Intersubjective Consciousness and Attention to the Other in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

In modern philosophy, Hegel recognized the crisis which he believed arose from the finitude and particularity of the subjective approach to consciousness, and the skepticism and alienation of consciousness from reality as a result. Thus, one of the things that Hegel considered a fundamental issue for philosophy, especially in the Jena period of his thought, was the resolution of this crisis. By focusing on the chapter of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of the Spirit, this article examines and analyzes one of the most important aspects of Hegel's attempt to eliminate this crisis that emerged in the theory of mutual recognition and intersubjective approach to consciousness. This paper will show how adopting an individualistic view of consciousness and acknowledging the immediacy of transcendental consciousness as a condition for the possibility of consciousness always causes fundamental conflicts in cognition. I will also show that mediation provided by the supposed recognition of intersubjective interactions is needed to overcome these conflicts. Finally, the claim that subjectivity finds the possibility of universality in which the gap between consciousness and reality is disappeared, not in some kind of internal relationship with itself, but through its acceptance and recognition, is introduced as Hegel's important vision in phenomenology for resolving this crisis.