نشریه متافیزیک
سال هفتم شماره 2 (پیاپی 20، پاییز و زمستان 1394)

What are to be discussed in this article include two main points: i) some kind of a fixed structure can be found in all the chronologies that have been proposed from the last quarter of 19th century onward; a structure that is called here “standard” chronology, and ii) in spite of the fact that the appearance of this structure owes too much to the stylistic evidences, these evidences themselves do not confirm anything in the structure but the place of the so-called late dialogues. The standard chronology of Plato’s dialogues is inclined to consider Meno and Republic as dialogues that have been composed after so-called Socratic dialogues and before Parmenides and Theaetetus. This chronology also insists that the latter two dialogues must be dated after so-called middle dialogues and before dialogues like Sophist, Timaeus, Philebus and Laws. This papper is to illuminate the fact that except the similarities between the late dialogues and their probable lateness, the place of other dialogues, more importantly among them the so-called middle period dialogues, Theaetetus and Parmenides, cannot be approved by stylistic evidences.

Every ethical theory is based on its ethical components. Tusi as an ethic theoretician has provided some systematic analyses of the ethical components such as felicity. Tusi has two approaches to felicity: (1) general approach that regards felicity in both humans & incorporeal beings (in interpretation of Isharat). (2) Special approach that study just human felicity. Studying the latter, Tusi believes that felicity is pleasure of manner of theosophical living (in Naserian ethics). Tusi’s analysis of felicity emphasizes on the components of perfection and pleasure; therefore, it is important to discover their relationship in order to have a comprehensive understanding of felicity. Tusi’s various moral models have linear relationship with one another, and from this perspective the pyramid of perfection degrees is drawn which begins with purifying the soul and in high degrees is ended to annihilation in Allah. Analyzing pleasure, this article firstly provides a comprehensive classification of pleasure definitions and then discusses Tusi’s triple analysis of pleasure. From Tusi’s point of view degrees of human perfection & grades of pleasure are coherent with degrees of felicity. Examining two definitions of felicity is going to clarify their distinction and their relationship.

In constructive empiricism Van Fraassen intends to defend the epistemological distinction between truth and empirical adequacy as well as between cognitive belief and pragmatic acceptance, based on epistemological distinction between observable entities and unobservable entities. Some of the critics not only disagree with these two epistemological distinctions, but also opposed to the mentioned basic epistemological distinction. Although van Fraassen himself with a linguistic evasiveness accepts the ambiguousness of the observable predicate of some entities such as molecule in order to sympathize with these critics, he considers some entities such as electron as definitely unobservable without providing any clear criteria and insists on the mentioned basic distinction. The present paper intends to argue that one can defend the basic epistemological distinction based on the epistemological limit of perception (vision) and the criteria of presence or absence of the observable refrence to the naked eye. Consequently, in order to reject the epistemological distinction between truth and empirical adequacy as well as between cognitive belief and pragmatic acceptance, Van Fraassen’s critics should appeal to some argument other than denying the epistemological distinction between observable entities and unobservable entities.

At first glance it seems that Kant distinguishes beauty from morality because while analyzing the matter of beauty according to quality, he explicitly separates pleasure of beauty from pleasure of agreeable and pleasure of good; and believes that the pleasure of the beauty is neither to satisfy our physical desires nor to achieve a moral purpose. On the other hand, Kant speaks of a connection between beauty and morality in some sections of his critique of judgment. This essay intends to study the mentioned sections and clarifies how one can distinguish beauty from morality and simultaneously believes in the connection between beauty and morality. Following this, we are going to discuss why Kant deems such a connection necessary. Examining this matter, we will find out that morality and aesthetics can be indirectly related to each other. Kant's most major concern with regard to the connection between beauty and morality is the connection between feelings and foredoom.

Daoist aesthetics is based on the creative power of Dao which has a pre-ontological origin. The original context of creativity which arises from Dao, forms the foundation of art in Daoist thought. In Daoist thought, giving meaning in art and language is only realized through the perception of Dao and unification with it. In his later works, Heidegger pays a great attention to Aesthetic issues in his analysis of language, thought and poetry and emphasizes on the internal mutual dependency of thought and poetry. Furthermore, Heidegger recognizes Dao as a poetic thought and argues that when a poetic thought occurs, Being and Thought would become one and the same. In Daoist thought, the identity of thought and poetry, is an aesthetic non-distinction that is called 'Huan Chen' in Daoist literature. Poetic self- consciousness would not be realized until the poet gets perfectly unified with the concrete reality of things; and this is the same poetic thought with a pre-ontological experience Heidegger had achieved. This essay intends to answer the question how and to what extent the Heideggerian aesthetic thought is near to Daoist Aesthetics; perhaps exploring this question can contribute to understanding Heideggarian aesthetic view in his later works and probably it would provide the possibility of dialogue for a better understanding of East and West thoughts.

“Nihilism” is one of the basic keywords in Nietzsche’s thinking, and because of its strong connection with his other teachings, it is considered to be a principle subject in his philosophizing. In fact, nihilism is Nietzsche’s criterion to evaluate whatever is relevant to the fate of human and human society. On one hand, he accused the most fundamental organized systems of thought and belief in religion, philosophy, and science of a kind of nihilism (passive) which in his view is somehow despicable and rejected; and therefore deserves to be destroyed. On the other hand, he, asking for the help of a Savior called “Super human”, invites us to another kind of nihilism in order to replace what has been destroyed. This paper intends to presents Nietzsche’s argues in his critique of these systems and also to provide a detailed description of the types of his nihilism.