agent-structure

The international system as a network with intermingled relationship is the platform for the evolution of the concept of power and its formation among multiple actors. This network is not integrated and the conflict of interests in it has resulted in diverse networks. While assuming that all the actors in the field of international relations are in an incongruous domino process, it should be acknowledged that relational power is a reciprocal process and can lead to the formation and correlation of balanced or unbalanced trust-building networks. The result will be symmetric or asymmetric interdependence. Power is the ability to organize relationships to maintain the process of empowerment. In this regard, the interaction or conflict between the structure and the agent is important as the main characteristic in the strength of the relationship, which results in trust or distrust within the trust network. . The main question of the present article is why and how relational power leads to trust-building in relations between actors in the international arena? In response to this question, the research came to the conclusion that relational power has an effect on trust-building by emphasizing the basic factors of Shareability, exchangeability, active mutual interaction of the structure and agent and Self-activity has influenced trust building between actors It leads to increased trust between actors within the trust network. This research was done on the basis of library sources and the research method is explanatory-constitutive.

Foreign policies of many countries in various conditions have been proved to be inconsistent with the predictions and prescriptions of realism. In this article, a realist foreign policy is defined as one followed on the basis of what realists regard as being rational, more or less risk-averse, furthering national interest and security, employing diplomacy as the preferred way for achieving goals, taking into account others’ vital interests, making a balance between one’s power and objectives, and being prudent. However, nearly irrational unrealistic foreign policies are not uncommon and attempts for explaining them have led to the emergence of other theoretical frameworks that take into account various factors, from cognition to bureaucratic politics to the role of identity and emotions in order to supplement realism.In this article, a discursive formalist theoretical framework based on Ernst Cassirer’s understanding of myth as a form of thought with extra-rational elements and categories has been introduced to show how unrealistic foreign policies—especially those inspired by ideologies such as nationalism—become possible through the formation of specific emotions, identities, and cognition. These elements and categories, when taken into language, acquire fluidity resulting from semantic and semiotic exchanges. Therefore, discourse analysis can help us understand them in specific cases. In order to emphasize the significance of unconsciousness in its interplay with mythical discourse, Lacanian psychoanalysis has been employed. Then, the limitations posed by the ideational structure of the international system comes into play to make changes in myth-based foreign policies inevitable et again the shift is not beyond the realms of possibility of mythical form of thought. Mythical form of thought as a whole contains certain characteristics and categories that make unrealistic foreign policies possible. It does not distinguish between objective reality and most subjective experiences such as fantasies and dreams and between objects and their representations such as pictures or symbols. This can be seen in nationalist ideologies where national symbols are as important as the nation itself, and any disrespect for the representations of the nation and/or its representatives are taken as disrespect for the nation leading to emotional reactions. The overemphasis of mythological form of thought on causality makes whatever cannot be easily understood or explained by a specific tangible cause to be attributed to something the effect of which cannot be verified, for example, the conspiracy of others; hence adding to the common pessimism in international life leading to proneness to preventive measures. Parts and whole are not separable here. Therefore, every characteristic is taken to be essentially the same as the object. Thus, for example, in Nazism, being German/Arian provides one with a superiority over others. The way in which similarities work result in over-generalizations that make, for example, the other an enemy.As space is divided into holy and unholy/profane places and holy spaces cannot be disintegrated, the homeland or even beyond that may take a holiness that makes defending it not only legitimate but also a necessity. This may lead even to over-expansionist aspirations to include the holy spaces that are somehow in the hands of others as a mission that cannot be ignored. Perhaps the most significant example is the Zionist territorial expansionist ideal of a territory from the Nile to the Euphrates. Time in this form of thought is not linear; present is not distinguished from the past which is justified and even sanctified. Referring to the past in order to justify and legitimize specific actions in the present thus becomes common in foreign policies no matter how different they are.If this form of thought exists in the cultural background of a society, mostly through the existence of particular myths, such as city upon a hill, the Russian World and the like, it can be unconsciously present in the cognition of everyone. When this mythical form of thinking becomes dominant, the agents of foreign policy reflect it in the form of narratives that have an unconscious dimension being explicable by psychoanalysis according to which the symbolic order, as the intersubjective relations, norms, rules, conventions and the like is the site of unconsciousness. The symbolic order which exists both at domestic and international levels imposes limitations upon actors. It is where the desire of the subject is formed and the real is perceived through the subject’s desire. Yet both the subject and the symbolic order face the lack as the subject cannot actualize its desire and the symbolic order cannot provide the subject with fantasy. When the state as an international agent faces the limitations of the international structure, its foreign policy may change but again within the limits of mythical thought.  Consequently, a mythical state, on the basis of a predestined mission and a sanctified past becomes an exceptional state assuming that whatever it imagines can be achieved in one form or another. These elements together form an identity that makes unrealistic policy choices possible.

The development challenges of Iran in the years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution are related to two fundamental issues: First, Iran is trying to gain an advantageous economic, political and strategic position in the region far more than its allocated share in the international division of labor. Such an approach challenges the balance of power in the global economic order and the western-dominated world. Second, Iran has decided to follow a political path in opposition to the structure, institutions and norms of the international system because it considers the current system to be unjust and untenable. Historical experience has shown that the global capitalist system has worked against the actors which have attempted to oppose and undermine its foundations. Therefore, the main obstacle to Iran's development in the post-revolution era has been the non-compromising orientation of Iran's foreign policy. The behavioral pattern of Iran (as an agent)’s interactions with the structure of the international system has worked against its development plans. The main purpose of this article is to answer two questions: 1. How has Iran interacted with the international system since 1979? 2. What are the consequences of the confrontational agent-structure interaction which have characterized Iran’s foreign relations during 1979-2021 time period? 3. To what extent has this type of interaction with the international system affected Iran’s development? In the research hypothesis, the authors assert that confrontational agent-structure interaction between Iran and the international system has adversely affected Iran’s development. Using Baskar’s theory of critical realism, the nature of Iran’s domestic system (e.g., the nature of its political elites and their worldviews, type of political system, and foreign policy orientation) as well as Iran’s interactions with the components of the international system (i.e., structure, institutions and norms) are discussed. Then, the implications of such interactions are analyzed by the use of a qualitative content analysis of documents and texts of speeches and comments made by key Iranian decisionmakers. The results indicate the negative impact of the ideological inconsistency and contradiction between Iran’s domestic agents and their interaction with the structure, institution and normative dimensions of the international system; and this has in turn led to the slow-down of the country’s development.

Since all currents of thought in different generations of revolutionary theory are only able to recognize and interpret the dimensions of those revolutions that they have sought to recognize, it does not seem reasonable to use them to theoretically justify future revolutions. Accordingly, the main structure of revolutionary theories during previous four theoretical generations is based on a set of predetermined factors and components as factors promoting the revolution, which are necessary in all revolutions, especially revolutions that occur after their presentation. Given these explanations and the title of the present article, the question can be asked, can all the dimensions of the Arab revolutions be theoretically justified and explained by the views of the four generations of the theory of revolution? The results of the studies show that in at least three areas, namely the process connection of domestic and international levels in a specific historical framework, the neutral role of the army in turning unrest into revolution and ultimately the victory of revolutions in the absence of leadership with the factors mentioned in previous theories have deep differences.  In this work, the author intends to investigate the mentioned differences based on the method of matching the factors influencing the occurrence of Arab unrest in the three mentioned areas with the factors mentioned in the four theories of the revolution.

This paper intends to study the role of Ayatollah Sistani, source of religious imitation, in political developments in post-Saddam Iraq, as an influential and active agent, as well as the quality of his interaction with the political and social structure in Iraq, particularly the codification procedure of Iraq's Constitution, through agent-structure analytical framework. The fall of the Baath regime by the U.S. and its allies in 2003 gave an opportunity to the Shia Iraqi Muslims to take control of the affairs in Iraq, thanks to their majority and their deprivation from the political scene in the reign of the Baath Party. This also boosted the power of sources of religious imitation such as Ayatollah Sistani. On this basis, we are after finding an appropriate answer to this question: How far did Ayatollah Sistani's views affect the procedure for codification of Iraq's Constitution? In response to the question, this paper hypothesizes that political views and jurisprudential stance by Ayatollah Sistani played a key role in codification of modern Iraq's Constitution. The bulk of the paper is therefore, on studying the role and quality of such influence.