Green Taxes in Energy and Final Goods Sectors in Iran: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Author(s):
Abstract:
Environmental tax and subsidy are two key instruments used in many countries to prevent environmental degradation and to achieve sustainable development. Using game theoretic approach, this paper develops and calibrates a model to determine optimum indirect environmental tax for Iran. More specifically, in the first stage the government sets green taxes and subsides, and in the second stage, the final goods and energy producing firms take these rates and choose their inputs. This dynamic game is solved by backward induction. Prior to our calibration, the production functions for fossil energy, renewable energy - as an intermediate goods - and final goods are estimated. The model is calibrated by using the Iranian data for the period 2015. The results indicate that the optimum green tax rate on fossil energy producing firm and final goods firm are 18 and 9 percent, respectively. These results have important policy implications for policymakers and social planners in Iran.
Keywords:
Language:
Persian
Published:
Journal of Iranian Energy Economics, Volume:5 Issue: 17, 2016
Page:
1
magiran.com/p1666336
دانلود و مطالعه متن این مقاله با یکی از روشهای زیر امکان پذیر است:
اشتراک شخصی
با عضویت و پرداخت آنلاین حق اشتراک یکساله به مبلغ 1,390,000ريال میتوانید 70 عنوان مطلب دانلود کنید!
اشتراک سازمانی
به کتابخانه دانشگاه یا محل کار خود پیشنهاد کنید تا اشتراک سازمانی این پایگاه را برای دسترسی نامحدود همه کاربران به متن مطالب تهیه نمایند!
توجه!
- حق عضویت دریافتی صرف حمایت از نشریات عضو و نگهداری، تکمیل و توسعه مگیران میشود.
- پرداخت حق اشتراک و دانلود مقالات اجازه بازنشر آن در سایر رسانههای چاپی و دیجیتال را به کاربر نمیدهد.
In order to view content subscription is required
Personal subscription
Subscribe magiran.com for 70 € euros via PayPal and download 70 articles during a year.
Organization subscription
Please contact us to subscribe your university or library for unlimited access!