A Logical Assessment of the Value of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Law and Ethics

This paper addresses the relation between Ethics, Laws, and universal declaration of human rights, from a logical point of view. There are two universal kinds of presented propositions; "descriptive propositions" and "prescriptive propositions". The principles of the universal declaration of human rights are not in the extent of descriptions, because they do not predicate any fact. Therefore, they should be prescriptive propositions. Ethics and Laws are the most famous prescriptive extents. Therefore, these principles should be in one of the extents. Ultimately, Laws are the compacts that are temporal and spatial, whereas the authors of the declaration of human rights do not seem to believe in such frameworks. Also, it is clear that any differences between the declaration of human rights and the national Laws will arrest the enforcement of the declaration. Therefore, these principles have to be ordered in the Ethical form. For example, the Kantian or Utilitarian Ethics can be the best basis for this declaration. It is clear that any criticism on the absolute ethical systems inevitably includes the declaration of human rights. Again, the declaration of human rights has a complex of principles that cannot be ethical because of their form. For example, ethical propositions stress on the relation between a human being and others, whereas the principles of the universal declaration of human rights focus on the relation between others and a human being. Therefore, the principles of the universal declaration of human rights cannot be a kind of descriptive propositions, nor ethical or legal propositions. Hence, they fall into a paradox that needs to be solved primarily. Clearly, this paradox discourages the universal declaration of human rights in present.