Analysis of Agency Theory in Explaining the Relationship Between Internal control weakness and CEO Recruitment

According to agency theory, CEO can inefficiently use the firms assets to promote their personal interests at the expense of shareholders, leading to agency costs such as weak internal controls, which the CEOs Recruitment can serve as a strategy for the board to improve controls. Internal and reduce firm representation problems. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the weakness of internal controls and the employment of CEOs in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange with respect to agency theory. To test the research hypothesis, the financial information of firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period between 2016 and 2020 has been used, so that after applying the restrictions in this study, the final sample consisting of 163 companies was selected. After measuring the research variables, multivariate linear logistic regression analysis was used to test the research hypothesis. Hypothesis testing was also performed using Eviews econometric software and statistical techniques of integrated data. The results of the statistical test of the research show that there is a positive and significant relationship between the internal controls weakness and the CEO Recruitment.