جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « کانت » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In Islamic tradition, man is defined as an intermediary and liminal being, situated between the animal and the angel, with the constant potential for ascent or descent to either of these ontological spheres. This paper endeavors to provide a philosophical interpretation of this intermediary and liminal position of man based on the concept of the imaginative faculty in the philosophies of Al-Farabi and Kant. The central question of this essay is to examine how, in the works of these two philosophers, epistemology serves as a platform for offering an ontological interpretation of man's liminal position. This paper represents an initial exploration of this topic. Given the prominence of the imaginative faculty in Kant's philosophy, particularly in his discussion of transcendental deduction, this paper will begin by tracing the trajectory of transcendental deduction, highlighting the role of the imaginative faculty and its two levels of productive and reproductive imagination. It will then proceed to examine these two levels of imagination (productive and reproductive) in Al-Farabi's thought, without resorting to simplistic comparisons or equating the two philosophers' perspectives. Employing an analytical approach, the paper will seek to establish an anthropological foundation for the imaginative faculty in the philosophies of both thinkers. The intermediary role of imagination in the realization of knowledge in the works of these two philosophers provides the basis for such an endeavor.

Kant considers pure aesthetic judgment to be disinterested and in the minute of quality and interest is a pleasure (delight) that results from the representation of the existence. In a footnote (§3), Kant declares that beauty is neither based on an interest nor establishes an interest. In explaining the concept of interest, Kant acts negatively and only by distinguishing between the agreeable and the good, depicting the disinterestedness of an aesthetic experience. In the first critique, Kant does not consider existence to be a real predicate; therefore, it is necessary to refer to his other works to find the clear and correct meaning of interest. By referring to moral works, we realize that interest is a kind of inclination towards something based on a rational rule. In this article, an attempt has been made to provide a clear concept of interest by considering the whole of Kant's aesthetic thought, to deal with the connection of interest with existence, and to answer the question of how interest is connected with the representation of existence.

One of the issues that has always been the subject of controversy between Islamic and Western theologians and philosophers is the issue of the relationship between faith and action. In all religions, their followers are asked to adhere to religion in addition to faith in action. Meanwhile, in his works, Kant considers human reason capable of drawing a comprehensive plan for his happiness and believes in a moral ritual itself. Relying on the power of reason to recognize principles and generalities, Motahari believes that human reason is not capable of drawing such a comprehensive road map and has criticized Kant's views on this matter. This article tries to express the damage caused to Kant's foundations regarding faith and religious practice. Among the harms that can be considered from the perspective of Kant to this idea are: reducing religious concepts to rational perceptions, not paying attention to the difference between Actual good and good actor, humanizing divine laws, wandering, being caught in the contradiction of idea and action, neglecting The root and origin of religious and moral actions, lack of separation between purpose and means and lack of separation between types of relationships.

Durkheim has considered crime as a "social reality". In Durkheim's thought, crime is a matter arising from the collective conscience changing with the passage of time and space with a special mechanism. Therefore, in his view, changing the realm of criminal behavior is a "normal" issue, and not their inherent characteristic. Simultaneously, in this approach, crime is an independent entity beyond the individual wills in case of members of the society that finds meaning under "social categories". This view guarantees the determination and stability of social reality that however, has some characteristics in terms of moral content and investigation method deeply rooted in Kant in the approach of Durkheim. Therefore, the lack of attention toward such foundations has provided the case for misinterpretations of sociologist's ideas, accordingly, incorrect analysis of his opinions,has necessitated a reconsideration in this regard. This research, in order to investigate Durkheim's special perception, as a neo-Kantian sociologist regarding social realities, especially crime, with the analytical method, is presenting the most relevant manifestations of Kant's thought in Durkheim's and the way of evolution and manifestation of his thought in Durkheim's views has been investigated. The outcome indicated that Durkheim, inspired by Kant's, tried to propose a new model for the study of ethics in modern societies by applying some reforms. Contrary to Kant, Durkheim never considers issues to be part of the structure of human nature as fixed and unchanging, but considered in the form and structure of people's thoughts arising from the content by the spirit of society. Considering the issues as social in Durkheim's thought, on the one hand, guarantees the stability of morality and the preservation of its totality, on the other hand, justifies the moral differences of societies throughout history and in all over the world. Therefore, in Durkheim's view, morality emerges from the collective conscience of society, which really exists, but may undergo alterations in the collective conscience. The condition of morality in Kant's thought, which was the existence of the absolute ideas of God and the immortality of the soul, was reduced to more abstract matters such as the collective will in Durkheim's regards, as the rule of recognition of the state. According to Durkheim, by identifying the social and moral realities, the state presents a single narrative of acceptable behaviors and considers them contrary to the cases as crimes. Philosophically speaking, this approach is encountered with the challenge not providing a criterion for judging the behavior of citizens and considering them as crimes. Consequent theories of criminology, on one side, doubt the function of the state in identifying collective realities due to the existence of different moral and behavioral attitudes in society, on the other side accept Durkheim's social reality approach as a basis for marginalizing different tendencies as criminals which are contrary to the social reality determined by the state.

This study aimed to clarify the aspects of human epistemology and its educational implications within Immanuel Kant's philosophical framework. The researchers utilized descriptive qualitative content analysis, specifically employing MAYRING's inductive model to collect information. After analyzing the data, the obtained findings revealed that regarding human epistemology and its educational implications, Kant emphasizes the role of consciousness, senses, experience, and reason as sources of knowledge. The research highlights the recognition of human beings' capacity for change, aiming to improve individuals within the process of societal transformation. It underscores the role of experience as a source of knowledge and the contribution of successive generations' experiences in human upbringing, gradual habit formation instead of abrupt elimination, the elimination of rewards and punishments in education, skepticism towards them, equality and sameness of human freedom and nature, resistance against elitism and human exploitation, and the non-influence of values in education. It emphasizes the responsibility of individuals in their educational journey. Kant's perspective on the philosophy of education is based on fulfilling one's duty, which essentially stems from the practical reason and pure conscience of every human being. Regarding education, Kant believes in the elevated position of education and the potential and educability of human beings. It is important to note that Kant's perspective on human beings is humanistic and non-religious. He does not consider humans as inherently valuable or religious beings. Therefore, his educational orientation cannot be interpreted solely through ethical approaches.

According to Kant, Synthesis is temporally structured. However, the "transcendental I" which serves as the foundation for temporal Synthesis, is out of time. In the analogies of experience, the "transcendental I" does not put into any moods of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This may seem contradictory, as it raises the question of how the timeless "transcendental I" can form the basis of a synthetic judgment while also being out of time. This article aims to show that, based on the discussion on synthesis and the analogies of experience, the timelessness of the transcendental self does not entail a disconnection from time. Because the disconnection with time will render the transcendence of the self meaningless in Kant's philosophy. Although the "transcendental I" is not "in" time, it is always "with" time. Being "with" time means that the subject, as pure spontaneity, constitutes objectivity through time. This is because the existence of phenomena and their objective knowledge is only possible through objectivity as a determination in time. By giving time to itself a priori, the transcendental self affects itself and thus guarantees its transcendence through its finitude which is the constant companionship to time.IntroductionKant's philosophy posits that every synthesis, such as apprehension, reproduction, or recognition, is temporally structured. However, the unity of these combinations requires the existence of the transcendental self as their a priori ground for knowledge. According to Kant, the transcendental self, as the ground of the temporality of combinations, exists outside of time. In the analogies of experience, Kant goes beyond this and claims that the transcendental self is even outside of any of the modes of time (persistence, succession, and simultaneity). This raises a problem: if the transcendental I is outside of time, then its transcendence would be meaningless in Kant's philosophy. We will show that the synthetic unity of knowledge occurs in all its stages in connection with time. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge depends on the relationship between time and the transcendental self. This article has tried to show with the phenomenological approach and by examining the discussion of synthesis and analogies of experience that the temporality of the transcendental self does not mean its "being in time" but rather, it means the constant companionship of the transcendental self and time itself.The relationship between time and SynthesisAccording to Kant, multiplicity needs synthesis to be known. The multiplicity of time cannot be understood unless the unity of time is assumed beforehand. The unity of time is the formal and a priori condition of the intuition of all phenomena. The synthesis of apprehension is related to the present. The synthesis of reproduction that is related to the past is the synthesis of the current moments with the previous moments. This is the responsibility of the transcendental imagination. The synthesis of recognition is related to the future because the a priori identity of the two moments will be the end based on which the imagination can order the multiplicity of intuitions (moments).The combination of recognition or the identification of understanding itself requires a fundamental identity that unites all three combinations. This second identity is called “Transcendental Apperception” which according to Kant is outside of time. How can the timeless transcendental self be the ground of the temporal combination? If the transcendental self is outside of time, it is no longer transcendental, and if it is in time, like other phenomena, it becomes an object of knowledge. How can this conflict be resolved in Kant? The answer to this question can be found in the section on analogies of experience.Analogies of experience: relation of time with the transcendentalself-consciousnessIn the analogies of experience, In analogies of experience, Kant talks about the moods of time. The moods of time are persistence, succession, and simultaneity. Even in analogies of experience, although Kant proposes these three modes of time, the above conflict is not resolved. Therefore, not only is the transcendental self not placed in any of the divisions of time, but also according to the analogies of experience, it is not placed in any moods of time.The conflict is resolved only when we note that all three analogies are related to the categories of relation. In addition to being related to the categories of relation, analogies reveal the meaning of "relation"; The "relation" between the subject and the predicate of the sentence and the relationship between the subject and the object in general. The pure unity of time - which is assumed by the transcendental subject - is the necessity that makes possible not only the knowledge of objects but also the realization of objectivity. Therefore, transcendental self-consciousness, as the necessary condition for knowing objects, must always consider its connection with the pure unity of time. If these rules - the analogies of experience - do not exist as transcendental time- determinations, the unity of nature and the temporality of phenomena will be lost. As a result, experience in the sense of a priori synthesis of phenomena also becomes meaningless.Therefore, even though nothing has been directly said about the relationship between time and transcendental self-consciousness in analogies, there is a fundamental connection between transcendental self-consciousness and time. The objectivity of synthetic judgments depends on time; Although, time is neither something outside the transcendental subject nor inside the subject. Rather, time is the way by which the subject affects itself. According to Heidegger, time is the continuous self-affecting of the subject.ConclusionAccording to what has been said, in the discussion of the analogies, it becomes clear how the transcendental subject, though it is not "in" time, makes it possible to be "in" time, And this is the same constant companionship of the transcendental self with time itself. Time and transcendental self are two sides of a pure combination. The transcendental self makes possible one side of knowledge - that is, subjectivity - and time - the other side - that is, objectivity. Neither time nor the transcendent self is "in" time. At the same time, both of them are a priori to all of the intra-temporal objects.Moreover, the transcendent self is not "in" time but "with" time. And in being with time, The transcendent self can make all the moods of time possible. This companionship means the persistence of the relationship.Finally, only being "with" time can justify the paradox of receptivity of self in intuition and spontaneity of understanding. The transcendental self as pure spontaneity accompanied with time can pose the receptive self in front of itself as objectivity and it guarantees the transcendence of the subject.

Kant's theory of hope focuses on the hope of the perfect good of man, which includes both his virtue and his happiness. According to Kant, individuals have a duty to strive for virtue and happiness, and they must achieve the highest good, in accordance with the morality and justice that lies within it. But is there any hope for highest good? In a theological approach, Kant promises that the human being will achieve highest good in another world with God's help. And in a secular approach he expresses the hope that mankind is moving towards highest good and will eventually achieve it in its gradual movement throughout history. The article claims that the secular approach was not proposed to compensate for the incompleteness of the theological approach - which some have stated - but rather it is in harmony with the theological approach and in accordance with Kant's philosophical system. However, it is criticized that in the secular approach, the human person has been neglected in favor of the human species. This critique can be described as the Gap of Justice.

Generally speaking, Kant’s academic life is divided into two pre-critical and post-critical periods. Some researchers have explored the historical development and evolution of his philosophical thoughts and divided the critical period into two parts as well. An explanation of Kant’s view of the problem of evil, given the difference in the subtle view that is witnessed in his works published in the early and late critical period, portrays the process of the formation of his philosophical structure in this regard. Related studies in this field reveal his gradual distance from the theoretical knowledge of God and, thus, his theological response to the problem of evil, which reached its culmination towards the end of the critical period. The principle of “freedom”, which is one of the postulates of ethics in Kant’s critical thoughts, is the axis of the justification of moral evil in his works, particularly during the later critical period. Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study investigates Kant’s view of the problem of evil during two critical periods. In the early critical period, he confirmed the theory of the “best possible world”, while equating the concept of “perfection” with the concept of “reality” therein. However, in the late critical period, he moves away from the common definition of “evil and good” and presents a new response to the dilemma of evil through denying the legitimacy of philosophical theodicies. During the critical period, Kant viewed evil as an essential feature of Man and denied the traditional and Stoic interpretation of the temporal and rational origins of evil in human nature.

The present article attempts to explore two principles out of four literary and poetic principles with the centrality of Kant's conceptual turn concerning the concept of time that Deleuze opted for treating Kant's philosophy. In order to reformulate the Critique of Pure Reason, Deleuze exploits two literary principles. The first one is taken from Hamlet according to which time is out of control, the second one is taken from Arthur Rambo as he said, I is another. For appreciating such complicated statements and explaining Deleuze's particular reading of Critique of Pure Reason, the author proceeds to explore Deleuze's writings and seminars on Kant in order to show that the presupposition of having a good command over Deleuze's philosophy is to study his confrontation with Kant's philosophy. For achieving such an end, the author accompanies Deleuze's treatment of Kant's philosophy step by step in order to shed some light on the concept of time in his reading of The Critique of Pure Reason from various perspectives so to apprehend the two poetic principles concerning the time.

Kant argues that an action is morally worthy only if it is done not from inclination or self-interest but from duty. In the Groundwork, he provides examples to illustrate that the presence of motives aligned with duty undermines the moral value of an action. These viewpoints have sparked significant controversy, particularly in light of the resurgence of virtue-ethics in recent years. Notably, the work of two famous Kantian philosophers, Richard Hanson and Barbara Herman, are especially remarkable as they provide an enlightening interpretation of Kant's perspective and address the raised concerns. While Hanson outlines two innovative models for the conditions of action, he also identifies the relevant phenomenon of overdetermination and states that an action has moral worth when the motive of duty is sufficient by itself to generate the action. Furthermore, Herman complements these models by introducing a third one and arguing that an action maintains its moral value if it necessitates both duty and if its primary motive is the motive of duty, regardless of whether it reflects the agent's desires or not. In this paper, we assess the strength and effectiveness of these models by examining Kant's examples. Consequently, despite shedding light on Kant's intentions, these accounts do not significantly contribute to resolving the existing ambiguities. Critics can express concerns regarding the simplification of the overdetermination, the fallacy of circular and tautology. A thorough examination of Kant's philosophy reveals that fulfilling one's duty and disregarding other motivations are essential for the development of an individual's moral character.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is one of the philosophers of the modern era, who expressed his dissatisfaction with the school of rationalism and the school of empiricism and started to present an epistemological system in which the possibility of knowledge is displayed. The importance of Kant in the history of Western philosophy could not ignored by anyone, and with his appearance, Western philosophy is at a turning point, so that in examining the opinions of philosophers, we can talk about the term philosophers before Kant and after Kant. Kant spent all his efforts to measure reason in the scale of critical method and define the boundaries of human knowledge. As a philosopher of the modern age, Kant inherited an epistemological tradition that, on the one hand, Cartesian rationalism introduced reason as the source of knowledge, and on the other hand, John Locke and Hume introduced experience as the source of knowledge. The common point of this tradition was the emphasis on the possibility of acquiring knowledge. But in his epistemological system, Kant acted in such a way that the contribution of reason and experience was considered in the acquisition of knowledge. The common point of the mentioned philosophers is the possibility of acquiring knowledge objectively. Kant is a philosopher who seeks to show the possibility of knowledge in the framework of the intellectual principles of the modern age. His epistemological concern, like other epistemologists of the modern age, which is similar to the intellectual principles of the predecessors, especially Plato and Aristotle, is to achieve the truth. Emphasizing on the truth in an epistemological project on the one hand and adopting the theory of correspondence in the traditional interpretation about the nature of truth on the other hand can be a significant challenge for any epistemological theory that leads to a result outside this framework, and this point is a challenge that should not be neglected in judging and evaluating Kant's epistemological project.

The research method to examine and answer the main research problem is descriptive and analytical, and the authors use a critical approach to answer. To deal this task, the research is based on Kant`s works in particular is based on the Critique of Pure Reason.

Based on the presented discussions and insisting on some important components of Kant's epistemic system, the findings of the research are revealed. The findings of the research show that the epistemological concern that emphasizes truth and seeking the possibility of acquiring knowledge on the basis of the correspondence theory, cannot present an epistemological theory based on which the human intellect cannot access the truth per se.

Kant's epistemological theory is actually a point of view that is in the middle of the point of view of Descartes and John Locke. Because he accepts this part of Descartes' view regarding the intrinsic value of some concepts and John Locke's and Hume's view regarding the empirical nature of all concepts. (Kant, 1997, p. 33) One of the important aspects that is one of the components of Kant's epistemic system and by relying on it, one can infer cognitive deadlock from it in such a way that despite Kant's effort to display the possibility of knowledge, he suffers some kind of epistemic deadlock is the reflection on his theory of mind and its function.The meaning of Kant's Copernican revolution lies in the fact that until Kant's time it was the object that imposed itself on the mind, but in Kant's epistemic system it is the mind that imposes its structure on the object. (Kant, 1881, 374) It iswith this revolution that Kant searches for the laws governing things not outside but in man himself.to him, in metaphysics, the relationship between object and the mind is not according to the opinion of the ancients. According to the old method, the mind reflected the object like a mirror, but Kant changed this perception. (ibid., p. 375) One of the main axes based on which a kind of cognitive blockage can be deduced from Kant's epistemic system is this component in his epistemological theory. If the mind has the ability to impose itself structurally on the object, then how can one claim knowledge. Especially since Kant considers the result of understanding in his epistemic system to be the achievement of the world of phenomena, and considers the world of noumenon to be beyond the reach of understanding.The noteworthy point is that, although Kant tried his best to solve the main epistemological challenge and show knowledge as possible, his theory itself fuels epistemological problems and suffers a kind of epistemological deadlock. Because human reason is suffering regarding what is going on outside the mind, and this is Kant's epistemic impasse.As a result, Kant's epistemological theory unwittingly leads to a cognitive impasse that he tried to get rid of. Because the central separation in his epistemological system (phenomenon and phenomenon) and the lack of access of reason to the world of truth per se and the impact and influences of understanding on sensory data cannot have any other result than this.

The present article attempts to carry out a critical examination of Deleuze's perspective on time, which he presents in the form of three syntheses of time. Deleuze proposes each of these times as syntheses with the inspiration of a specific philosopher, but his overview concerns Kant's notion and definition of time. Furthermore, Hume is also the subject of Deleuze's reference in the first synthesis, which is called the passive synthesis of habit. The second synthesis, which is the active synthesis of memory pertains to Deleuze's reference to Bergson. Kant's definition of time as a pure and empty form, the concept of cut and caesura, and Nietzsche's eternal return are used to propose the third synthesis. Our purpose is to present and articulate the distinctive features and attributes of each of these three syntheses, their interrelationship, and a critical assessment of the mechanism proposed by Deleuze. As far as the authors of the article are aware, so far there is no independent research on Deleuze's syntheses of time in Persian. In addition to the works used in this article, at a global level, we can mention the works of (Roudinesco, 2008), (Hodges, 2008), (Lundy, 2017), and (Roberts, 2006). 

In order to carry out this research work, we will use Deleuze's works, specifically difference and repetition, in order to explain his ideas clearly. Therefore, we have attempted to critique and evaluate his views by utilizing descriptive-analytic methods, relying on commentators' views, and utilizing authentic sources and documents. 

The three syntheses of time are actually Deleuze's answer to the Kantian concept of time, according to which time is the condition of all internal perceptions. This means that the relationship between the subject and time is "always" conscious. Deleuze believes that the conscious active synthesis is based on a passive and unconscious synthesis. He calls this synthesis the passive synthesis of habit. Hume explains that our imagination is characterized by the expectation of two phenomena or sequences that always appear together in our experience. This definition describes imagination as a contractile power. Deleuze states that this is not a form of memory, an act of memory, or an act of understanding. Therefore, this process indicates a time synthesis. Time is created only in the primary synthesis that operates on the repetition of instants. The living present is created through the integration of independent and consecutive instants in this synthesis. According to Deleuze, the synthesis is constructive but not active. Deleuze takes the view that the second synthesis, the active synthesis of memory, is based on the passive synthesis of habit. He emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between the foundation and the ground. Therefore, habit is the foundation of time, and memory is the ground of time. Habit is the primary synthesis of time that constitutes the life of the passing present. Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time that creates the existence of the past, which in turn causes the passing of the present time.  Deleuze's account of the third synthesis of time encompasses a range of ideas from philosophy, Greek drama, and mathematics. In the third synthesis, Kant has a revolutionary role, because he considered time as a linear concept, also expressing the gap and fracture that are happened in I through the form of time as a form of auto-affection. Deleuze also refers to Oedipus' interpretation of Hölderlin, in order to clarify the effect that the pure and empty condition of time has on the subject. Hölderlin's concept of caesura is used by him to define the past and future, which are inconsistent and asymmetrical. The concept of caesura finds its mathematical expression in the concept of cut, which was developed by Dedekind, in line with the construction of a merely ideal and static concept of continuity. Deleuze proposes three rules whereby the three major innovations that Kant creates in the notion of time are classified. The first rule is Hamlet's rule that "The time is out of joint". The second rule basically says: “Until today, we considered ourselves obliged to represent the space. Today, it is time to think about time.” The third rule is also from the French poet Rimbaud who says: “I is an Other”. The dissolved "self", God's death, and Nietzsche's eternal return create a concept of time that Deleuze expresses in the synthesis of the future. 

It is important to note that Deleuze takes many different concepts from philosophers, poets, and other thinkers and combines them into an amazing concoction. If Deleuze allows such a thing, then the question will arise that, basically, Can we separate a concept and even a poem from its original context without changing its meaning? We also have to take into account the fact that the type of combination of concepts is not clear. In other words, it is unclear if what Deleuze is talking about is metaphysical, real, or something like a chemical compound. Deleuze insists that these concepts must maintain their differences from each other. If that's the situation, then one must question how, despite their differences, they can come together in the ultimate process.As a result, Deleuze deserves praise for his initiative in establishing or discovering the passive synthesis of time. This was not present in Kant. It should not be forgotten that the use of these different concepts of Deleuze is entirely dependent on a specific interpretation and reading. Changes in the meaning of one of these adapted concepts can lead to serious difficulties for Deleuze's explanation.

This paper analyzes and criticizes Swanson’s position on the relationship betweenthe predictive processing paradigm (hereafter called PP) and Kant’s philosophy. According to Swanson, this paradigm is rooted in the works of Immanuel Kant. He explains and demonstrates this connection in cases such as (1) top-down analysis, (2) the mind and causal structures of the world, (3) reversal and the Copernican revolution, (4) hyperpriorities and forms of intuition, (5) generative models and schemata, and (6) analysis by synthesis. In evaluating his point of view, we demonstrate that his claim encounters difficulties in at least two general instances: first, his reading of PP is completely selective, and he does not consider the significant differences between different readings. Second, his reading of Kant is naturalized and experimental. Such a reading disregards and wipes out the most basic concepts of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, that is, the self or self-conscious subject. Besides, Kant’s approach to the mind is metaphysical, while PP’s approach to the brain is completely empirical. Hence, if there is a fundamental conflict between the PP paradigm and Kant’s transcendental philosophy, then the assertion of compatibility between them faces serious difficulties.

This article aims to review and critique Kant's philosophy of mind, its impact on contemporary philosophy of mind, also its impact and relation to functionalism. Kant's influence on philosophy is based on the answers and methods he uses to explain the mechanism of human knowledge. The Copernican revolution of Kant refers to the change in epistemological direction of the object to the subject, for the correct understanding of the object. This approach has had important effects on contemporary philosophy of mind. Now our goal is to explore some of these effects.

Our study method in this article is evaluate these effects in the field of contemporary philosophy of mind and especially, contemporary functionalism.

Kant attempts to explain the mechanism of human cognition by considering the mind as a structured thing that has some cognitive faculties, including the faculties of sense, understanding, and reason. In brief, the effects of such a mechanism in the contemporary philosophy of mind can be expressed in the following cases: (1) The need for a necessary structure of thought and experience. (2) The relationship between certain forms of consciousness and self-consciousness; and (3) excluding the Cartesian self. (4)The separation between sense and understanding is considered as the rise of the subjective matter from a physical foundation, and it indicates the hard problem of consciousness, that is, experience or phenomenal consciousness.

It is not possible to see the influence of Kant's philosophy of mind on the contemporary philosophy of mind as answers or even solutions, but as a way of thinking about problems. Kant's solutions have two characteristics, disregarding them will lead to a misunderstanding of his philosophy. First, Kant has expressed his philosophy of mind in a transcendental form. Taking him out of his vital form certainly leaves some of the most significant aspects of his philosophy behind. Secondly, his approaches are presented in a historical context. For instance, we should consider Kant's statement on the structures of the mind to be a metaphysical mechanism, and his perspective on causation is basically meaningful in a historical context. Admittedly, many of the problems raised in contemporary philosophy were discussed in Kant's philosophy, but the progress and transformation that occurs in these concepts cannot be attributed to Kant. The functionalist interpretation of Kant is possible, but it is in conflict with the most crucial teachings of Kant, which are architecture and the transcendental method. Such a reading excludes many aspects of an individual's mental life, and is based on a purely formal similarity.

Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, one of the prominent thinkers in the field of Islamic Philosophy, and Immanuel Kant, one of the great thinkers of Western philosophy, have presented some innovative theories in the realm of philosophy. The “theory of fiṭrah” is one of the most significant theories in Muṭahharī’s philosophical system. He maintains that Man possesses three levels of nature, instinct, and fiṭrah (primordial nature) and also divides fiṭrah itself into two parts: “fiṭrah of knowledge” and “fiṭrah of interest”. Most of Muṭahharī’s innovative ideas, particularly when explaining some topics “such as God, eternity of the soul, and ethics, have been presented in his discussions related to fiṭrah of interest.” On the other hand, as a distinguished and influential philosopher, Kant has criticized metaphysical issues, particularly problems in connection to God, immortality of the soul, and freedom, and transferred them to the realm of “practical reason” from theoretical reason. Muṭahharī’s theory of fiṭrah and, particularly, the discussion of fiṭrī interests and the related issues, such as demonstration of God, immortality of the soul, and ethics, are completely comparable to Kant’s theory of practical reason, specifically the discussion of the essential principles of practical reason, including freedom, eternity of the soul, and God. The purpose of this study is to compare Muṭahharī’s theory of fiṭrah and Kant’s theory of practical reason and to explain their common features, that is, the similarity of infinite perfection with supreme good, the similarity of their methods of demonstrating the eternity and God, and the similarity of their views as to status of philosophy of ethics. The author has followed a descriptive-analytic and comparative approach in order to conduct this study based on the data collected from these two thinkers’ works.

In Sino's interpretation of the proof of possibility and obligation, based on the immediacy of proving reality and the refusal of the community of contradictions, and based on the possible feature of external reality, doubt is removed from the existence of obligation. According to Leibniz's reading of this proof, Kant states that it only doubts the observer's theorems. The reality and possibility of them does not make it mandatory; Because the same doubt exists in the existence of the obligation. Also, according to the field of Kant's philosophy, since it is permissible to doubt all factual propositions, a definitive proposition cannot be used as a basis for obligatory proof, and since existence, necessity, possibility, and causality express the relationship of propositions; Therefore, talking about the external possibility and proving the existence of the obligatory in the context of the flow of causality is inappropriate. In this article, we are going to criticize these problems by using the descriptive analytical method and state that in Sino’s interpretation, first of all, the meaning of possibility is the non-existence of external reality, not the permission to doubt the facts. Secondly, the principle of proof of reality and the refusal of the community of contradictions have been placed as two realistic and certain propositions as the basis of the proof. Also, based on this interpretation, existence, obligation, and possibility can benefit from foreign examples in addition to the relationship found in cases. Therefore, the interpretation of these concepts according to the ratio existing in the cases regarding the spreading of the ruling is one of the examples of the concept of Sinew’s interpretation of this proof .

There could be various comparative studies between Kant and Kierkegaard on fields like human knowledge, ethics, faith, art, etc. This paper aims to compare the two philosopher’s epistemology through their writings. The main common ground of Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s epistemology is their belief in the idea of a “fissure” between theory and practice, which constitutes the core of their contemplations on human knowledge. This article shows that Kant’s theory of knowledge paved the way for Kierkegaard to describe his notions of the “fissure” between being and thought. Thus, it will be shown that Kant and Kierkegaard have been led to believe in the finitude of human beings in knowledge by this split. Then, it will be demonstrated that Kierkegaard, following Kant, distinguishes “being” from “essence” and “actuality” from “ideality”. Finally, we argue that Kant’s critique of the traditional proofs of God’s existence anticipates Kierkegaard’s conflict with natural theology and his idea that traditional demonstrations are useless for a believer.

Tusi wrote works in the name of Ismaili elders and in those books he praised the elders of this sect. There is also a serious possibility that during his presence in this sect, he wrote treatises confirming their religious beliefs. But tusi, a Muslim scholar, is considered to be one of the twelve Imami Shiites, and based on moral responsibility, he is obliged to protect the correctness of the beliefs of his fellow believers, and morally, he cannot approve and promote the beliefs of other sects. Based on our inference from the method of statistics and analysis and comparison of related data, in addition to his explicit statement in the rewritten preface of Akhlaq Naseri, it follows that freedom in choice and agency in action, which The main conditions of moral responsibility were not there during the time of Khwaja''s presence among this sect. Therefore, he cannot be held responsible for the possible consequences of writing those books in support of the beliefs of this sect.

In his theory of knowledge, Kant presents an exclusive method for obtaining science by applying categories to the data of sensory intuition. "A priori synthetic propositions" are those the only the product of the application of categories to the data of sensory intuition, Propositions that are Kant's exclusive criterion in diagnosing science. Kant claims that only the sciences that have a priori synthetic propositions, which necessarily have sensory intuition data are science, and propositions that do not have sensual intuition data are nothing more than fake science. With the same reasoning, he pushed metaphysics out of science. Accordingly, the attempt of this paper is to measure Kant's theory of knowledge with his own criterion of knowledge. We want to know whether it has a priori synthetic propositions or not. To be more precise, do the propositions through which Kant explained his theory of knowledge, contain sensory intuition data or not? If they have these data, they are science, otherwise, they are not. The investigations carried out in this article, which focuses on Kant's important and key propositions in transcendental aesthetic and Transcendental analytic, show that these propositions, which define and explain the basis of Kant's theory of knowledge, lack sensory intuition data and are not science. Eventually, Kant's "theory of knowledge" is not able to obtain the accreditation it wants and according to Kant's own theory of knowledge, it is not a valid science.