The UAE - Israel Relationship in the Light of the Abraham Agreement and its Impact on the Neighboring Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran

As two neighboring countries, Iran and the UAE have maintained relatively stable relations since the independence of the UAE in 1971. Except for the dispute over the triple Islands in the Persian Gulf and the UAE's pursuit of resolving this through international forums, there has been no significant tension in the relations between the two. The UAE's foreign policy has always been cautiously towards Iran and the country avoided a direct confrontation with its big northern neighbor. A new generation of UAE political leaders in 2011 began charting a more proactive approach to reshaping the Middle East security landscape in the country's favor, often focusing on countering the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni Islamist groups. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan of Abu Dhabi was and continues to be central to this approach. Although he holds no formal position in the UAE federal government, he has consolidated his role as Abu Dhabi’s, and indeed the UAE’s, de facto leader since his 2003 elevation as successor to the role of crown prince of Abu Dhabi. (Crisis Group, 2021) With the geopolitical changes in the Middle East, UAE leaders have seized the opportunity to influence on regional equations. In this regard, the UAE attempt to strengthen national security and enter into regional and extra-regional alliances and coalitions. For instance, it could be mentioned the active presence of the country in Yemen's war. Another important issue that should be noted is the endorsement of Abraham's contract with Israel which has led to the normalizing relations process between them. A significant issue that should be kept in mind is that with the signing of the agreement, Israeli has accessed to the security complex of the Persian Gulf, and this is considered a threat to Iran and its national interests. The purpose of this present research is to investigate the impact of the Abraham Agreement on the neighborly relations between Iran and the UAE. Using descriptive qualitative method and applying the two concepts of balance of power and strategic hedging, this study has analyzed the relations between theU AE and Israeli and also its consequences on the neighboring relations with Iran. The term “hedging” is widely used in the academic and policy literature. However, its casual usage has created conceptual confusion because its meanings is varying greatly. Most of the time, practitioners and policy researchers consider the term (hedging)parallel to “balancing,” remarking it to be an antonym of “engagement,” which recourses to an effort to create a cooperative relationship through political, military, economic, or social means. This “engagement-hedging” insight illustrates one’s political status: engagement emphasizes cooperation as a primary objective, whereas hedging is an insurance policy in the event engagement fails. (Koja,2018:636) Strategic hedging is a relative and incomprehensible concept that is innately difficult to quantify. Tessman and Wolfe have already noted to three primary resources that generate strategic hedging; economic capacity, military power and central government. (Salman& Geeraerts,2014: 3) The other concept is “balancing power”. Schweller offers the following definition of balancing centered on military capabilities “Balancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through either internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the state occupation and domination by a foreign power or coalition(Schweller,2016:4). The term balance of power adverts to the distribution of power capabilities of rival states or alliance. The balance of power theory holds that when one state or alliance mounts its power or applies it more aggressively; threatened states will increase their own power in response, often by forming a counter-balancing coalition.(legalserviceindia.com). Being aware of its geopolitical position and mentality that there is an objective threat against the country's national security from Iran, the UAE entered into an interaction with the IRI as part of a "hedging strategy" to deal with this threat. In fact, the country considered Iran to be its biggest regional threat, and there were sources of mistrust and tensions between the two sides, including over the triple islands, the nuclear issue, the ballistic missile program, and accusations against Iran of inciting the political sentiments of Shiites in the UAE.In line with its dual policy of strategic hedging and balancing, the UAE has taken many defense and military measures in the past years. The UAE has quietly established its own independent defense force. Over the decades, this country has provided a relatively small but sophisticated military possess such as air force, special forces and offensive and defensive weapons with advanced technology. (El-Dessouki & Rafik Mansour,2020) On August 13, 2020, Israel and the UAE announced the normalization of relations between the two sides and the establishment of a new relationship. Contrary to the normative historical view of the Arab world regarding Israel, the UAE considers the regime neither an enemy nor a threat to the stability of the region. According to the worldview of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the main threats to the UAE and its allies are the expansionist Iran and transnational political Islamists. In return, the UAE considers Israel a strong regional power, which has shared the view and it is willing to work alongside the UAE against regional enemies. Therefore, the official alliance with Israel has the strategic logics. (Rahman, 2021:2) Telaviv and Abu Dhabi consider Iran and Turkey as a threat to national security. These possible threats from Tehran and Ankara are reinforced by Washington's plan to reduce its military presence in the Middle East. The normalization agreement publicly and officially brings Israel and the UAE together, which will bring its own set of complex challenges and potential risks (Guzansky & Heistein, 2020). One of the important components of the Ibrahim agreement, although not specifically explained, is increased security cooperation against regional threats, especially from Iran and its proxies. It is important to mention that Israel and the UAE have had security relations since the past, but this agreement exposes them (COOK, 2020). As mentioned, one of the important articles of the Ibrahim contract is the security cooperation between the two sides that will probably create challenges for Iran in terms of security issues in the future. By having the support from USA, Israel enjoys a relative military superiority in the Middle East. However, drones, missiles and new cyber capabilities and other technologies may reduce this gap in the coming years. (Sachs & Huggard, 2020:12)In this research, we sought to find an answer to this question; what effect will the strengthening of relations between the UAE and Israeli have on the neighboring relations of this country with Iran? And the hypothesis that was raised in relation to the question was that the consolidation of the relations between the UAE and Israeli after the Ibrahim Agreement would cause the influence and indirect presence of Israeli in the vital security environment of Iran and as a result, changing in the balance of threats. It will intensify the skepticism of the neighborly relations of the parties. The findings of the research show that the security aspect of this cooperation is dangerous for Iran's national interests because it opens a foothold for Israel to the Persian Gulf region near the borders of Iran. Besides, the close intelligence and cyber cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Telaviv in the region could endanger the national security of Iran. Cyber-attacks on infrastructure, while being inexpensive, could be very dangerous.