mohammadjavad hasanzade

In the first half of the 20th century, the ontological approach in explaining philosophical issues was first reduced to an epistemological approach and then to a linguistic approach. The experts of the recent approach claimed that the meaningfulness and truth of propositions can be explained by relying on theories of meaning. As a result, the discussion about being and it’s judgments changed to a discussion about language and its meaning and what it is.In this article, we tried to answer the question of what is the theory of meaning in the Allāma Tabātabāī’s, after defining the theory of meaning and the outline of theories of meaning in the West? And does this theory has the ability to answer the problems of the theory of meaning or not?Allāma Tabātabāī, in discussing the primacy and priority of existence over essence or meaning, basically considers it impossible the realization of any meaning, both verbal and non-verbal,in reality, and on the other hand, he proves that meaning is the same mental form and its place is in the mind. Therefore, it can be concluded that his theory is closely related to the imaginary theory of meaning, but it does not have the problems of the apprehension in mind theory of meaning that is discussed in the West, and through the foundations of Islamic philosophy, such as the discovery and recital of the mental form, it answers them.

The goodness and ugliness of actions have always been cited by theological religions and Muslim thinkers; It's as if Mu'tazila have become the promoters of essential goodness and ugliness, but the Ash'arites have insisted on legitimacy of goodness and ugliness. In addition to these two central views, Ibn Taymiyya al-Ḥarrānī, emphasizing the essential goodness and ugliness, considers it as the third view and contrary to the two views of Mu'tazila and Ash'ari. In this article, an attempt is made to answer the question whether it is possible to accept Ibn Taymiyyah’s claim about the essential goodness and ugliness. In fact, Ibn Taymiyya al-Ḥarrānī, who considers intellectual knowledge to be relative and unbelievable and does not accept it as an independent element in the understanding of facts, tries to distinguish essential goodness and ugliness, he denies essential goodness and ugliness, and emphasizes on the legitimacy of reward and punishment and believes that an action is not worthy of praise and reward, nor is it worthy of ugliness and punishment. He emphasizes that there is no entitlement to human action. In this article, while explaining Ibn Taymiyya’s point of view and critically examining his view on the essence of reason and intellectual knowledge, his depiction of goodness and ugliness in the two issues of denying essential goodness and ugliness and his emphasis on the legitimacy of rewards and punishment are reviewed and criticized, a view that can be considered a corrected approach.