جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « unexpected earnings » در نشریات گروه « مالی »

Under uncertainty, investors do not have enough information about the firm's future cash flows and there is ambiguity about future state of the market. In this situation, according to Bayes' rule, when the market receives information signals (such as firms’ earnings announcements), it may reduce uncertainty and results in more investors' reaction to earnings announcement. The purpose of this study is investigating investors' reaction to unexpected earnings under market uncertainty.
For doing so, a sample of 162 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 1384 to 1394 have been selected. Two methods (the computational formula and GARCH method) were used for calculating market uncertainty.
The results of hypotheses test indicated when market uncertainty is high (compared to lower uncertainty), investors’ reaction to earnings announcement is more. Also, under high market uncertainty, investors display more reaction to bad news that this response is consistent with the conservatism approach.

The aim of this study is to investigate the role of corporate governance in the timely of reporting the restated financial information and the effect of corporate governance on the relation between restated financial information and abnormal returns. A sample of 160 list companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2012-2017 has been selected. The results show that there is a direct relationship between independence of the board of directors, Chief Executive Officers (CEO) change and auditor change with Timely of the restated financial information. Other results show that there is no relationship between duties duality of CEO and Timely of the restated financial information. The results show that after the date of restatement, Timely of the restated financial information is effect on abnormal returns and unexpected earnings is not important for this result. other results show that CEO change is influence on the relationship between abnormal returns and season information after date of restated financial information. Eventually the results show that in firms by Timely of the restated financial information that reports season information after date of restated, the change of CEO is not influence on the relationship between unexpected earnings and abnormal returns. This result can be accepted in the firms that do not reports restated financial information by timely.