaning of “concomitance” in two different periods: before and after ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. The author initially investigates the lexical meaning of “concomitance” and its functions and applications in the words of mutīkallīmūn and philosophers and demonstrates that its common meaning of their time was different from what is common today.  Then, after a meticulous study of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s words, he proves that this great philosopher also used this term in the same sense that his predecessors did. Finally, he explores and criticizes the arguments of the advocates of the new interpretation of “concomitance” and challenges their ideas. To support his argument by an example, the author provides a historical analysis of the “concomitance of existence and unity” in Islamic kalām and philosophy.

This paper focuses on a challenge rooted in Aristotle’s writings on the truth of corporeal substance. On the one hand, body as substance is always concomitant with a kind of ontological priority. Therefore, the unity of corporeal substance is prior to the unity of matter and form. On the other hand, Aristotle’s perception of the truth of change necessitates that matter, as one of the components of body, remains fixed in the process of change in order to preserve the unity of change. Thus, corporeal substance consists of matter and form, is posterior to them, and depends on them. The response to this problem, which is called the “paradox of unity”, is formulated in two traditional and new molds of interpretation. The present study initially reviews the main elements of these two interpretations and then, through distinguishing between the two types of unity, namely vertical and horizontal, demonstrates that the traditional interpretation is incapable of explaining the vertical unity of matter and form. It also stipulates that the new interpretation is insufficient for clarifying horizontal unity. Finally, the authors provide a unitary interpretation of the synthesis of matter and form, as a third response to this question, which explains both horizontal and vertical forms of unity free from previous problems.

The theory of the accidentality of unity is seen in many works of Ibn Sina. It has attracted the attention of his commentators and critics. The statement that unity is an accident does not mean that, in his view, unity is included in the nine accidental categories; instead, he intended the additionality of unity to its subject and such additionality, as long as it does not extend to external occasion, can also be interpreted based on analytic accident. Leaving aside his explicit statements regarding the external accidentality of unity, an examination of Ibn Sina's works, based on the question of the possibility of interpreting the accidentality of unity as an analytic accident, yields three types of statements:  (1) Statements that, at first glance, could indicate that "unity is an analytic accident." (2) Statements according to which, in the case of some entities, the identity of unity with existence is raised. (3) A statement that states the identity of existence and unity in an absolute way. A rational analysis of all these statements leads us to conclude that Ibn Sina's statement about the external accidentality of unity contrasts with some of his other statements. This conflict seems to be due to a change in Ibn Sina's thought or an inconsistency in his intellectual structure due to a lack of a clear understanding of philosophical concepts and their relationship to reality. In any case, his view on the accidentality of unity cannot be interpreted as the external accidentality of unity.

The issues and questions of knowledge (Arabic: العلم, romanized: al-ʿilm) discuss the accidents (Arabic: عوارض) and rulings (aḥkām, Arabic: احکام “rulings”, plural of ḥukm “حکم”) of the subject specific to that knowledge. Among the strengths of knowledge and the presentation of scientific issues in educational texts are the preservation of the subject, the maintenance of discussions within the scope of accidents, and the determination of the appropriate position of each issue in the technical order of the topics. The issue of the existence gradation (Arabic: تشکیک الوجود) in the common didactic texts of philosophy is usually discussed at the beginning of the discussions of the book and among the precepts of existence, and its expression, arguments, and problems are discussed in this position. The question is whether it is possible to propose a more appropriate position for the discussion of the existence gradation. Given the nature and content of skepticism, it appears more beneficial to include the topics of the existence gradation under the issue of unity and diversity. This approach would help establish a proper connection with the subject of philosophy through unity and diversity, which are among the properties and accidents of existence. Additionally, it would secure an appropriate place for the existence gradation within philosophical issues and organize its topics related to unity and diversity in a more logical manner. In this article, we analytically demonstrated that the topics of the existence gradation will achieve better logical order and philosophical articulation (expression) when included within the discussions of unity and diversity.

Anyone who seeks truth and happiness acknowledges the necessity of studying God's existence and his uniqueness. This necessity is even more important considering that human’s innate nature has a tendency towards God. However, one can research this issue in the holy texts of different religions, not with “a priori” approach or seeking their rational reasons, but merely with “a posteriori” and descriptive approach; and can reach to this conclusion that the doctrine of the existence of God and monotheism is not necessary in one religion, but it is necessary in various religions. This result can be worthwhile for religious scholars. This research has tried to analyze the issue of God's existence, especially his uniqueness, in the Old Testament, using a library research method and a descriptive-analytical method. According to this research, there are numerous evidences in the Old Testament that introduce God as the progenitor of being, and several terms indicate the unity of God as well. Although some believe that the two mentioned belief principles are evident based on the Old Testament, but this claim is not acceptable, which is elaborately discussed in the article.

Moderation is one of the core concepts of ethics, the history of philosophical thinking about it goes back to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and Islamic philosophers in the same Aristotelian tradition or beyond, have discussed this issue and have obtained minutes of this discussion. . Mulla Sadra has presented important theories in the field of justice and moderation of the human soul's powers, for which the following steps can be listed: 1. Aristotelian point of view; 2. A perspective that gives a new and negative element in justice; 3. A final point of view that introduces a new and positive element - which has an original aspect compared to other levels - for moderation and justice, which is monotheism. The purpose of this article is to analyze the theory of moderation and justice from Mullah Sadra's point of view, which is clarified by describing and analyzing the mentioned stages that they are not incommensurable, but in fact, they are different longitudinal stages of a single theory that corresponds to a kind of length and progression. It is designed according to the theories of existence.

Gradation of existence is one of the most important philosophical principles in the transcendent philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, based on which we can answer this question, "what is the relationship between the three phenomena of awaking, sleep and death". This article shows that this relationship is longitudinal and gradational. Therefore, the difference between these states comes back to their commonality, which is: intensity and weakness in the concentration of the human faculties on the outer or inner aspects of the soul and the worlds corresponding to them. Awakening is the result of maximum attention of the soul's forces to the material world and external senses. When this attention weakens and the soul pays attention to the imaginal world, sleep occurs. Finally, with the complete disconnection of the soul from the material world, death –in its common use- occurs. In another sense, however, due to the substantial movement of the soul, death is a constant state that dominates other states. In a deeper view and based on the personal unity of the soul, awakening, sleep, and death are manifestations of the soul, and while maintaining a gradational relationship, they are unified with the soul and with each other.

The problem of the unity of the body or its plurality for every human being, like the problem of the unity or plurality of the soul, is one of the controversial issues in classical philosophy. In the religious documents, though in the initial view, there seems to be an apparent conflict, but in general, a favorable conclusion can be reached. This article has investigated the documents in this regard with the descriptive method and content analysis. Research findings show that according to religious documents, every human has two "material" and "imaginary" bodies. But regarding the number of souls, there is a difference of narrations, some narrations consider man as having two spirits "Al-Hayavan" and "Al-Aql" and some narrations consider man as having five spirits "Al-Quwwa, Al-Shahwa, Al-Madraj, Al-Iman and Al-Quds". Also, it seems that the second category of narrations can be combined with the first category, and the narrations about the five spirits refer to the powers of the animal soul and the soul of the mind.

Ibn Gabirol (a Jewish philosopher of the 11th century CE) enumerates different divisions for the concept of "being" in his book, “Fons Vitae". At first glance, some of these divisions seem incompatible with each other. Based on the findings of this research, Ibn Gabirol considers “being” to be equivalent to “unity”. By focusing on this concept, different divisions of being can be reconciled. God (Unity the Creator) is at the head of the hierarchy of beings and after that, there is “what is possible” (unity the created). Every “possible” is made up of two beings: matter and form. According to Ibn Gabirol, the form is the same as unity, but matter (material being) is neither unity nor plurality, although it can be the subject and sustainer of unity and plurality.

Ibn Gabirol has several different interpretations of the meaning of “being” and its types. On the one hand, he attributes “being” to God or “First Essence”, and on the other hand, he attributes it to “universal matter” and “universal form” and not God. The Jewish philosopher, also, has different interpretations about the value of “being” and its meaning. But how can these different interpretations and statements be united? Is it possible to achieve a coherent philosophy from Ibn Gabirol's ontology?

The issue of "being" in the philosophy of Ibn Gabirol is not raised by the commentators of this philosopher and his book, “Fons Vitae”. Most of the commentators have not tried to specify the type of being of matter and determine its relation to the “universal form” and “First Essence”. It is only “Sarah Pessin” who has tried to determine the place of matter and explain the ontology of Ibn Gabirol in her book: "Theology of Desire". But she has abandoned the duality of matter and form and has considered “universal matter” to be higher and more valuable than form, and this is exactly what is not consistent with Ibn Gabirol's philosophy and the text of “Fons Vitae”.

This article’s method is "structural textualism". In this method, some internal contradictions of a specific text are considered and only based on the text and its content and rules, and without considering external assumptions, it is tried to dissolve the contradictions or solve the problems.

In Ibn Gabirol's ontological system, “matter” has a special place and cannot be compared with Ibn Sina's "quiddity" (Mahiyat). According to Ibn Gabirol, universal matter and universal form are equal and none is superior to the other. Only God is the source and creator of both and for this reason, God is above them. This point of view is opposed to the dominant view of the Platonic philosophers (such as Muslims, Jews, Christians, and even pagans) who consider matter as the source of ambiguity and change, and sometimes equal to privation. Ibn Gabirol has a different view of “matter” and believes that matter has the highest ontological rank after God and is more valuable (dignior) than all beings in the world (from Intelligence to Soul, Nature, etc.).

The foundation of the coherence of the Jewish philosopher's ontology and the relationship between the types of being is the concept of "unity". The statement "being is unity" is the fundamental statement of Ibn Gabirol's ontology. Unity the Creator or God, which is "one", is the unity that is self-sufficient and has inherent consistency. This pure unity emanates its unity to the world. This emanated unity (unity the created) is called “universal form”. But the emanated unity is not self-sufficient and needs a sustainer, which is a “universal matter”. Matter in itself is neither unity nor multiplicity, but the origin of the realization of unity and multiplicity, and for this reason, it is related to unity. All beings in the universe can be analyzed into matter and form. God is "one" or unity that is self-sufficient and is the origin of all numbers or beings. From this self-sufficient being, another “one” is created, which is conjunct with matter. This substance causes the multiplication of this secondary unity and makes different numbers which are created from "one". Therefore, the only beings that have real existence are:The first essence (unity the creator and self-sufficient)
universal form (unity the created and non-self-sufficient)
universal matter (the sustainer of form).
The “First Essence”, which is “pure unity”, is called “absolute being” (esse tantum). The universal form and universal matter are called universal beings (esse universalis) and all other entities that are reduced to matter and form are called beings (esse).
 The relationship between matter and being is as paradoxical and ambiguous as the relationship between matter and unity. Matter is not the substance of unity, but is the sustainer of unity, and for this reason, it is indirectly called “unity”. In the same way, matter is called “being” because of its connection with being.

The concept which is able to solve the problem of “being” in Ibn Gabirol's philosophy is “unity". Just as all beings are numbers and numbers are all created from the repetition of “one”, beings are also the result of the repetition of “being” and finally reduced to universal matter and form and the first essence.

This paper is to investigate the possibility of the lack of influence of philosophical research in the issuance of jurisprudence rulings (Ahkam al-fiqhiyah) and its purpose is to prove this influence by studying cases of unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud). Some jurists in their rulings related to unbelievers (Kuffar) as well as in the rulings of the heretical books (Kutub al-zelal) dealt with the issue of the unity of existence and believing in it, and judged the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such a point of view, and according to that, have issued rulings about those who believe in it. As described in this paper in a descriptive-analytical way, the emergence of jurisprudence in this regard is a function of the encounters and understanding of jurists with philosophical opinions. Based on this, after assessing examples of jurisprudence of the last few centuries and clarifying the background philosophical or mystical presuppositions, the position of Sadr al-Mutalahin's interpretation of disagreements in comparison to other interpretations has been clarified and the result of its acceptance or non-acceptance in the judgment of jurists has been determined. As the result, at the first step, it is revealed that Sadr al-Maltahin's perception of the unity of existence is different from the mystic version, and in the other hand, the acceptance of this interpretation can resolve the duality and otherness between the monotheism of jurists and mystics. Lastly, with the help of this philosophical research, the ijtihad of the jurists should be freed from the unwarranted attribution of the of disbelief and misguidance

The journey of Man toward God which is a spiritual and intuitive movement as well as a manifest teaching in Quran and tradition, like any other movement, enjoys four basic constituents of origin (point of departure), destination, wayfarer and the way. Apparently, the wayfarer and the way seem dissociated. However, relying on some Quranic verses and traditions about spiritual journey toward God, some commentators believe in the unity of way and the wayfarer and hold that wayfarer moves toward God through an internal journey of soul. This research is intended to investigate whether such a claim can be proved through conventional explication based on the appearance of Quranic verses and tradition without an accurate rational reasoning or mystical intuition. Being convinced by the unity of way and wayfarer is the scientific prerequisite of the best method in soul purification and self-knowledge that is an essential condition of knowing God. Also, proving the aforesaid claim through the appearance of Quranic verse and tradition reveals the emphasis of divine law on gaining such a knowledge. In the current research, it is revealed that the unity of way and wayfarer through conventional explication based on the appearance of Quranic verses and tradition can be proved. It is also proved that the implications of the verse “straight path” and the verse “have charge of your own soul” submit further proof on the afore-raised claim.

This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents, or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work.

“The Rule of the One (Qāʻîdâh Al-Wāḥîd)” regarded as one of the fundamental philosophical rules, which is not only directly or indirectly connected with several philosophical issues about God, cosmos, knowledge and so on, but also some thinkers have used it in other sciences such as Physics (Ṭâbīʻîyyāt) and Jurisprudence (Ûṣūl al-Fîqh). Although historically rooted in ancient Greek philosophy, the Rule of the One, like other philosophical rules, after the introduction of the Science of Philosophy into the Islamic world, was dealt with by Muslim philosophers. The Rule of the One indicates that from a one simple cause only one effect is produced. The Muslim philosophers have often used this rule to explain how creatures are produced from a one supreme cause. However, this rule in that is related to God and His agency, can be considered as a Kâlāmī (theological) problem. Hence, most of Mûtâkâllîmūn (theologians) have discussed on it in their writings.In spite of the significance of this rule and its several usages in real and conventional sciences, the Muslim thinkers don’t agree on it. So, in discussing on the Rule of the One, some Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā, Sûrâwârdī and Mûllā Ṣâdrā, using the foundations of their philosophical systems, not only have accepted and proved this rule, but also have employed it in their philosophical views. But many Mûtâkâllîmūn (theologians) and mystics and even some philosophers have not accepted this rule, and consequently, have criticized it. Apparently, no book has been written about this rule by the early Muslim thinkers, but in the writings of the later Muslim thinkers, there are many works related to this rule. Of course, as far as I have searched, in most of these works, their authors have tried to criticize the Rule of the One, and in a few works, this rule has been defended. Since the acceptance or rejection of the Rule of the One has very important implications for the philosophical epistemological and cosmological issues, and many philosophers’ belief in this rule has been one of the main causes of the criticisms of the opponents of philosophy against the Muslim philosophers, it is necessary to classify, analyze and evaluate the criticisms arisen against this rule in order to respond to them, based on the foundations of Transcendent Philosophy. After classifying and examining the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One, it was found out that, in general, these criticisms either have arisen from denying or rejecting one of the philosophical foundations of this rule (Kâlāmī (theological) criticisms) or from considering this rule as incompatible with some other philosophical rules (philosophical criticisms). In this paper, I have tried to classify, analyze and evaluate, by a descriptive-analytical method, the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One. The findings of this paper show that these criticisms can generally be classified in two main kinds of criticism: the first kind is related to the criticisms which have been arisen against the reasons for the Rule of the One, and in which those reasons have been considered as insufficient for proving this rule; and the second kind is related to the criticisms which, apart from the reasons for proving the Rule of the One, have considered this rule as incompatible with some other philosophical rules.According to what has been discussed in this paper, it can be said that   For some contemporary scholars of philosophy, the Rule of the One is incompatible with some philosophical doctrines, such as “The Simple Reality’s being All theThings”, “The particular and immediate knowledge of God to things”, “The soul’s being, in its unity, all its faculties”, “The simplicity of the essence of Necessary Being”, “The immediate relation of the existents with the Necessary Being”, and “God’s being the Willing”. 2. Some other scholars of philosophy, taking a historical approach to the Rule of the One and its origin in Greek philosophy, believe that this rule is confined to the natural causes. They argue that Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā and Mûllā Ṣâdrā, should not applied this rule to the Divine agent, especially to the Necessary Being.3. Some others, emphasizing on some philosophical doctrines such as “the absence of necessary concomitance between the conceptual multiplicity and the extensional multiplicity” and “the possibility of analyzing a simple essence into various concepts”, consider the production of many effects from a one simple cause as possible, and thereby, criticize the Rule of the one.4.Finally, Some other scholars, based on some philosophical foundations, regard the essence of Necessary Being as the Comprehensive of all the Attributes of Perfection, which implies the possibility of inclusion of the multiplicity of existential perfections in a simple essence. At the end, I have concluded that in most of the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One, we can see two kinds of error: “the confusion between the Concept and the Extension”; and presenting an incorrect and inaccurate image of the philosophical premises of the Rule of the One, such as “the principle of congruence”, “the impossibility of production of the simultaneous effects from a simple agent”, and “the necessity of differentiation between cognitive and objective multiplicity”.

According to Aristotle, a number of philosophers in ancient Greece theorized that the “one” is an independent substance that performs a causal role in relation to other substances. Through clarifying the predicative nature of the “one” and referring to the false consequences of the above theory, he tried to reject it. Ibn Sīnā has extensively investigated the theory of the one’s being a substance and Aristotle’s related criticisms in the ilāhīyyāt section of al-Shifā’. Unlike Aristotle, he has not merely referred to the one’s being a predicate and, rather, through a lengthy and complex argument, has tried to demonstrate that unity, as the source of the derivation of the one, is a necessary accident. Ibn Sīnā’ argument is prone to criticism from different aspects, the most important of which is the confusion of categorical and analytic accidents with each other. Unity is merely an analytic accident, and Ibn Sīnā’s argument is incapable of demonstrating its being a categorical accident.

Theists believe that God has various perfection attributes such as knowledge, power and life, and just as his being is the highest and most transcendent existence, the perfection attributes are also ascribed to God in their highest level. There are differences among Muslims about how the attributes are ascribed to God. It is stated that the Mutazilites deny the attributes of God and consider His essence as a substitute for the attributes. The Asharites consider the attributes of God to be superfluous to His essence, and the philosophers consider them to be identical to His essence. Accepting the fact that the attributes of God are identical to the essence, the question arises: how can the many attributes that are one with the essence of God not lead to multiplicity in His essence? Various answers have been given to this question. These answers seek to prove the attributes of God and to unite these attributes with His essence, while accepting the assumptions in the question. In this article, these answers are quoted and evaluated, and finally the view of mystics is preferred.

the view of souls eternity has been sometimes explained on the basis of the opposite mode of principle “all things coming to being are preceded by potentiality and matter”. this principle has been challenged in islamic philosophy and it is the ground for introducing the body as the matter of the multiple souls and the base of preferring the soul’s spiritual coming to being by Ibn-Sina. Ibn-Sina referring to personal mental properties shows that these properties cannot be explained without multiplicity of human souls. transcendental wisdom says that Ibn-Sina’s view is subjected trying to reconstruct it. The present study stating the reasons for the unity or plurality of human souls based on the mentioned rational rule, an attempt has been made to express the subjections on the rule and the proposed answers, finding a new way sole the challenges on the soul’s occurrence and its coming to being.